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ABSTR ACT
Successful realization of practical computer security improvements requires an understanding
and insight into the system’s security architecture, combined with a consideration of end-users’
needs as well as the system’s design tenets. In the case of Android, a system with an open,
modular architecture that emphasizes usability and performance, acquiring this knowledge and
insight can be particularly challenging for several reasons. In spite of Android’s open source
philosophy, the system is extremely large and complex, documentation and reference materials
are scarce, and the code base is rapidly evolving with new features and fixes. To make matters
worse, the vast majority of Android devices in use do not run the open source code, but rather
proprietary versions that have been heavily customized by vendors for product dierentiation.
Proposing security improvements or making customizations without suicient insight into the
system typically leads to less-practical, less-eicient, or even vulnerable results. Point solutions to
specific problems risk leaving other similar problems in the distributed security architecture
unsolved. Far-reaching general-purpose approaches may further complicate an already complex
system, and force end-users to endure significant performance and usability degradations
regardless of their specific security and privacy needs. In the case of vendor customization,
uninformed changes can introduce access control inconsistencies and new vulnerabilities. Hence,
the lack of methodologies and resources available for gaining insight about Android security is
hindering the development of practical security solutions, sound vendor customizations, and
end-user awareness of the proprietary devices they are using.
Addressing this deficiency is the subject of this dissertation. New approaches for analyzing,
evaluating and understanding Android access controls are introduced and used to create an
interactive database for use by security researchers as well as system designers and end-user
product evaluators. Case studies using the new techniques are described, with results uncovering
problems in Android’s multiuser framework and vendor-customized System Services. Finally, the
new insights are used to develop and implement a novel virtualization-based security
architecture that protects sensitive resources while preserving Android’s open architecture and
expected levels of performance and usability.
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I for one welcome our new android overlords.
- Robin Sloan,Mr. Penumbra’s 24-Hour Bookstore
Over the near-decade since its 2008 introduction, Google’s Android has been a stunning success,
eclipsing the market share of every other mobile operating system by a huge margin. Android is
shipping on well over 1 billion new devices annually [1], and over 1.5 million new devices are being
activated every day [2]. This growth, however, has not been without its pains. Recent measures
estimate that 96-97% of today’s mobile malware targets the Android operating system [3,4], and
73% of these are designed specifically to satisfy profit motives [4]. Also, as the system becomes
more popular and scrutinized, the number of identified vulnerabilities has skyrocketed. For the
years 2009-2014, the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) maintained by the National Institute of
Technology (NIST) issued a total of 43 Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE) reports for
Android. In 2015, this jumped to 125, and 2016 had seen 346 by August with four months still to go
[5].
In light of this, end-users are increasingly concerned about privacy and protecting their personal
information. Unfortunately, most have a hard time using available security indicators to discern
2
the trustworthiness of apps [6]. Even if they can determine that a particular app warrants extra
caution, many users possesses little or none of the specialized technical expertise necessary to
fully understand the relevant security controls. Finally, secure modes of operation oen degrade
performance or usability, sometimes to levels that far outweigh users’ willingness to compromise.
Faced with this lack of information, complexity, and unattractive trade-os, many users become
complacent, careless, or make mistakes in performing what amounts to critical system
administration tasks.
Security researchers and developers are also working hard to address the problems with Android.
Although successive releases continue to enhance and improve security and user controls [7],
balancing security with usability has proven diicult for system designers and security researchers.
For example, while evidence of the shortcomings of Android’s permission system has been
present in the literature as early as its initial release [8], no real user control over permission
granting was provided until the advent of the ill-fated App Ops hidden feature in July 2013. This
selective permission-granting mechanism was removed less than 6 months later, apparently due
to usability concerns that quickly surfaced when it was first released [9]. Because developers
could not anticipate the endless security configurations App Opsmakes possible, many apps
failed to function or simply crashed when their permissions were selectively revoked by the user.
Although App Opswas technically sound, and many useful 3rd party apps were created to “unhide”
it, Google removed it nonetheless. To understand why a useful security feature was removed
(much to the chagrin of security and privacy advocates [9]), the original goals of the Android
project must be revisited. Android’s design is based on several strong tenets that are unlikely to be
put aside, even for dramatically increased security or privacy. According to AOSP’s on-line security
documentation [10]:
• “Android is a modern mobile platform that was designed to be truly open.”
• “Android was designed with developers in mind. Security controls were designed to reduce
the burden on developers.”
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• “Android was designed with device users in mind. Users are provided visibility into how
applications work, and control over those applications.”
• “Android seeks to be the most secure and usable operating system for mobile platforms...”
(emphasis added).
In the case of App Ops, Google’s commitment to making things easy for developers and end-users
outweighed security, and it was removed. Aer all, as Felten and McGraw state in [11], “given a
choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing pigs every time.” Because of
Google’s caution in this regard, even later releases of Android 5.0 did little to help end-users
protect themselves from soware they chose to install. Only with the advent of Android 6.0 did
selective permissions and run-time confirmations become part of the Android mainstream [12,13].
With this example, we can see that developing and deploying viable security and privacy
improvements in Android requires considerations beyond those that are purely technical. Taking
a look at other examples of Android security enhancements, we consider two categories: those
proposed via the scientific literature, and those present in actual products and apps available to
end-users.
1.1 Security enhancements proposed by the scientific literature
Going beyond the App Ops example, it’s not hard to conclude that Android’s architects are unlikely
to embrace other solutions to security problems that would make the systemmore closed or
restrictive, increase developers’ burden, relinquish control from or inconvenience users (to
include noticeable performance degradation). If technical improvements are pursued without
consideration of these tenets, the result may run counter to one or more of them, and most likely
prevent its widespread adoption. In fact, there’s no shortage of interesting and sound technical
Android security improvements in the scientific literature that have had no direct impact on the
open source project, which instead has improved incrementally and with bug fixes for specific
vulnerabilities [7]. Obviously the many proposed solutions found in the literature have technical
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merit or they wouldn’t have appeared in peer-reviewed forums. However, from Google’s point of
viewmost are impractical because they represent radical system redesigns or run counter to the
vision of Android being open and easy to use and develop for. In addition, many fail to account for
end-users’ specific security and privacy needs and instead trade usability, performance and even
basic device functionality for security that the user may not want or need. A more detailed
discussion of these related works is contained in Chapter 6.
1.2 Security enhancements available to end-users
Although AOSPmay shun security improvements that have negative eects on usability or
performance, even if they are technically sound, there are a number of products that are
successfully marketed to end-users via Google Play as “add ons”. These are successful because
they “fit in” with Android’s design tenets, and are perceived by end-users as filling an important
security need. One example is Android virus detectors (AVD), the most popular of which have as
many as 500 million downloads from Google Play [14].
AVDs are examples of security solutions that naively apply traditional (i.e., PC) security concepts to
Android, without adapting to Android’s fundamental dierences. A great deal of their success in
the marketplace is due to end-users’ fear coupled with a misunderstanding of their theory of
operation. Specifically, the very basis for anti-virus’ eectiveness on PCs, 3rd party access to
administrative privileges, doesn’t exist on production Android devices [15]. Thus, AVDs are limited
to providing warnings based on the limited system information Android makes available to apps.
Moreover, the current design of Android’s ActivityManager, PackageManager, system broadcasts,
and various Linux facilities such as build.prop and /proc filesystem, can leak critical
information about an AVD’s running state to malware, dramatically increasing the chance of AVD
evasion [16]. Google has addressed this somewhat with its centralized malware scanning strategy
for the Play Store, but users are able to negate this by allowing Unknown sources or disabling Verify
apps. Chapter 2 includes a discussion of other important dierences that must be addressed
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when developing security products for mobile devices.
Whether it be sound-yet-impractical proposals from the research community, or easily-installable
security apps that give a false sense of security, it is clear that developing practical and eective
security for Android requires three things:
1. Adherence to Google’s design tenets which emphasize openness and usability.
2. Consideration of users’ and developers’ interests in terms of security needs and the burden
imposed.
3. Thorough technical knowledge of the system, especially that related to its unique
architecture, characteristics, and existing security mechanisms.
Although the design tenets are relatively straightforward, and users’ security needs are readily
identified, acquisition of the unique system knowledge necessary for security insights is diicult
and and time-consuming for three reasons.
First, the Android system is extremely complex. In April 2016, the Black Duck Open Hub free and
open source soware (FOSS) directory reported that the Android Open Source Project (AOSP)
includes 13,499,670 lines of code (LoC) representing 4,271 years of eort by 3,448 contributors.
This massive code base is composed of 36 dierent programming languages, with the vast
majority written in Java (40%), C (29%), and C++ (18%) [17]. Besides making the system diicult to
understand, this complexity also has ramifications to security. As Bruce Schneier remarked in 2012,
“complexity is the worst enemy of security” [18]. When this complexity is coupled with a
distribution and stakeholder model that makes rapid patching nearly impossible, the real-world
impact of the problem is amplified. Indeed, a 2015 study revealed that overall, at any given
moment, a majority of Android devices are running a vulnerable version [19].
Second, access controls in Android use multiple means of identifying the subject, are
implemented across multiple layers of soware, and usually reside with the object being
accessed rather than in a centralized reference monitor. This makes identification of all factors in
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an access control decision diicult. For example, for an app to access location, it must first obtain
permission from the user. This is accomplished via a dialog box that identifies the app to the user
making the decision by common name. Next, a binder token issued by the kernel binder driver
aer consideration of the requester’s uid and pid allows the app to communicate with the native
ServiceManager running in userspace and obtain the location service handle. Distribution of some
of these service handles are restricted to specific uids and is enforced by the native code. Next,
when the app uses the handle to request location from the service, an IPC_DESCRIPTOR value
from each side of the IPC channel is compared to ensure the calling process’s transactionmatches
the interface of the reciever. Next the caller’s manifest permissions are checked by the specific
service thread running in the native systemserver, again using the uid and pid. Finally, a
“location blacklist” is consulted using the package name. Underlying each of these steps is
enforcement of mandatory access controls (MAC) determined by the device’s SE for Android (i.e.,
SELinux) policy. With so many checks and decisions spread out across many parts of the system,
addressing security or privacy concern with apps’ use of location is diicult and the solutions can
take many forms with various tradeos.
Lastly, security documentation of the Android system leaves much to be desired, which results in
more mistakes by developers and end-users, while increasing the learning challenges for security
researchers. Although the situation has improved since, a 2011 study found that only 6.2%
(78/1,259) of application programmer interface (API) calls with permission checks are
documented, and of those, nearly 8% (6/78) were incorrectly documented [20]. Moreover, oicial
documentation of Android internals is virtually non-existent, making understanding how access
controls and security mechanisms are implemented within the vast code base a daunting task.
Doing so requires painstaking source code review and consultation with informal (and possibly
incorrect or outdated) sources such as blogs, forums and on-line tutorials. Finally, for vendor
customizations of Android, gaining this knowledge is even more diicult since vendor code and
their modifications are typically closed-source. In fact, the vast majority of devices in use are not
running pure Android, but many dierent versions each customized dierently by numerous
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competing vendors.
1.3 Thesis and Contributions
Providing the means to acquire the necessary system knowledge and insight so that practical
security and privacy improvements can be designed for Android is the subject of this dissertation.
This dissertation’s thesis is as follows:
It is possible to design and implement practical security and privacy improvements
for Android when the following conditions are met:
1. Insights are gained from a systematic understanding of Android security and
its unique characteristics;
2. End-users’ security and privacy needs are accounted for; and
3. Android’s design tenets are preserved.
Because of its complexity, Android system understanding requires a systematic approach to
gathering knowledge. Chapter 3 describes the development of such an approach and its
application to the first and only known security evaluation of Android’s multi-user architecture.
In spite of the successes derived from this eort, it’s clear that manual analysis of the system is too
time-consuming and error-prone to be practical for a platform like Android that evolves so rapidly.
The problem is further compounded when vendors make proprietary modifications to the
platform in order to customize and dierentiate their product. The lack of source code in these
cases makes gathering the required knowledge diicult at best. Addressing this problem led to
the development of an eicient, automated modeling and analysis technique described in
Chapter 4. This technique enables security researchers to gain insight about the design of access
controls in System Services, rapidly identify specific vendor customizations of System Services,
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and focus their testing on the most interesting portions of code.
Combined, these eorts yielded deep insights regarding the protection, or lack thereof, of
common system resources in Android and its vendor-specific derivatives. Unfortunately, directly
addressing many of the problematic situations uncovered would be diicult due to Android’s
open design and the number of stakeholders involved. For example, while patching a vendor’s
insecure System Service with an appropriate access control might fix that specific problem, it
would do nothing to address future modifications by other vendors or stakeholders that may
make mistakes. Instead, a more general solution was sought. Chapter 5 describes PINPOINT, a
novel, lightweight isolation-based solution to protect sensitive, or vulnerable, resources and
information from untrusted apps. The eectiveness of PINPOINT is independent of vendor
customizations and any shortcomings of resources’ access controls. Moreover, PINPOINT oers a
practical alternative to existing isolation architectures that force users to sacrifice convenience,
performance and usability for security features they may not need.
In all, this dissertation describes the following contributions:
1. An insightful model and systematic methodology for analyzing access controls in
Android (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3).
2. The first and only known systematic security evaluation of Android’s multiuser
architecture, also serving as a case study to demonstrate the eicacy of the
aforementioned methodology (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4).
3. A novel Android access control feature set, useful for characterizing Android access
controls (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2).
4. A feature set-based dierential analysis methodology, useful for identifying and
understanding closed-source vendor modifications to Android System Services (see
Chapter 4, Section 4.3).
5. A case study of 12 closed-source vendor images, that applies the feature-set based
dierential analysis to reveal specific shortcomings and actual access control issues
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stemming from vendor modifications to Android System Services (see Chapter 4, Section
4.4).
6. Two access control feature databases containing over 35,000 methods from System
Services of 19 Android images, allowing security researchers to interactively query and
compare System Service access controls.
7. A novel, lightweight hypovisor-based approach to protecting sensitive and vulnerable
resources from untrusted apps and sensitive apps from untrusted resources. Known as
PINPOINT, the concept deliberately addresses Android’s unique open architecture, while
simultaneously respecting its design tenets (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3).
8. A working prototype implementation of PINPOINT that demonstrates a new isolation
capability for the full range of Android System Services. The prototype is evaluated using
four System Service case studies (see Chapter 5, Sections 5.4 and 5.5).
1.4 Dissertation organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 includes backgroundmaterial on Android security and discusses some important
characteristics of the Android architecture;
• Chapter 3 describes the systematic access control analysis methodology as well as the
multiuser case study;
• Chapter 4 describes the design of the access control feature set, feature extraction
methodology, and feature vector-based case study of 19 real Android images;
• Chapter 5 describes PINPOINT, its design, implementation, application and evaluation;
• Chapter 6 discusses previous work by others and relates it to the contributions claimed; and




I wonder, he wondered, if any human has ever felt this way before about an
android.
- Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
Since this dissertation focuses on understanding and improving security of Android devices, this
chapter gives a brief overview of the unique characteristics impacting mobile security
architectures, followed by a tutorial on Android security. Background information specific to
material discussed only in a single chapter is included within the respective chapter.
2.1 Uniqueness of Mobile Devices
Android is an operating system designed specifically for lightweight mobile devices. As such, it has
unique characteristics that set it apart from traditional platforms. Identifying and understanding
these dierences is an important prerequisite when studying the system and proposing
improvements.
Table 2.1 compares mobile devices with fixed computers in terms of features, characteristics, and
environment. Each of these has an impact on security and potentially the design of the platform’s
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Table 2.1: A comparison of mobile vs. fixed computing platform attributes.
Typical attributes
Category Mobile Fixed
Input So keyboard, tap Full keyboard, mouse, tap
Authentication PIN, pattern, short password,
fingerprint
Long password, multi-factor














VPN or direct-app connection
to enterprise
Direct, trusted connection






Special uses ID/financial proxy, billed
services (e.g., SMS)
Physical security Vulnerable to loss, the Secured
security architecture.
The lack of a full-size keyboard on mobile devices makes entering long, complex passwords
diicult as well as inconvenient. As a result, several other authentication options are typical of
mobile devices. However, not all of these are as secure as the strong passwords andmulti-factor
authentication common to fixed systems. Moreover, the combination of these with sensors and
other features unique to mobile devices can further exacerbate security problems. For example, it
has been shown that lock screen PINs can be inferred through a device’s camera andmicrophone
[21] or by other sensors such as the accelerometer [22,23,24,25].
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2.2 Tutorial on Android Security
The foundation of any operating system security architecture is the security of the device itself. In
fixed systems, much of this is based on an assumption of strong physical security such as a locked
room or secure enclosure. Since mobile devices are inherently more susceptible to the and
tampering, modern Android devices include several features to secure the device itself. This
includes:
• Bootloader locking. Prevents new firmware from being flashed onto the device.
• OEM signature check. Prevents 3rd-party or tampered firmware from being flashed onto the
device.
• Secure boot. Requires firmware integrity check at boot time.
• Partition lock. Bootloader prohibits changes to system partition and other sensitive storage
areas.
• Read-only mounts. Kernel prohibits changes to system partition and other sensitive storage
areas.
• Filesystem encryption. Prevents side-channel access to user data.
To organize an overview tutorial of Android security and its mechanisms, the application life-cycle
depicted in Figure 2.1 is used as a road map. The following subsections correspond to the five
steps of the app life-cycle.
2.2.1 Development
Android applications are packaged as APK archive files, with the structure shown in Figure 2.2. A
key component of this file is themanifest, AndroidManifest.xml. This is where the developer
must declare needed permissions as well as any public interfaces and their associated access
control requirements. Most platform resources and actions that can aect the system, other apps,
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Figure 2.1: Android security mechanisms across the app lifecycle.
Figure 2.2: APK file structure.
or incur costs require permissions. These include accessing location, Bluetooth, phone, camera,
Internet, contacts databases, logs, etc. A full list of permissions allowed in the manifest is found in
[26].
Permissions are categorized as normal, dangerous, signature or signatureOrSystem. Normal and
dangerous permissions are available to all apps, with the latter requiring an explicit approval from
the end-user. Signature permissions are only granted to apps signed with the platform key, while
signatureOrSystem permissions may be granted to apps that are signed with the platform key or
part of the system partition that is defined at system build time.
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Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) permissions enable a calling app to grant a callee access to a
specific resource, such as a specific file, owned by the calling app. It is also possible for an app
developer or system vendor to define custom permissions in the manifest, and use them to
implement custom protections for their apps’ public interfaces.
All APK files must be digitally signed with the developer’s certificate. This allows the author to be
identified and is used to establish a security relationship among applications signed with the
same certificate. APK signing certificates do not require a certificate authority (CA) and may be
self-signed. Also, in order to publish apps in Google’s Play store, developers must use certificates
that are valid for at least 25 years when registered. This is because any updates to the appmust be
signed with the same key or the update installation will fail. Unfortunately, there is no standard
mechanism for revoking compromised keys, so developers must strictly protect their private keys.
In fact, the entire certificate management system of Google Play (or lack thereof) has led to
several problems including developers signing all of their apps with a single key, 3rd-party
developers signing thousands of dierent customers’ apps with a single key, and apps signed with
publicly-known private keys [27].
2.2.2 Download
By default, Android is configured to only allow app installation from Google Play. This restriction is
part of Google’s market-based anti-virus and malware prevention strategy. For the reasons
discussed in the example of Section 1.2, 3rd-party anti-virus tools are largely ineective on stock,
unrooted Android devices. To address this, Google scans oerings in the Play store for the
presence of malicious libraries and other malware indicators (the exact nature of this scanning
algorithm is unknown outside Google). By restricting the installation source to only the Play store,
this market-based protection is extended to end-users. Users who opt-in to allow unknown
sources bypass this protection and open themselves to significant threats from repackaged and
pirated apps. Significant portions of repackaged and pirated apps in these markets have been
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shown to contain malicious ad libraries, additional functionality, and request more permissions
than the originals in Google Play [28].
In order to oer malware protection even to users that install from unknown sources, Google
includes a device-based app verification feature starting with version 4.2. Because it is part of the
Android system, Verify apps does not suer from the same limitations as 3rd-party anti-virus apps.
2.2.3 Installation
Prior to Android 6.0, permissions were granted to apps at install-time, in an all-or-none fashion.
Presented with a partial list (only those permissions categorized as dangerous), users would have
to accept all requested permissions or forgo installation. Once accepted, permissions could not be
revoked without uninstalling the app.
Beginning with Android 6.0, users do not interact with the permission system at install-time.
Instead, permission granting is deferred until a run-time action requires it. At that moment, the
user is presented with an allow/deny dialog. In addition, all permissions can be individually
granted or revoked at any time via Settings.
When an app is installed, it is assigned a Linux uid that is used as subject identification in
kernel-level access control decisions, just as in standard Linux. This kernel-level identification is
the basis for the application sandbox that all apps are subject to at run-time. However, unlike
standard Linux, in Android the Linux uid is separated into fields that have special meanings in the
Android Framework. The twomost significant digits of the uid correspond to the Android userId,
while the remaining five correspond to Android’s appId. This allows the same app to run with
dierent Linux uids and pids for dierent human users or dierent managed provisioning profiles.
In this way, sandbox isolation is maintained among users and profiles, even for the same app
used by two users. Chapter 3 contains more detailed specifics about Android’s multiuser features
and related security mechanisms.
16
Android’s application sandbox is anchored in the process and user isolation aorded by the Linux
kernel. From the kernel and Linux userspace point of view, apps are dierentiated just as Linux
users are on a traditional system. Each app and all of its data files are assigned a unique uid and
gid. For example, a data file for an app assigned uid 0010068 would have the following mode,
owner and group: -rwx––– u0_a68 u0_a68, where u0_a68 is the Android “username” for uid
0010068. Thanks to this kernel-enforced isolation, by default apps cannot read/write files other
than their own, manipulate or access other apps, access peripheral devices, access the network,
incur costs (e.g., send SMS), or access user data stores (e.g., contacts). One exception are apps
whose APKs are signed with the same developer certificate. If so specified in the manifest, these
apps are allowed to share the same uid and pid. This enables developers to share common
databases and files amongmultiple apps in their suites.
To escape the sandbox, apps must have been granted specific permissions by way of the manifest.
Certain manifest permissions, such as those controlling access to some hardware resources (e.g.,
Bluetooth, Internet), logging subsystem, etc., are translated to additional gids. Apps possessing
the corresponding permission(s) are then granted membership in the group(s) and the Linux
permissions on the corresponding file or device allow group access. For example, the manifest
permission android.permission.INTERNET is mapped to gid 3003 (inet), and an app with
this permission declared in its manifest is granted membership in this group at install-time.
Networking-related sockets are then set with modes, owners, and groups that allow access to this
group. These settings are controlled dynamically at boot-time by the init process via settings in
init.rc and ueventd.rc, or statically during the system build. For example, the socket
dnsproxyd, which enables Internet-capable apps to query the Domain Name Service (DNS) via a
proxy daemon, has the following mode, owner and group: srw-rw–– root inet. This allows the
resource to be accessed from within the sandbox directly via system calls, with access control
enforced by the kernel. This approach prevents native code from attempting to bypass Framework
controls.
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Other manifest permissions are checked and enforced by the Android Framework at run-time and
are eectively gates that allow dierent forms of inter-process communication (IPC) between an
app and the resources and other apps on the device. In order to enable initial IPC requests, all
apps have default permissions to communicate with the kernel’s binder driver, accessed via
ioctls with /dev/binder. This character device is owned by root but is world-readable and
world-writable.
2.2.4 Run-time
Started by init, zygote is a privileged process which is responsible for launching apps. When an
app is launched, zygote forks a new process, sets the assigned uid and gid(s), and finally drops
unneeded privileges and capabilities. Process isolation courtesy of the Linux kernel ensures that
an app cannot interfere with other running apps and processes. A running app can attempt to
escape its sandbox by twomechanisms as shown in Figure 2.3: Binder IPC ( 1© and 2©) and system
calls ( 3©).
Binder IPC provides a pathway to Framework resources and components of other apps. Binder
itself has no security; instead, access control is enforced at the destination (indicated by♦ in
Figure 2.3) by way of permission checking.
In the case of apps accessing System Services (path 1©), the freely accessible binder driver allows
access to a directory service, ServiceManager. ServiceManager dispatches capabilities known as
handles for registered System Services such as LocationManagerService, SensorService, etc.
Additional specifics about ServiceManager and its security is included in Chapter 5.
Apps use these capabilities to invoke public methods of the corresponding service via Binder IPC.
Any access controls are enforced within each method, usually by checking whether the caller has
been granted the necessary manifest permission(s). For example, at the entry point of method
getLastLocation() in LocationManagerService, checks are made to determine whether the
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Figure 2.3: Sandboxes (- - -), escape paths ( 1©, 2©, 3©) and enforcement points (♦).
caller has been granted android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, or no permission at all. The result of this
check is used to return a most-accurate, less-accurate, or null location, respectively. It is important
to note that this access control check is done by the specific method(s) implementing access to
the Location object, not by a central referencemonitor. This pattern of placing access controls as
close to resources as possible is a key insight in understanding the security architecture of
Android.
As mentioned earlier, Android 6.0 introduces the concept of run-time permission granting. In fact,
in this newmodel, no permissions are granted at install time. When the app is launched and
encounters a situation which requires use of a dangerous permission declared in themanifest, the
user is prompted. By choosing allow at this prompt, the app is permanently granted the
permission, which must then be manually revoked via Settings.
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2.2.5 Removal
When apps are uninstalled, the assigned uid is freed up for reuse and its data directories are
removed. In some cases, remnants of the installation persist, such as credentials, capabilities,




Android Access Control Evaluation
Methodology
The only truly secure system is one that is powered o, cast in a block of
concrete and sealed in a lead-lined roomwith armed guards.
- Gene Spaord
The Android operating system is rapidly evolving, with major releases now occurring
approximately every six months. Each of these releases contain new features, enhancements, and
refinements that have significant security implications. These implications must be understood,
especially when devices are employed for critical and sensitive applications or in adversarial
environments. Unfortunately, Android is a very complex system, and as explained in Chapter 2, its
security architecture has been designed as an open system whereby access controls are placed as
close to the corresponding resource as possible. In this architecture, access control policy and
implementation are the responsibility of the resource itself. While this modular approach makes
adding new or unique resources easier, evaluating the soundness of platform-wide changes as
they relate to every resource becomes very diicult because of the many access control points
involved.
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This chapter introduces a methodology for modeling, discovering and evaluating access controls
in Android. It is especially well-suited to evaluating how platform-wide architectural changes or
feature additions impact the security of the many separate resources whose access controls may
have been designed under earlier, potentially invalidated assumptions. The chapter also
describes the results from a case study which demonstrates the eectiveness of the method. The
case study applied the method to evaluating the security of Android’s multi-user framework, a
significant platform change which was first introduced in the 2012-2013 time-frame. Themulti-user
extensions to Android represent exactly the kind of platform change that results in security
problems involving resources previously designed under assumptions invalidated by the change.
3.1 Introduction
The impressive growth of Android includes not only the number of traditional smartphone
devices running it, but an expansion to other “keyboardless” and embedded devices such as
tablets, home entertainment equipment, automobile dashboards, and home appliances. While
the typical smartphone is a personal single-user devices, many of the others are intended for use
by several individuals. Thus, one major driving force behind the features included in recent
releases of Android is the need for multi-user support, which has grown along with its expansion
from strictly personal devices to those with varied purposes in multi-user environments. Today,
the vast majority of fielded Android devices are multi-user capable, with Google Dashboards
reporting in June 2016 that 89.2% of active devices were running a multi-user-capable version [30]
(up from 27% in 2014).
Multi-user features take two dierent forms in Android:Multiple Users (MU), introduced in version
4.2 (API 17) in November 2012, and Restricted Profiles (RP), introduced in version 4.3 (API 18) in July
2013. With each subsequent release, the multi-user functionality was refined and expanded to fit
other contexts such as corporate environments.1 Targeted towards sharable devices such as
1Since the timeof this study,ManagedProvisioningwas introduced inAndroid version5.0 (API 21) toallowenterprise-
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tablets, these enhancements strive to provide individual, isolated user spaces on a single physical
device. Each user space supports a separate set of accounts, apps, settings, files, and user data,
distinct from those of the primary owner [32], however there are slight dierences in the
functionality they provide.
Multiple Users (MU) designates the main account as Owner. Through the device settings, the
owner account may create additional MU accounts. These secondary accounts are
essentially the same as the owner, except for the fact that they cannot manage (i.e., create,
modify, delete) other users. MU accounts enjoy most of the other privileges and
functionality of the owner, including managing the device’s wireless and network settings,
pairing Bluetooth devices, customizing sound and display settings, installing/removing
their own apps, adjusting privacy settings (e.g., location access), and configuring security
features (e.g., screen lock, credentials). Each account also has a separate virtual SD card
storage area within the physical SD card.
Restricted Profiles (RP) are similar to MU accounts, but they lack several key functionalities
compared to owner and MU accounts. Like MU accounts, RP accounts cannot manage users.
In addition, RP accounts are restricted from installing apps. Instead, the owner account
“turns on” specific apps from the set of installed apps for the RP account.
A reasonable layperson might assume that these enhancements would provide user and profile
isolation similar to that provided by today’s desktop multi-user systems. However, end-users
working with multi-user features immediately encounter warning signs that this may not be the
case. When creating new users on a device, two telling confirmation dialogs appear as shown in
Figure 3.1. The dialog shown in Figure 3.1a warns that “any user can update apps for all other
users”, while that of Figure 3.1b implores the new user to “only share this phone with people you
trust”.
managed apps to coexist with personal apps in the same user account and launcher. My own brief investigation [31]
revealed that the underlying technical implementation of Managed Provisioning is very similar to that described here
for Multiple Users and Restricted Profiles. As such, many of the security concerns outlined here are applicable to Man-
aged Provisioning.
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(a) Warning to device owner. (b) Warning to new user.
Figure 3.1: Warning messages encountered while creating additional user accounts.
To security-minded individuals, these kinds of warnings raise red flags. Combined with the fact
that multi-user features were basically “bolted on” to an existing design, and the obvious security
implications of multi-user features for any system, there is plenty of reason to worry about the
soundness of these new capabilities. In fact, Android’s evolution towards a multi-user system is
not unlike that which happened with Microso’s Windows operating systems in the 1990s, which
started out as a single-user system. Compared to Unix, which was designed from the outset with
multiple users in mind, Windows’ later inclusion of these features was muchmore problematic in
terms of security [33]. Thus, is important to assess whether Android’s newmulti-user framework
accounts for the fact that the single-user assumption of the original design has been invalidated,
as Microso arguably failed to do with initial multi-user versions of Windows.
However, rather than conducting an evaluation specific to the multi-user framework, this work
contributes a systematic access control evaluationmethodology that is tailored to the unique
characteristics of Android, but generic enough to be suitable for use in evaluating any aspect of
the system’s access controls. The method enables one to gain security (and vulnerability) insights,
which then lead to hypotheses about potential security problems. These hypotheses can be
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tested by way of focused experimentation. The eicacy of the method is proven via a case study
on Android’s multi-user framework, a recent, security-related addition to the system, which had
not been studied before.2
3.1.1 Threat Model
Most security evaluations focus their scope by defining a threat model. In fact, as stated earlier,
Google recommends sharing multi-user devices only with trustworthy people. Unfortunately,
varying definitions of trust, dierent expectations for security and privacy, and a wide variety of
use cases make this a very ambiguous statement. Because of this, and since the methodology is
intentionally generic with respect to the types of Android access controls being evaluated, we do
not immediately identify a specific threat or scenario. Instead, insights and knowledge are
produced first, through a systematic, exhaustive analysis, independent of any particular threat
mindset. The hypotheses which can then be generated factor in the specific threat scenarios.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: a background on howmulti-user has been
implemented in Android is first provided in Section 3.2 so that later descriptions of the
methodology can include the multi-user case study context for clarity and as an example. Next,
Section 3.3 describes the systematic methodology for gaining insights into relevant access
controls and hypothesizing about potential vulnerabilities. A sampling of the most interesting
hypotheses are given in Section 3.3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 presents the findings from experiments
designed to test the hypotheses. Related work is consolidated in Chapter 6.
2A high confidence anonymous reviewer of [34], the peer-reviewed publication describing this work, stated that the
paper is “...the first work that I’m aware of that looks at the security of Android’s multi-user framework.”
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3.2 Background
Before describing our investigation, a brief technical overview of Android’s implementation of
multiple users is needed. The following section expands on the general backgroundmaterial of
Chapter 2, and is divided into four subsections: Android framework extensions, filesystem
configuration, kernel mechanisms, and run-time considerations. Each subsection may contain a
brief security discussion in order to emphasize aspects that are important for later discussions.
Throughout the chapter, the Linux user ID and group ID are referred to as uid and gid, respectively,
while IDs within the Android framework are denoted by userId, and appId.
3.2.1 Framework - userId
Version 4.2 added android.os.UserHandle class to represent multiple users on the device. This
class designates userId 0 as the device owner, and several special userIds to represent all users
(userId -1), the current user (userId -2), the current user or self (userId -3) and the null user (userId
-10000). Actual userIds are assigned by the UserManagerService class (also introduced in 4.2) when
new users or new restricted profiles are created by the device owner. This class defines the
starting userId as 10, and increments it by 1 every time a new user or profile is created, until the
number of current users equals the maximum number defined by the system property
fw.max_users from build.prop. State is maintained in /data/system/users/userlist.xml,
where a list of currently-assigned users and the next available userId is stored. On devices where
users or profiles have been repeatedly added and deleted, the userIds may be re-used, although
the next available counter continues to increment as shown by the example of Listing 3.3. userIds
are assigned in the same way regardless if they are for a secondary user or a restricted profile.
For example, Listing 3.1 shows a representative userlist.xml file from a fresh device with one
secondary user and one restricted profile added. Aer deleting these two accounts and adding a
third secondary user, the file appears as shown in Listing 3.2.
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Listing 3.1: userlist.xml showing users 0 (owner), 10, 11, and next available userId 12.

1 <?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’utf -8’ standalone=’yes’ ?>
2 <users nextSerialNumber="12" version="4">
3 <user id="0" />
4 <user id="10" />
5 <user id="11" />
6 </users >  
Listing 3.2: userlist.xml aer deleting users 10, 11, and adding a user, showing users 0, 12 and next
available userId 13.

1 <?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’utf -8’ standalone=’yes’ ?>
2 <users nextSerialNumber="13" version="4">
3 <user id="0" />
4 <user id="12" />
5 </users >  
Listing 3.3: userlist.xml aer deleting users 10, 11, and adding a user, showing users 0, 12 and next
available userId 13.

1 <?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’utf -8’ standalone=’yes’ ?>
2 <users nextSerialNumber="27" version="4">
3 <user id="0" />
4 <user id="11" />
5 </users >  
As has always been the case in Android, each installed application is assigned an appId.3
android.os.Process class defines ranges of appIds that can be assigned to dierent types of
apps. Normally, these IDs range from 10000 to 99999.
In the past, appIds were the same as the Linux uid, thus enabling process, memory and filesystem
isolation among the dierent apps installed on a device. With the advent of the multi-user
framework, the most significant bits of the Linux uid take on the semantics corresponding to
userId, while the remaining bits continue to correspond to appId. Specifically, the Linux uid is
obtained by concatenating the userId and appId as follows:
3Before the introduction ofmulti-user, uid and userIdwere used interchangeably to refer to the unique identifier for
each app installed on the system. In versions withmulti-user extensions, userId is used to denote the actual user, while
appId is the designation for each app’s unique ID. However, there are still several instances of code and files that use
userId to refer to apps. For example, the sharedUserId tag in AndroidManifest.xml actually refers to package names
which will share the same appId.
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uid = userId × PER_USER_RANGE + (appId mod PER_USER_RANGE) , (3.1)
where the default PER_USER_RANGE is 100000.
Likewise, userId and appId can be recovered from uid using
userId = uid div PER_USER_RANGE (3.2)
and
appId = uid mod PER_USER_RANGE , (3.3)
where div denotes integer division andmod the modulo operation. The UserHandle class
includes methods getUid, getUserId, and getAppId for performing these conversions.
Thus, the Linux uid is comprised of a two-digit Android userId (00, 10, 11, 12, ...) concatenated with a
five-digit Android appId (10000, 10001, ...). For example, an app with appId 10056 will run with
Linux uid 0010056 when started by the owner (userId 0), and Linux uid 1010056 when started by the
first secondary user or restricted profile (userId 10).
System uids not directly associated with apps are still in the range 0-9999. For example, root is
uid 0, system is uid 1000, radio is uid 1001, and shell is uid 2000.
3.2.2 Framework - Permissions
Several new permissions have been introduced with the advent of multi-user support. These
include MANAGE_USERS, INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS and INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL, which
are used to protect some types of inter-user functionalities such as startActivityAsUser().
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Generally, checks for these permissions are bypassed if the calling process has a root or system
uid. Several are also bypassed for processes running as shell. As signatureOrSystem permissions,
they will not be granted to apps not in the /system partition or signed with the platform key, and
thus are not obtainable by 3rd-party apps.
3.2.3 Framework - Package Management
To accommodate multiple users, Android’s package management system was modified so that
secondary users can choose dierent sets of installed apps, and the owner can choose which
apps are enabled or disabled for RPs. However, as currently implemented, package management
is still largely platform-centric rather than user-centric. Although it may appear that each user has
their own independent set of apps installed, in reality, each app is installed once for the entire
platform, and then either enabled or disabled for each user. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that
a device with multiple users still has only one, platform-wide packages.list file to map package
names to corresponding data directories, appIds, and gids. This can be seen in the example
packages.list file shown in Listing 3.4. This file is from amulti-user device with two additional
accounts configured. For example, the package jackpal.androidterm shown in Listing 3.4 was
installed by the secondary user and is not visible at all to the owner or other users. However,
packages.list only contains the package name, appId, flag, data directory path, signing key
name, and gid assignments.
Listing 3.4: packages.list excerpt showing the lack of user-specific information.

1 com.android.soundrecorder 10051 0 /data/data/com.android.soundrecorder release
3003 ,1028 ,1015
2 com.android.voicedialer 10014 0 /data/data/com.android.voicedialer release 3002
3 com.android.defcontainer 10003 0 /data/data/com.android.defcontainer platform
1028 ,1015 ,1023 ,2001 ,1035
4 com.android.launcher 10008 0 /data/data/com.android.launcher shared none
5 com.android.quicksearchbox 10050 0 /data/data/com.android.quicksearchbox shared 3003
6 com.android.contacts 10002 0 /data/data/com.android.contacts shared 3003 ,1028 ,1015
7 com.android.inputmethod.latin 10035 0 /data/data/com.android.inputmethod.latin shared
1028 ,1015
8 com.android.phone 1001 0 /data/data/com.android.phone platform 3002 ,3001 ,3003 ,1028 ,1015
9 com.android.calculator2 10020 0 /data/data/com.android.calculator2 release none
10 com.android.proxyhandler 10012 0 /data/data/com.android.proxyhandler platform 3003
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11 com.android.htmlviewer 10033 0 /data/data/com.android.htmlviewer release 1028
12 com.android.providers.calendar 10001 0 /data/data/com.android.providers.calendar release
3003 ,1028 ,1015
13 com.android.bluetooth 1002 0 /data/data/com.android.bluetooth platform
3003 ,3002 ,3001 ,1028 ,1015 ,3005 ,1016 ,3008
14 jackpal.androidterm 10058 0 /data/data/jackpal.androidterm default 3003 ,1028 ,1015  
Moreover, there is also only one platform-wide packages.xml file for associating package names
and appIds with signature keys, native library paths, code paths, granted permission(s), and
special conditions such as sharedUserIds. As illustrated by the packages.xml excerpts in Listing
3.5, the file has four major sections: a <permissions> block where permissions for the entire
platform are defined; one or more <package> blocks where each installed package is associated
with its signature identifier, code path, native library path, ApplicationInfo flags, permissions,
appId (shown in file as userId for historical reasons explained earlier), and other package-specific
settings; one or more <shared-user> blocks where shared appIds (indicated by sharedUserId)
are associated with permissions; and a <keyset-settings> block where signature identifiers are
mapped to the actual public key.
Listing 3.5: packages.xml excerpts showing the lack of user-specific information.

1 <packages >
2 <last -platform -version internal="19" external="19" />
3 <permission -trees />
4 <permissions >
5 <item name="android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE" package="android"
protection="1" />
6 <item name="android.permission.WRITE_CALL_LOG" package="android" protection="1" />
7 <item name="android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE" package="android" protection="1" />
8 <item name="android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS" package="android" protection="
1" />
9 <item name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIMAX_STATE" package="android" />
10 <item name="android.permission.ASEC_ACCESS" package="android" protection="2" />
11 <item name="com.android.browser.permission.WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS" package="android
" protection="1" />
12 <item name="android.permission.INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW" package="android" protection=
"2" />
13 <item name="android.permission.CAMERA_DISABLE_TRANSMIT_LED" package="android"
protection="18" />
14 <item name="android.permission.ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION" package="android" protection="1
" />
15 <item name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE" package="android" />
16 <item name="android.permission.CHANGE_BACKGROUND_DATA_SETTING" package="android"
protection="2" />




20 <package name="com.android.contacts" codePath="/system/priv -app/Contacts.apk"
nativeLibraryPath="/data/app -lib/Contacts" flags="1078509125" ft="155316 fb3a0" it="
30
155316 fb3a0" ut="155316 fb3a0" version="19" sharedUserId="10002">
21 <sigs count="1">
22 <cert index="2" />
23 </sigs>
24 <signing -keyset identifier="3" />
25 </package >
26 <package name="com.android.providers.userdictionary" codePath="/system/app/
UserDictionaryProvider.apk" nativeLibraryPath="/data/app -lib/UserDictionaryProvider"
flags="572933" ft="155316 d2f18" it="155316 d2f18" ut="155316 d2f18" version="19"
sharedUserId="10002">
27 <sigs count="1">
28 <cert index="2" />
29 </sigs>
30 <signing -keyset identifier="3" />
31 </package >
32 <package name="jackpal.androidterm" codePath="/data/app/jackpal.androidterm -1. apk"
nativeLibraryPath="/data/app -lib/jackpal.androidterm -1" flags="572996" ft="1567
f5e9058" it="1567 f5e928b" ut="1567 f5e928b" version="63" userId="10058">
33 <sigs count="1">





37 <item name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" />
38 <item name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK" />
39 <item name="android.permission.ACCESS_SUPERUSER" />
40 <item name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" />
41 <item name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
42 </perms >
43 <signing -keyset identifier="1" />
44 </package >
45 ...
46 <shared -user name="android.uid.shared" userId="10002">
47 <sigs count="1">
48 <cert index="2" />
49 </sigs>
50 <perms >
51 <item name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" />
52 <item name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" />
53 <item name="android.permission.WRITE_CALL_LOG" />
54 <item name="android.permission.REBOOT" />
55 <item name="android.permission.READ_SOCIAL_STREAM" />
56 <item name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" />
57 <item name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" />
58 <item name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS" />
59 <item name="android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS" />





65 <keyset -settings >
66 <keys>






72 <key -id identifier="1" />
73 ...
74 </keysets >
75 <lastIssuedKeyId value="1" />
76 <lastIssuedKeySetId value="0" />
77 </keyset -settings >
78 </packages >  
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Notably, this file also associates the aggregate permission list for <shared-user> packages to
appId without regards to any particular framework userId. For example, the packages
com.android.contacts and com.android.providers.userdictionary each declare
sharedUserIds of 10002 which means they are each granted all of the permissions defined by
shared user android.uid.shared.
Because the content and structure of the above files was not changed whenmulti-user features
were added to Android, PackageManagermust have a way of keeping track of each user’s specific
app installation status. This is accomplished by way of individual package-restrictions.xml
files for each user (default location: /data/system/users/<userId>/). When an individual user
installs an app for themselves, the app is really installed on the platform (as indicated by the
platform.list and platform.xml files, and then simply “hidden” from other users by tagging
the package name with inst=false in that user’s package-restrictions.xml. In the
jackpal.androidterm example used earlier, the package-restrictions.xml file for the user
who installed the package contains
<pkg name="jackpal.androidterm" stopped="true" nl="true"/>,
while the same file for all other users and profiles contains
<pkg name="jackpal.androidterm" inst="false" stopped="true" nl="true"/>.
We confirmed that the inst="false" parameter controls app visibility to users by manually
editing the file to remove it and observing that the app becomes available.
3.2.4 Filesystem
To support multi-user, several changes to the filesystem organization were made. Whereas the
single user’s app data was previously stored under /data/data/<package_name>, this data is
now isolated for each user under /data/user/<userId>/<package>. To maintain backwards
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compatibility, the owner’s (userId 0) app data is still stored under /data/data/<package>, with
a symbolic link from /data/user/0 to /data/data. Subdirectories in these locations are owned
by the uid for the respective user and app. Strong isolation is achieved through the use of Linux
bind mounts and filesystem namespaces [35].
3.2.5 Kernel
Since Linux is naturally a multi-user system, implementing Android’s multi-user extensions at the
kernel level did not require any changes to the kernel itself. For all versions of the Linux kernel
used in Android, the Linux uid is an unsigned 32-bit integer which can represent over 4 billion
unique uids. Thus, the uid discussed above, formed from the Android userId and appId, uniquely
identifies both the user and app, and is directly used as the Linux uid. In this way, standard Linux
discretionary access control (DAC) can provide isolation not only among apps, but also among
each user’s data files for a particular app.
3.2.6 Run-time
On a running device, only one user can be “logged in” at any one time. However, through the
switch users function, multiple users introduced the concept of the current user, which refers to
the user interacting with the device. We refer to other users whomay have been using the device
before it was switched to the current user as “inactive users.” Although these users cannot interact
with the device, many of the underlying processes associated with their active session, are le
running, as shown in Listing 3.6 where app processes from both the owner (uids beginning with
u0_) and a secondary user (those beginning with u10_) are running while the owner is using the
device. The inactive user’s apps are paused and their background services may be le to run. On
builds we have used, there is a limit of 3 to the number of users that can be inactive before their
processes are completely removed.
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2 root 224 1 552688 57232 ffffffff b7676770 S zygote
3 media 225 1 78740 23504 ffffffff b75f4586 S /system/bin/mediaserver
4 system 551 224 650404 58416 ffffffff b767807b S system_server
5 u0_a7 607 224 602888 68144 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.systemui
6 radio 713 224 583828 40852 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.phone
7 u0_a8 726 224 615000 52292 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.launcher
8 u0_a55 791 224 560552 30312 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.smspush
9 u0_a40 805 224 562260 32440 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.music
10 wifi 883 1 5424 2156 c021a64f b75f6770 S /system/bin/wpa_supplicant
11 dhcp 1146 1 1620 488 c021a64f b76da146 S /system/bin/dhcpcd
12 u10_a8 1239 224 592460 64512 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.launcher
13 u10_a7 1269 224 566924 42024 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.systemui
14 u10_a5 1358 224 565424 38488 ffffffff b767807b S android.process.media
15 u10_a25 1515 224 565728 35796 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.deskclock
16 u10_a29 1532 224 572716 37892 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.email
17 u10_a40 1585 224 562260 32432 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.music
18 system 1598 224 572196 33272 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.settings
19 u10_system 1614 224 572196 33276 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.settings
20 u10_a32 1636 224 605964 41540 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.gallery3d
21 u0_a35 1669 224 570692 38484 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.inputmethod.latin
22 u0_a48 1682 224 561888 31144 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.printspooler
23 u0_a2 1702 224 563436 36836 ffffffff b767807b S android.process.acore
24 u0_a1 1732 224 565668 35076 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.providers.calendar
25 u10_a1 1748 224 563640 35132 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.providers.calendar
26 u0_a21 1904 224 573064 33828 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.calendar
27 u10_a9 1921 224 565712 34396 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.mms
28 u10_radio 1943 224 563976 32948 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.phone
29 u10_a21 1958 224 569984 34872 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.calendar
30 u0_a5 1995 224 564904 34964 ffffffff b767807b S android.process.media
31 u0_a9 2011 224 567784 34968 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.mms
32 u0_a25 2046 224 563640 34508 ffffffff b767807b S com.android.deskclock  
3.3 Method and Model
At the core of any security investigation lies the question of whether the system design is based on
valid assumptions. As Android evolves into a multi-user system, what once may have been a set of
valid assumptions may suddenly be undermined by emerging system characteristics and/or
usage models. In the case of the multi-user framework, the original assumption of a benign,
single-user environment is no longer valid. Rather than a single owner who has administrative
authority over most aspects of system configuration and would not attack or intentionally
mis-configure his own system, there is now an environment where it is plausible for secondary
users to bypass restrictions, attack other users, or deliberately reconfigure the system in an
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unauthorized way. This insight gives us a way to focus the scope of the investigation.
3.3.1 Scope
To define the scope of this evaluation, we consider the overall architecture of Android depicted by
Yaghmour’s [36] high-level architectural view shown in Figure 3.2. This diagram is not specific to
multi-user, which enables us to employ the methodology below to other types of access control
evaluations besides the multi-user case study discussed here. This diagram shows broad
categories of system resources such as stock apps and system services, which become the subject
and object categories. The goal is to enumerate all relevant subject-object combinations and then
evaluate the suitability of the access control path(s) between them, where suitability is dependent
on whatever case is being looked at. In the case study presented here, our scope is limited to
scenarios whereby a secondary user exercises all possible paths to access resources and/or gain
privileges.
3.3.1.1 Identify subjects
With the above in mind, the subjects considered are apps and user interface (UI) elements that the
users can install or use. This list includes user-installed as well as stock apps (e.g., Settings), with
the key dierence being privilege (i.e., stock apps can have signatureOrSystem permissions
while user-installed apps cannot). In Figure 3.2, these are labeled as SUBJECT A for the case of a
user-installed appmaking API requests to other parts of the system, and SUBJECT B for cases
whereby the user interacts with stock apps to access resources.
For the example multi-user case, the subjects we identify are restricted to those apps that a
secondary user can install or use. A very important dierence about the secondary user subjects
considered compared to those of the single-user case is that the secondary user who launched
the appmay not necessarily still be the current user of the device. For example, components of an
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Figure 3.2: Investigation problem space showing various subject-object combinations. Adapted from
[36] with the permission of O’Reilly Media, Inc.
app launched by a secondary user prior to switching to another user may still function.
3.3.1.2 Identify objects
The resources available to the subjects discussed above are represented as the object in the
access control investigation. Examples from Figure 3.2 include public interfaces of other apps
(OBJECT 1), services (OBJECT 2), abstracted hardware devices (OBJECT 3) and kernel objects
(OBJECT 4).
The most important dierence about the objects considered for the multi-user case study
compared to the single-user case is that some resources may be shared with other users on the
device. For example, hardware devices such as the camera, or common settings databases are
objects that are shared amongmultiple users on the device.
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3.3.1.3 Identify access control paths
Between these subjects and objects are communication paths that may include access control
mechanisms. We draw upon the work of [10], [20], and [37] to present the simplified models of
Figure 3.3 that show communication paths pertinent to our investigation. This simplified model
gives us an Android-specific frame of reference with which we can consider each
SUBJECT-OBJECT path’s adequacy for whatever aspect of access control is under investigation.
(a) System access control points.
(b) Person-based access control.
Figure 3.3: Android communication paths showing access control points.
Figure 3.3a depicts each app and system service contained by separate sandboxes as indicated by
the dotted lines around them. Communication among these sandboxes (denoted by
bi-directional arrows) is done through Intents and Binders. Using Binders, apps obtain access to
services or providers (path 1©), and using Intents may launch exported activities of other apps
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(path 2©). These paths include access control points provided either by the system (e.g., as part of
the Intent or Binder mechanism), or at the public interface of the object itself. Using the native
interface, apps may also make system calls to directly request resources controlled by the Linux
kernel (path 3©), and these are subject to Linux DAC. These three paths are permission-based,
access control list (ACL)-based, or based on some combination of these.
Figure 3.3b shows another communication path with access control typical of smartphones and
tablets, that performed by the user (path 4©). In this case, the current user makes the decision to
allow or disallow access to a resource such as location, for instance. We refer to this as
person-based access control to avoid confusion with the notion of users on the device.
A fih type of path, not shown, are those that have no access control along them.
3.3.2 Questions & Insights
As we study the inner-workings of Android’s multi-user features, we are able to make two
observations. First, the new features have introduced important new considerations for the
subjects and objects shown in Figure 3.2. Examples of this include the concept of apps run by a
userId that is dierent than that of the current user, and person-based access control decisions
being made by multiple individuals. Second, even though none of the access control paths of
Figure 3.3 are unique or dedicated to the extensions, some have been modified to account for the
presence of multiple users on the device. Examples include methods that include checks for
INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS permission and apps that express dierent versions of their UI to
restricted users than they do to the device owner.
These observations lead us to the following top-level questions for our investigation:
1. Do Android’s access control points properly account for the new considerations regarding
subjects and objects?
2. If not, can a secondary user exploit these shortcomings, and what is the potential damage?
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In order to answer these questions, we enumerate all of the meaningful subject-object
combinations within the broad categories identified by Figure 3.2, and identify the corresponding
access control paths from Figure 3.3. This gives us a comprehensive list of specific things to study.
For example, a user-installed app (SUBJECT A) can send an Intent using startActivity() to
launch any exported activity of any other app (OBJECT 1). Thus, we study the system’s Intent
mechanism and the specifics of how these activities are exported. Specifically, we examine the
source code in order to determine what considerations, if any, do the Intent mechanisms and
exported activities give to multiple users. If none or partial, we consider whether there should be
protections and how a secondary user might exploit the shortcomings.
3.3.3 Hypotheses About Multi-User Security
This last step allows us to develop a set of hypotheses which can be used to design experiments
for testing the adequacy of access controls and demonstrating the consequences. Because they
must be testable, the hypotheses may include additional details about the threat model or
scenario required to exploit the potential vulnerability. We present a partial list of our most
interesting hypotheses for the multi-user case study here:
Hypothesis 1: Secondary users may be able to bypass their restrictions by exploiting the
unprotected public interfaces of system apps. Secondary users are supposed to lack certain
capabilities that the owner has, such as mobile plan settings. However, from our study of
how access control restrictions are implemented in Settings, we see that many are
accomplished by way of hiding portions of the UI, while the corresponding activities are
exported publicly. This situation corresponds to a particular OBJECT 1 in Figure 3.2
(Settings) that is shared among all users without adequate access control along path 2© of
Figure 3.3a. Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section 3.4.1.
Hypothesis 2: Secondary users may be able to maliciously reconfigure critical platform-wide
settings that are persistent across user switches. Secondary users possess certain
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administrative capabilities (e.g., network settings) that are normally reserved for privileged
users on mature multi-user systems such as Linux. Under Android’s single user assumption,
some of these settings are protected by person-based access control since UI interaction by
the benign user is required to prevent malicious apps frommaking invisible changes
programmatically. However, when the benign user assumption is invalid, Figure 3.2’s shared
resources protected only by Figure 3.3b’s person-based access controls (path 4©) can be
maliciously manipulated. The consequences are even more severe for cases where the
configurations are persistent across user switches, such as in the case of network
configuration. Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section 3.4.2.
Hypothesis 3: Inactive users may be able to spy on active users by exploiting improper access
control enforcement on shared hardware resources. As mentioned above, multi-user
extensions introduce the concept of current and background users. However, unlike a true
multi-user system such as Linux, which generally allows multiple remote logins
simultaneously, there can only be one active user “logged in” an Android tablet at any one
time. However, our enumeration of Figure 3.2 objects discovered apps and services that
have access to shared objects and are allowed to continue operations even aer a user
switch occurs. Of these, certain ones such as audio, camera and location have obvious
privacy implications if used without the current user’s knowledge or consent. From an
analysis of the implicated access control paths 1© and 4© in Figure 3.3, we find that
authorizations granted when the secondary user is the current user may not be properly
reconsidered aer a user switch. Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in
Section 3.4.4.
Hypothesis 4: sharedUserId permissions may not be properly separated when sharedUserId
apps are installed by dierent users.Multiple users extensions bring with them the idea that
each user may have dierent settings, preferences, and apps. Obviously, these should be
isolated such that one user cannot accidentally inherit permissions or capabilities from
another. Because our enumeration of all subject and object combinations of Figure 3.2
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included apps that leverage the sharedUserId feature, we discovered problematic
situations with overprivilege that can occur when dierent users install apps with
sharedUserIds. In particular, we see that access controls at Figure 3.3a locations 1©, 2©,
and 3© fail to dierentiate the subject because each sharedUserId app’s permissions are
commingled with others of the same appId in a single packages.xml file shared among all
users. Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section 3.4.3.
Hypothesis 5: Amalicious user may be able to exploit the shared packagemanagement system to
modify another user’s app bytecode or prevent them from installing apps with package names
identical to ones installed by the attacker. The shared package management mechanism
that led to Hypothesis 4 is also the cause of other problems. Since package installation is
platform-centric rather than user-centric, changes by any user authorized to install apps will
aect all users on the platform. Specifically, if a secondary user upgrades a package, the
bytecode changes aect all users that have that package installed. Likewise, if a malicious
user installs a fake app with a real app’s package name, all users are prevented from
installing the real app. Results from testing this hypothesis are contained in Section 3.4.3.
To test these hypotheses, experiments were designed and conducted using builds of Android
4.4.2_r1 branch of the open source project [38]. The details of these experiments and findings are
the subject of Section 3.4.
3.4 Case Study Findings
3.4.1 Unprotected Activities
Hypothesis 1 states that secondary users may be able to bypass their restrictions by exploiting the
unprotected public interfaces of system apps. To find out if this is true, our experiment must first
identify the intended restrictions placed on a secondary user, and then compare them with the
full set of exposed interfaces.
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To understand the intended restrictions on secondary users, the device UI elements accessible to
a secondary user were systematically mapped and compared with those of the owner. A privileged
app where significant dierences have been observed is Settings. Settings is important to consider
from a security point of view because it is granted SignatureOrSystem permissions such as
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS. This permission allows Settings to make changes to variables defined
in Settings’ protected nested classes Settings.Global and Settings.Secure via the settings
provider [39]. With these special permissions, Settings is the means by which the owner can
perform device management tasks, such as adding, removing & restricting users, changing mobile
data/plan settings, changing locations settings, changing WiFi settings, performing backups, etc.
From the UI mapping, we observed that Settings implements a number of UI restrictions based on
type of user by hiding certain menu items. As such, we infer that these are capabilities that
secondary users are not supposed to have. As an example, virtual private network (VPN) settings
are hidden from the secondary user by way of logic within WirelessSettings.java, as shown
in Listing 3.7. This logic compares the current user’s userId with that of the owner and executes
removePreference(KEY_VPN_SETTINGS) if not equal.
Listing 3.7: Settings code which hides VPNmenus for secondary users.

1 public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
2 ...
3 final boolean isSecondaryUser = UserHandle.myUserId () != UserHandle.USER_OWNER;




8 }  
With an understanding of how Settings presents a restricted UI to secondary users, we compared
the list of restricted UI elements with exported activities in the app’s manifest to find which of
these elements can be launched directly via Intent [40]. Listing 3.9 contains an excerpt from
Settings’ AndroidManifest.xml showing an Intent filter in VpnSettingsActivity, implying
that it can be launched from components of other applications [40]. As expected the code shown
in Listing 3.8 was used in a test app to confirm that a secondary user could bypass the UI
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restrictions and access VpnSettingsActivity directly.
Listing 3.8: Code for direct access to VpnSettingsActivity

1 Intent intent = new Intent ();
2 intent.setClassName("com.android.settings",
3 "com.android.settings.Settings$VpnSettingsActivity");
4 startActivity(intent);  
Similar examples were found in Mobile network & Mobile plan settings (under Wireless & Network
settings), and in Backup & reset settings (under Personal settings). Secondary users can access
these activities because of a lack of access control along path­ of Figure 3.3a, such as a check
based on UserHandle.myUserId(). Thus, each of these examples represent potentially
dangerous situations since these activities allow a secondary user to manipulate configuration
settings that may be able to be used to negatively aect the owner or other users of the device.
As it turns out, the VPN example contains additional access control checks in Vpn.java that do
properly identify the subject and prevent restricted users from connecting VPNs. Thus, for VPNs at
least, the hypothesis is only partially true. Because of the numerous cases of restricted UI
elements also being exported to all users, other cases will be investigated in the future.





4 <intent -filter >
5 <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />




10 </intent -filter >
11
12 <meta -data android:name="com.android.settings.FRAGMENT_CLASS"
13 android:value="com.android.settings.vpn2.VpnSettings"/>
14 ...
15 <meta -data android:name="com.android.settings.PARENT_FRAGMENT_CLASS"
16 android:value="com.android.settings.Settings$WirelessSettingsActivity"/>
17 </activity >
18 ...  
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3.4.2 Unrestricted Administrative Functions
Hypothesis 2 states that secondary users may be able to use device configurations which are
persistent across user switches to attack other users. Although related to Hypothesis 1, this case
does not involve a user bypassing restrictions, but simply implementing a malicious environment
using the UI elements freely available to them.
To test this hypothesis, we built an experiment around network configuration, since this function
is usually reserved for administrative users on standard multi-user platforms. We found that all
users, secondary, restricted profile or otherwise, have full access to WiFi settings and can add and
configure network connections as they choose. Furthermore, these settings are common to all
users since they are ultimately stored by the system in a single
/data/misc/wifi/wpa_supplicant.conf file that has no provisions for identifying the user
who has authorized a particular connection. Finally, our experiment showed that WiFi
connections are persistent across user switching.
This arrangement enables a secondary user to connect a multi-user device to a malicious hotspot
and control all traic to/from the device while it is being operated by other users. The hypothesis
is true and the situation represents the fih case mentioned in the Figure 3.3 discussion, that of no
access control.
3.4.3 Shared Package Information
Hypotheses 4 and 5 state that specific problems may occur due to the fact that Android apps
belonging to dierent users share critical package information:
1. Apps sharing the same appId in dierent users share permissions. As a result, the eective
permission of these apps is the union of the declared permissions for each app and the
sharedUserId apps escalate their permissions. This is the essence of Hypothesis 4.
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2. An app installed for dierent users shares the same app package information.
Consequently, one user may trigger a package update to modify the app’s manifest file or
code without other users’ consent. This is Hypothesis 5.
To design an experiment to confirm these two problems, we need to first understand more about
how PackageManager stores and uses an installed app’s package and its relevant information. In
PackageManager, all the package information among users are stored in a global hash map
mPackages as shown in Listing 3.10.
Listing 3.10: Global hash map storing package information.

1 // Keys are String (package name), values are Package.
2 final HashMap <String , PackageParser.Package > mPackages =
3 new HashMap <String , PackageParser.Package >();  
The keys of this hash map are package names, and the values are packages including permissions
and code information of the packages. Hence, we realize that mPackages is app name-based,
rather than user-based, confirming the platform-centric approach to package management that
remains in Android, in spite of the addition of the multi-user framework. With this as a basis for
our understanding, we can now discuss the testing of each of these hypotheses separately.
3.4.3.1 Permission leakage in sharedUserId apps
Android’s sharedUserId feature allows apps signed with the same key to share permissions and
data. Previous work in the single user environment has shown this convenience feature to have
risks due to implicit capability leaks among apps [41]. Although sharedUserId app’s data ends
up being properly isolated in multi-user due to Linux’s use of the uid (which accounts for both
appId and userId), this is not the case with permissions. In fact, these capabilities are leaked
across user boundaries, even if a particular user only has one of the sharedUserId apps installed.
This occurs because of the platform-centric design of PackageManager.
During installation, permission sets are stored in packages.xml, while installation status is stored
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in separate package-restrictions.xml files for each user. For sharedUserId apps,
permissions from each app are combined within the <shared-user> block in packages.xml, as
explained previously in Section 3.2.3. During boot, PackageManager loads this permission list into
the hash map mPackage in a way that makes it impossible to separate the individual permissions
from each sharedUserId app in case a particular user does not have them all installed. As a
result, when sharedUserId apps from the same developer are installed in varying combinations
by dierent users on the same device, every single app gains the union of permissions from all of
the sharedUserId apps installed on the platform, regardless of which sharedUserId apps have
been installed by that particular user.
To confirm this, we created a pair of sharedUserId apps. shareduidapp1 declares INTERNET
permission, and shareduidapp2 declares READ_CONTACTS permission. We then installed
shareduidapp1 under the owner’s account only, and shareduidapp2 under a secondary account
only. Aer these installations, packages.xml contained the entries shown in Listing 3.11:
Listing 3.11: packages.xml excerpt showing permissions associated with shareduidapp1 and share-
duidapp2.

1 <package name="com.example.shareduidapp1" ... sharedUserId="10056">
2 <package name="com.example.shareduidapp2" ... sharedUserId="10056">
3 <shared -user name="com.example" userId="10056">
4 <perms >
5 <item name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" />
6 <item name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
7 </perms >  
As Listing 3.11 shows, shareduidapp1 and shareduidapp2 share userId 10056 per the <package>
blocks. Separate from the package names, within the <shared-user> block, userId 10056 is
then associated with the two permissions. However, no structure retains the fact that the
INTERNET permission was contributed by shareduidapp1, while READ_CONTACTSwas contributed
by shareduidapp2. The record of which users have these apps installed is contained in each user’s
separate package-restrictions.xml file. As Listings 3.12 and 3.13 show, user 0’s (Owner)
package-restrictions.xml shows inst=false for shareduidapp2, while user 10’s
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(secondary user) shows inst=false for shareduidapp1.
Listing 3.12: package-restrictions.xml for user 0 (Owner).

1 ...
2 <pkg name="com.example.shareduidapp2" inst="false" stopped="true" nl="true" />
3 ...  
Listing 3.13: package-restrictions.xml for user 10 (secondary user).

1 ...
2 <pkg name="com.example.shareduidapp1" inst="false" stopped="true" nl="true" />
3 ...  
Because of the commingling of permissions within packages.xml, when user 10 runs
shareduidapp2, the system grants both INTERNET and READ_CONTACTS permissions even
though shareduidapp1 is not installed for the user. Meanwhile, Settings reports shareduidapp2
only holds READ_CONTACTS permission. This condition also occurs for shareduidapp1 run by
user 0. Each user is unaware of the permission leakage and over-privilege. Moreover, if user 10 is a
restricted profile for which the owner carefully enabled apps based on their reported permissions,
this leakage could allow the restricted profile accesses they should not have.
3.4.3.2 Package-based code sharing across users
Android’s app install and update procedure is depicted in Figure 3.4. When PackageManager
receives an install request, it first checks whether the package has been previously installed on the
platform. If the package has been previously installed by at least one user, it’s treated as a package
replacement. Otherwise it’s treated as a new install.
For new installs, a newmapping is created in the hashmap mPackages, and the app is marked as
installed for the installing user (or in some cases, all users) by passing the appropriate userId(s) to
the setInstalledmethod of the new package’s PackageSetting, as shown in Listing 3.14.
Hence, packagemeta-data, in the form of an instance of PackageSetting, solely determines
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Figure 3.4: Package installation and update procedure.
whether the package is installed for a particular user. This is further evidenced by the code of
method installExistingPackageAsUserwithin PackageManagerService, shown in Listing 3.15.
Here we see that an existing package is installed for a particular userId simply by changing the
values within an instance of PackageSetting.
Listing 3.14: Per-user package installation state is maintained within packagemeta-data.

1 PackageSetting p = mPackages.get(name);
2 ...
3 // The caller has explicitly specified the user they want this
4 // package installed for, and the package already exists.
5 // Make sure it conforms to the new request.
6 List <UserInfo > users = getAllUsers ();
7 if (users != null) {
8 for (UserInfo user : users) {
9 if (installUser.getIdentifier () == UserHandle.USER_ALL
10 || installUser.getIdentifier () == user.id) {
11 boolean installed = p.getInstalled(user.id);
12 if (! installed) {





18 }  









6 if (! pkgSetting.getInstalled(userId)) {
7 pkgSetting.setInstalled(true , userId);
8 pkgSetting.setBlocked(false , userId);
9 mSettings.writePackageRestrictionsLPr(userId);
10 sendAdded = true;
11 }
12 ...  
Since installation state for each user is maintained within the package meta-data, it is impossible
for users to maintain dierent versions of the same package. In fact, PackageManager uses the
package signature to ensure that updates replace old versions of the package. Listing 3.16 shows
that a package update passing the signature check is then used to replace the old package by way
of replaceSystemPackageLI or replaceNonSystemPackageLI. Moreover, per-user package
installation state is preserved with the new package installation, as evidenced by the passing of
perUserInstalled to these methods. As a result of this design, a user who updates a package
updates it for all other users of the device.
Listing 3.16: Package signature is checked prior to replacement during an update.

1 private void replacePackageLI(PackageParser.Package pkg ,
2 int parseFlags , int scanMode , UserHandle user ,
3 String installerPackageName , PackageInstalledInfo res) {
4 ...
5 oldPackage = mPackages.get(pkgName);
6 if (compareSignatures(oldPackage.mSignatures , pkg.mSignatures)
7 != PackageManager.SIGNATURE_MATCH) {
8 Slog.w(TAG , "New package has a different signature: " + pkgName);




13 boolean sysPkg = (isSystemApp(oldPackage));
14 if (sysPkg) {
15 replaceSystemPackageLI(oldPackage , pkg , parseFlags , scanMode ,
16 user , allUsers , perUserInstalled , installerPackageName , res);
17 } else {
18 replaceNonSystemPackageLI(oldPackage , pkg , parseFlags , scanMode ,
19 user , allUsers , perUserInstalled , installerPackageName , res);
20 }
21 }  
The most significant security impacts of this design are as follows:
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First, one user may escalate the permissions of apps belonging to a second user. For example, the
latest version of Twitter requires an extra permission, READ_SMS, compared to the old version. The
owner may choose not to upgrade to the latest one for privacy concerns related to SMS. However,
a secondary user may choose to update the app through Google Play because she likes the new
features. As a result, this update event will update all users’ version of Twitter without their
consent. The newly updated package requests more permissions and performs dierent
computing logic than the old one. In this scenario, a secondary user grants a new permission to
Twitter on behalf of all the users instead of just herself.
Second, a user may have a chance to aect other users’ app installation by creating denial of
service (DoS) attacks in two ways. First, a user can fake a package and create package installation
denial-of-service (DoS) by installing a fake version of an app before other users install the
legitimate one. In such a case, because of the signature matching requirement, no one else can
install the legitimate app, or uninstall the faked package through the user interface. Only the
owner can force uninstalls using adb. Moreover, if other users do not notice that the app is fake,
the attacking user can update the fake app and include malicious logic that attacks other users’
sensitive information.
Another negative side-eect of all users sharing the same appId, is that one user may use up all
the appId values which prevents other users from installing any apps. We confirmed this by
installing 50,000 dummy apps on a Nexus 10 running KitKat 4.4 as a secondary user, thus using up
all available appIds. As a result, any other user, including the owner, cannot install apps anymore.
The logcat will show that the installation failure is because
INSTALL_FAILED_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE, but actually there is still space in data partition. The
failure is because all users must share the same appId range.
The root cause for this code sharing problem is that Android does not provide code separation for
dierent users. All users share the same code for each package, appIds, and their privileges for
installing apps is mixed together. The package manager fails to isolate the code space of each
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Figure 3.5: New package installation is denied due to existing package with the same name but dif-
ferent signature.
user, although this design significantly saves the valuable disk space.
3.4.4 Use of Sensors and Hardware Devices by Multiple Users
Hypothesis 3 from Section 3.3.3 was tested by a colleague, and therefore only summarized here as
a way to provide additional evidence of how the methodology described earlier was put to use.
Further details pertaining to the sensor and hardware testing are found in [34].
In this section, we aim to answer Hypothesis 3 from Section 3.3.3. That is, non-logged in
secondary users can exploit improper access control enforcement on shared hardware resources
to spy on current users. In fact, if Android does not enforce proper access control on shared
hardware resources based on user status, a non-current user can still use a hardware interface to
infer various information about the logged in users and spy on them. For example, if a non-current
user can query the light and accelerometer sensors over a time interval, he can infer potential
activities about current user such as whether he is sitting indoors, or jogging outdoors. Moreover,
if he can query the GPS service, he can even infer where he is sitting or jogging. Even more
concerning, if he can launch the sound and camera recorders, he can know easily more details
such as with whom he is and what type of conversation he is having.
Under single-user assumptions, all hardware interfaces belong to the same user without any
concerns of misuse. Ideally, with multi-user features, a hardware resource should only be bound
to a single user at a time, corresponding to the currently logged-in user. Since the hardware
interfaces are shared among the users on an Android device, the transition from single to multiple
user framework requires changing the access control model on all hardware resources to make
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sure that use of a hardware resource is only granted to the logged in user.
To ensure that a hardware resource is only bound to the currently logged in user, Android should
be able to identify if the user requesting a resource is logged in. Also, it should track if the user who
initiated the request is continuously logged in during the service lifetime. More specifically, if
user-switching occurs, Android should be able to revoke any resource access from non-logged in
users. Thus, the hypothesis testing in this section focuses on whether or not Android access
control enforcement for shared hardware resources factors in user status. Media resources and
common sensors are each tested against the hypothesis: for each resource, an test app is
designed that will attempt to access a resource even if the user running the app is not logged in.
This approach exploits the fact that ActivityManager does not kill all non-current user processes.
Thus, the attacking app can be launched when the malicious user is logged in, and continues to
run aer he logs out and the victim user logs in. A non-owner user is deliberately chosen to be the
attacker, and the owner to be the victim since non-owner is less privileged compared to the owner
and represents the worst case. Findings for each of the resource categories are summarized below.
3.4.4.1 Media resources
To check if relevant access control points take into account multiple users, an test app was
designed to launch the camera (without a preview window) and start video recording while the
victim is using the device. The app is launched from the attacker user account (userId 10) and then
the device is switched to the victim account (userId 0). The test app was observed to continue
recording video while the victim is using the device. Since the test app is running as the attacker,
the recorded video is saved under the attacker’s data directory and can be retrieved by the
attacker later. The success of the attack reveals that the media resource access controls only come
into play at request-time and do not consider the changing of user status.
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3.4.4.2 Motion, environmental and position sensors
Most Android devices have numerous built-in sensors such as motion, environmental, and
position. Motion sensors include accelerometers, gravity, rotational vector sensors, and
gyroscopes. Environmental sensors measure ambient air temperature, pressure, illumination and
humidity, while position sensors measure the physical orientation of a device. Unlike the media
devices discussed above, activity from these sensors follow an event-driven approach. In other
words, an app first registers a listener to receive sensor events through the SensorManager, then
SensorServicewill deliver the sensor data to the registered listeners.
To test whether Android’s sensor access controls consider user state, a test app was developed to
continuously log sensor data. Similar to how the video recording app was used, the sensor app is
launched from the attacker account and then the device is switched to the victim user. Even aer
user switching, the app continues to receive sensor events, silently while the victim is using the
device. Sensor data logs are stored in the attacker’s data directory and may be retrieved later. This
success indicates that no access controls exist for the sensor devices, either at listener registration
time or during sensor data delivery. The conclusion is that the sensor subsystem fails to consider
the new
3.4.4.3 Location sensor
Tests similar to those above were performed on the GPS location sensor and found that a
non-current user cannot succeed in getting GPS location updates of the logged in user. A review of
LocationManagerService code revealed that it does indeed apply proper access controls that
consider user status when location data is dispatched. Specifically,
handleLocationChangedLocked()will only dispatch location updates to registered listeners
belonging to the current user. In this case, LocationManagerService properly tracks the current
user and updates its instance variable, mCurrentUserId, each time the user is switched. A similar
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You can’t secure what you don’t understand.
- Bruce Schneier, Schneier on Security, 1999 [42]
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter highlights the need to consider Android’s unique factors when evaluating or
improving the platform’s security. These factors include its open design, decentralized,
resource-centric access controls, and emphasis on usability. Besides these, the phenomenon of
vendor and carrier customization is another reality that sets Android apart from other mobile
operating systems—and introduces a whole new dimension of security concerns.
Nearly all of the Android devices in use throughout the world are those which have been
customized by manufacturers and service carriers. Unlike devices running the open-source AOSP
baseline, these customized devices run versions of Android that are proprietary and closed source.
Designed to create a competitive advantage through product dierentiation, typical modifications
include the addition of pre-loaded apps, custom launchers, mobile device management (MDM)
features, carrier-specific enhancements or restrictions. Previous work has studied the security
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implications of some of these modifications, including hanging attributes references [43],
problems with pre-loaded apps [44,41,45], security configuration changes [46], and access control
inconsistencies [47]. Other work has focused on automated detection of bugs in the Linux kernel
[48,49,50] and and inconsistencies in its configuration options [51,52]. These and other related
works are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
4.1.1 System Services Customization
One type of customization that has not been thoroughly explored, but is seen in nearly all vendor
images, is that of customized System Services. As described in Sections 2.2.4 and 5.4.1, Android
employs a modular System Services architecture, whereby system resources are accessed via
separate managers, such as LocationManager and TelephonyManager. These managers
communicate via IPC with the corresponding service which in turn accesses the actual hardware
or soware resource. The service is responsible for enforcing its own access control policy. Under
this resource abstraction, specific resources can be presented via one or more managers with
dierent APIs. For example, NetworkManager and ConnectivityManager both manipulate the
device’s networking infrastructure, but via dierent APIs intended for dierent purposes. This
modularity allows 3rd parties to easily add andmodify System Services, creating custom resource
interfaces without aecting other parts of the system. Unfortunately, since access control is
implemented in each service rather than centrally, it also opens the door for new vulnerabilities
and access control inconsistencies if not done properly.
4.1.2 Motivating Example
To illustrate the types of customization problems that can occur, consider the following example.
In Lollipop 5.0, AOSP’s NetworkManagementService contains 81 remotely-callable public interface
methods which collectively are protected by 64 permission enforcement points that check the
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CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL permission. Since this is a signatureOrSystem-level permission, it is only
obtainable by apps signed with the platform key or residing in the system partition (i.e., trusted
system apps). In no instances does AOSP’s NetworkManagementService rely on credentials
obtainable by 3rd-party apps (i.e., normal- or dangerous-level permissions) to enforce access
control. As such, it is evident that Android’s designers intended this service to be used exclusively
by system apps.
In contrast, Motorola’s customized NetworkManagementService obtained from a Moto X device
running their version of Android 5.0 contains 8 additional remotely-callable methods:
addUpstreamV6Interface(), blockDataTrafficInternal(), enableTrafficMonitor(),
getSapAutoChannelSelection(), getSapOperatingChannel(),
removeUpstreamV6Interface(), runIpLogCmd(), and setChannelRange(). None of the
other 81 methods are changed from their AOSP version.
Of the eight addedmethods, only two, enableTrafficMonitor() and
blockDataTrafficInternal(), require system-only credentials such as those in AOSP’s
NetworkManagementService. Specifically, enableTrafficMonitor() requires
CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL permission, while blockDataTrafficInternal() requires the calling
process to be running as uid 1000 (a privileged uid, reserved for system processes).
Those that appear to deviate from Google’s system-only design for NetworkManagementService
include addUpstreamV6Interface() and removeUpstreamV6Interface(), which are
protected with the normal-level permission ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE. Also,
getSapAutoChannelSelection(), getSapOperatingChannel(), and setChannelRange()
are protected with the dangerous permission CHANGE_WIFI_STATE. Finally, runIpLogCmd() has
no apparent access controls at all. A test app was written to verify that these six methods could




This example illustrates several aspects of system customization that are important to understand,
and thus translate into the research questions for this investigation. First, “what is the type and
nature of access controls in System Services?” Second, “has a vendor customized System Services for
their devices and, if so, how?” Finally, “if present, how do the customizations compare with a known
baseline, AOSP?” Answering the first research question requires a characterization of access
control, while answering the second two requires a comparison, or dierential analysis, of the
vendor image vs. the baseline AOSP. As such, this chapter first introduces a newmethod for
characterizing Android access controls (Section 4.2), and then describes how these
characterizations are compared to highlight interesting aspects of their dierences (Section 4.3).
4.2 Characterizing Android Access Controls
The purpose of any characterization is to describe the distinctive features of something so that it
can be distinguished from otherwise similar objects. For example, accurate automatic facial
recognition relies on careful selection and quantification of various facial features extracted from
an image of the subject. These features alone are then used in distinguishing one subject from
another or when matching against a library of subjects. Thus, to accurately characterize access
controls of a particular entity in Android, we must first determine the features that are most useful
for capturing the nature of the entity’s access controls and in turn allow it to be distinguished from
its customized counterpart. Before proposing a feature set, we capture some specifics of Android
access control and its implementation. To this end, we begin with “first principles” and consider
the high-level diagram of Figure 4.1, as well as the backgroundmaterial provided in Chapter 2.
The core of this diagram shows a subject, s ∈ Subj , requesting access to an object, o ∈ Obj , by
way of a central access control mechanism,m ∈ Mech. This well-known simple model is extended
in two ways here. First, an assignment step ( 1©) is added to indicate how the subject gets its
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Figure 4.1: High-level access control model.
privileges when it’s created or elevated. These privileges, p ∈ Priv , come in the form of capabilities
that the subject possesses (such as a Binder token), or labels (such as uid or gid). Second, an
enforcement boundary ( 2©) is shown to indicate that the set of mechanisms may include those
that are implemented by the resource, as well as those that are central systemmechanisms.
In order to make this generic diagram useful for representing Android access controls, the
following questions must be answered for Android:
1. What are the possible subjects, Subj?
2. What labels and capabilities, Priv , can be assigned to the subject?
3. What enforcement mechanisms,Mech, are used for access control?
4. What are the possible objects,Obj?
5. Are there other interesting access control-related mechanisms?
In general, there are several ways in which these questions could be answered, including
comprehensive code analysis, by inferences made from system observations, from
documentation, or information provided by experts. As a starting point, since formal
specifications for Android do not exist, a collection of security documents from the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP) [10,7] and several key papers [20,53,37] were manually parsed for
security-related assertions. This analysis found 146 security statements, 110 of which were related
to access control (see Appendix A). From these, all mentions of dierent subjects, objects,
assignments, and enforcement mechanisms were extracted. These lists were further refined and
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confirmed using the results of the subject-object-path identification process described in Chapter
3. The result, summarized below, provides answers for the questions above:
1. What are the possible subjects? Subjects are initiators of requests governed by access
controls. In Android, these are apps, services and native processes. According to the default SE for
Android [53] policy, apps are further refined as isolated apps, platform apps, system apps,
untrusted apps, and shell apps. This refinement is important in this model since the assignment
process is dierent for dierent types of apps. For example, platform and system apps can obtain
special permissions that untrusted apps cannot. Thus,
Subj = {isolated_app, platform_app, system_app, untrusted_app, service, native} .
2. What labels and capabilities can be assigned to the subject? Assignment is when the
subject get its powers. These powers come in the form of labels and capabilities. Labels are simply
properties or meta-data that are used to identify the subject during access control decisions. In
Android, labels include Linux user ID (uid), Linux group ID (gid), SELinux security identifier (SID),
appId/userId (these are related to uid [34]), package name, and signing certificate.
Manifest permissions are assigned to apps at installation and run-time. Permissions have a
protection level of normal, dangerous, signature, or signatureOrSystem, corresponding to the
potential risk involved, and aecting which subjects can obtain them and whether the user is
consulted when they are granted [54].
Capabilities are tokens (tickets) that are actually held by the subject and presented to the
enforcement system when access is needed. In Android, Binder tokens and file descriptors are
examples of capabilities that are used to control access. Hence,
Priv = {uid , gid ,SID, package_name, cert, perms,Binder_token, file_desc} ,
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where uid is a combination of userId and appId, and perms is the set of all possible manifest
permissions.
A key insight that was gained during this analysis is related to label assignment. It was found that
assignments may take two forms, which this work terms dynamic and fixed. Dynamic assignments
are those that are dependent on some external input or environment. For example, the device
owner may choose to deny certain permissions when installing an app or make the app available
to only certain secondary users. In another example, assignment of signatureOrSystem
permissions is dependent on whether the app is signed with the platform key or located within
the system partition. Apps not meeting one of these criteria will be denied the system permission.
In both of these cases, the resulting label(s) depend on the specific circumstances at the time of
assignment. On the other hand, fixed assignments are those that are hardcoded into the system,
such as the permissions assigned to native daemons by init per init.rc, or the SID labels
applied to files and directories when the system image is built. Thus, the assignment itself may be
subject to access controls, and some of these are discretionary (i.e., up to the user) and some are
mandatory (i.e., hardcoded or fixed by mandatory policy).
3. What are the enforcement mechanisms used for access control?When a subject requests
something, it is usually the system’s job to make an access control decision based on the subject’s
identity, capabilities it may posses, and system policy. In many cases in Android, access control
points are implemented by resources themselves and may factor into the chain of access controls.
The study identified five basic types of enforcement mechanisms in Android:
• Capability-based. In the Binder driver, these come in the form of Binder tokens which are
issued to processes requesting access to IPC targets like services and other apps. The kernel
Binder driver maintains a structure of issued tokens for each process so as to enforce this
access control. This category also includes standard Linux capabilities such as file
descriptors which are also enforced by the kernel.
• Linux pseudo-capability-based. When apps are launched as new processes forked by zygote,
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various Linux capabilities are added or dropped from the forked process. While not true
capabilities, these nonetheless represent specific powers that the forked process may
possess. These are enforced by the Linux kernel in the same way as in traditional Linux
systems.
• Linux id-based. Every file and running process is owned by a Linux uid, one or more gids,
and is labeled with an SELinux SID. Running processes are also assigned a Linux process
identification (pid) and SID. All of these identities are maintained and protected by the
kernel and are used by traditional Linux access control mechanisms and, with the exception
of SID, relied upon throughout the Android Framework. In the Framework, these checks are
based on the caller’s id as reported by the kernel Binder driver that is mediating the IPC.
• Android permissions-based. At installation-time, a record of an app’s permissions, as
requested via themanifest file, is stored by PackageManager. When an appmakes a request,
the presence of a needed permissions is looked up by the system and/or the resource
requested. This mechanism is exclusive to the Framework, as manifest permissions have no
meaning to the kernel. Enforcement points typically include calls to checkPermission()
or its variants.
• User-based. As explained in Section 3.3.1, some access control decisions are accomplished
via direct interaction with the user. Many of these involve actions that would incur financial
obligations, such as premium SMS, or revealing private information, including location,
contacts, and photos. With the recent addition of run-time permissions to Android, the role
of this mechanism has been greatly expanded.
In summary,
Mech = {cap, linux_cap, id , perm, user} .
Important to the discussion of access control mechanisms is the fact that ultimate access to a
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particular Android resource usually requires several steps and involves more than one of the
above mechanisms. For example, access to a resource managed by a system service requires the
app to first obtain a capability (Binder token) for the service, which is permitted or denied based
on the app’s uid and SID. Once the app holds the capability, it may attempt to communicate with
the service via IPC, which is allowed only if the caller continues to hold the capability and the
kernel can verify this. Finally, the app’s request must pass any access controls present in the the
service method being remotely called. These are usually permission- or Linux id-based, and may
also include user-based confirmations.
4. What are the possible objects? Objects are the target of an access control request. The
document analysis and enumeration of Section 3.3 reveals that objects in Android include System
Services, apps (when their components are called by others), Linux files and sockets, and many
dierent Framework objects including the certificate store, modular frameworks such as Device
Administration, DreamService, etc.
5. Are there other interesting access control-related mechanisms? Security decisions in
Android are based on the identity of the subject, Subj . However, there are times when System
Services, acting on behalf of the subject, need to perform operations that the subject does not
have permission for. For example, before returning the appropriate Location object,
getLastLocation() in LocationManagerService first checks the location blacklist, whether the
available location provider(s) are allowed, how oen the app has requested location, and if the
location object contains a mask flag. These internal operations require privileges not granted to
apps, so they are placed in a block wrapped with clearCallingIdentity() and restoreCallingIdentity().
clearCallingIdentity() resets the identity on the current thread so that these operations are
peformed with the privileges of the systemserver process, not the caller. When finished,
restoreCallingIdentity() restores the identity on the current thread to that of the orignal caller.
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4.2.1 Access Control Feature Set
Knowing the sets of possible subjects, objects, labels and access control mechanisms in Android
allows for the definition of a feature set that can capture the nature of access control present in
code. Just as in facial recognition algorithms that rely on extraction of geometric feature sets, the
access control feature set does not attempt to capture every aspect of the object, but strives to
represent certain aspects well enough to be useful. Moreover, the object’s representation in terms
of a feature set should be resilient to uninteresting changes in the object. For example, eective
facial recognition systems need to be robust against superficial changes such as skin tone, scars,
or facial hair. While these may change the original image enough that a direct comparison would
fail, a set of numerical features that capture the unique geometry of the face can be more eicient
as well as independent of the superficial changes. In the same way, the access control feature set
should be independent of superficial code changes, such as the addition or removal of logging
statements.
Choosing the right set of features to accomplish this is non-trivial and may require significant
domain knowledge. This process of feature definition is known as feature engineering. Feature
engineering uses domain knowledge to identify numerical features for use in machine
automation [55]. In feature engineering, intuition and domain-specific insights into what’s being
represented are just as important as the technical aspects of using the features for automation
[56]. The insights and experience gained from the research and solutions described in the
previous chapters, combined with the initial NetworkManagementService study and systematic
Android access control analysis described above, form the foundational domain knowledge
necessary to establish a useful feature set.
The focus of this work, Android System Services, are typically large Java classes containing public,
private and protected methods. In addition, a subset of each service’s public methods are
remotely callable via Android’s Binder IPC. These are referred to here as AIDLmethods, and are
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special interest since they represent the entry points accessible to untrusted apps and potential
malware. Hence, it is of first-order importance that the AIDL methods be fully understood in terms
of access control. As such, the Android access control feature set, Feat , used in this work is as
follows:
Feat = {methodType, isAIDL, getCallingUid , getCallingPid ,








methodType = public , private, or protected ,
isAIDL = 1 if method is remotely callable; 0 otherwise,
getCallingUid = 1 if method calls getCallingUid(); 0 otherwise,
getCallingPid = 1 if method calls getCallingPid(); 0 otherwise,
clearCallingIdentity = 1 if method calls clearCallingIdentity(); 0 otherwise,
restoreCallingIdentity = 1 if method calls restoreCallingIdentity(); 0 otherwise,
checkPermission = 1 if method calls checkPermission(); 0 otherwise,
checkCallingOrSelfPermission = 1 if method calls checkCallingOrSelfPermission();
0 otherwise,
checkCallingPermission = 1 if method calls checkCallingPermission(); 0 otherwise,
enforcePermission = 1 if method calls enforcePermission(); 0 otherwise,
enforceCallingPermission = 1 if method calls enforceCallingPermission(); 0
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otherwise,
enforceCallingOrSelfPermission = 1 if method calls
enforceCallingOrSelfPermission(); 0 otherwise,
securityException = 1 if method can raise a SecurityException; 0 otherwise,
permissionNormal = 1 if method is protected with a normal-level permission; 0 otherwise,
permissionDangerous = 1 if method is protected with a dangerous-level permission; 0
otherwise,
permissionSig = 1 if the method is protected with a signatureOrSystem-level permission; 0
otherwise, and
permissionUndef = 1 if the method is protected with a unknown-level permission; 0
otherwise.
For every methodm in the class under study, a feature vector, fm is extracted that contains specific
values corresponding to each element of Feat . By way of example, Listing 4.1 shows the Java
source code for method addUpstreamV6Interface(), reconstructed from the .class file
containing Motorola’s customized NetworkManagementService discussed above.
Listing 4.1: Reconstructed Java source for method addUpstreamV6Interface() in Motorola’s cus-
tomized NetworkManagementService.






5 Slog.d("NetworkManagementService", "addUpstreamInterface(" + paramString + ")");
6 try
7 {
8 NativeDaemonConnector.Command localCommand = new NativeDaemonConnector.Command("tether",





13 catch (NativeDaemonConnectorException paramString)
14 {
15 throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot add upstream interface");
16 }
17 }  
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A review of this code for the features defined in Feat reveals thatmethodType = public and
enforceCallingOrSelfPermission = 1. Also, since the permission ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE is
defined as a normal-level permission in the image’s manifest, permissionNormal = 1. Finally, by
matching the method to one defined by the corresponding interface,
INetworkManagementService, isAIDL = 1. Therefore, the feature vector for this method is as
follows:
faddUpstreamV6Interface = [public , 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
.
4.2.2 Feature Vector Extraction
In production Android devices, there can be dozens of System Services containing thousands of
methods and representing 10s of thousands of lines of code. Practical extraction of the feature
vectors for every method in every System Service therefore requires automation. For the feature
set defined above, standard static analysis tools can easily perform the task of analyzing code and
writing feature vectors to a database. The feature vectors used for the results presented herein
were automated using Java static analysis to extract feature vectors from key .jar files found in
Android system images. An overview of the entire extraction process is shown in Figure 4.2 and
summarized below.
The process begins with either an actual device or image archive file. If an actual device is
available, and it can be rooted, a shell on the device itself can be used to extract the system
partition ( 1©) by dding the partition to a file, system.img. This dumped image can then be
transferred o the device andmounted via the Linux loop device which enables access to the files
within the system partition.
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Figure 4.2: Process for extracting access control features from an Android device.
Image archive files, typically available from vendor support sites, can be unpacked and their
contents accessed using procedures similar to those described in Appendix B for the images
studied in this work.
In either case, of interest to the feature extraction described here are the JAR files services.jar,
framework.jar and, if present, framework2.jar ( 2©). services.jar contains most of the
service manager classes instantiated by apps (e.g., LocationManagerService), while
framework.jar and framework2.jar contain the interface classes containing the stub and
proxy subclass implementations of the interface (e.g., ILocationManager).
AndroidManifest.xml files ( 3©) from each app installed in the image are also required to
determine the actual configuration of permissions on the device (i.e., permission protection levels
and custom permissions). This information is obtained by using apktool to decode all of the APK
files in the image, followed by parsing of the manifest files to find permission names and
associated protection levels. Code for accomplishing this is shown in Appendix C.
Extraction ( 4©) of the actual feature vectors specified here is accomplished with FeatureExtraction,
a project developed by a colleague using the WALA libraries [57] to extract the features specified
above. This code takes the JAR files and permission configuration file as input and writes a feature
vector file for each System Service found in the image. The functionality of this code is
summarized here.
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From the WALA ClassHierarchy, System Services present in the JARs are discovered by searching
the call graph for methods that register services to ServiceManager with addService() or
publishBinderService(). The declaring class for methods using these are stored as a binder
name and service name key-value pair in a hashmap, SSClasses.
Each class in SSClasses has a ServiceClassRecord that identifies the outer class, interface classes
and inner classes for the service. All of the methods from each of these are combined to form a
call graph which is then used for feature extraction. Each node in the graph is checked for the
presence of a feature. If the feature is permission-related (e.g., checkPermission(),
enforceCallingOrSelfPermission, etc.), the permission configuration data is consulted so that the
permission-level features can be populated. Finally, a hash map is populated with the state of all
features and then written to the feature vector file as comma-separated values. For
addUpstreamV6Interface() discussed above, the record containing the feature vector is
written to the file NetworkManagementService.csv as follows:
“[AIDL] public < Application, Lcom/android/server/NetworkManagementService,
addUpstreamV6Interface(Ljava/lang/String;)V >”,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0
Processing of the images studied here was accomplished on an 8-core i7 laptop with 32GB of
main memory running WALAmaster branch1 and Super CSV2 in Eclipse Platform3 v3.8.1. Generally,
processing times for complete feature extraction ranged from less than an hour for some images
to 10s of hours for others. Some highly-customized images, with many additional System Services
required these longer processing times. For a small number of services, WALA threw exceptions
and feature extraction for those services failed. This is believed to be related to errors encountered





4.3 Comparing Android Access Controls
To highlight changes introduced by the vendor, a dierential analysis of the feature vectors may
be performed. This could be done during static analysis if both AOSP and vendor JARs are
available simultaneously. Although this may shorten static analysis times, it would preclude full
characterization of the image since only dierences would be subject to feature extraction.
Instead, the approach taken here is to dierence the corresponding AOSP and vendor full System
Service feature vector files generated earlier and store the result as a file that contains only feature
vectors for added andmodified methods. These files can then be analyzed to gain insights about
the vendor modifications.
Dierencing is accomplished by way of standard Linux scripts. First, each image’s feature vector
files are filtered for AIDL methods and combined into a single CSV for that image, all_aidl.csv.
Next, pairs of these combined files are compared using diff in unified mode, as follows:
diff -u <baselineImageDir>/all_aidl.csv <vendorImageDir>/all_aidl.csv | grep ˆ+ >
<baselineImageDir>_<vendorImageDir>_AIDL_change.csv
Following this, someminor processing of the file is needed to remove unnecessary diff lines and
add a column index header. The result is a single file which contains a method-level list of every
feature vector from the vendor image that is dierent in some way from the corresponding AOSP
feature vector.
4.4 Case Study
The utility of the access control feature vectors and dierencing procedure introduced above is
demonstrated by way of a case study on AOSP and vendor images in which the research questions
above were addressed. Specifically, for characterization, “what is the type and nature of access
controls in System Services?” For comparison, “has a vendor customized System Services for their
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devices and, if so, how?” and “if present, how do the customizations compare with a known
baseline, AOSP?” Ultimately, these questions lead to the question of whether there are potential
vulnerabilities introduced by the customization. This question will also be addressed in the case
study.
Images listed in Table 4.1 were gathered from real devices, vendor support sites, and AOSP’s
“stock” firmware site.
4.4.1 Procedure
First, each of the images listed in Table 4.1 was processed through the JAR deodex and feature
vector extraction process. The resulting set of comma-separated values (CSV) files together
contain over 1.8 million feature vectors for all methods in all System Services that were
successfully decompiled and statically analyzed with FeatureExtraction. These CSVs were placed
in a folder hierarchy with a common root node, and then imported into Microso®Excel®by way of
the Power Query Formula Language (PQFL) script shown in Appendix D. In total, for all of the
images and services analyzed combined, the resulting database contains 35,802 AIDL method
feature vectors. Dierence files are similarly imported using PQFL. In this case study, the database
contains 8,037 feature vectors representing added or modified System Service methods.
4.4.2 Characterization Analysis
Once imported, a pivot table analysis is used for initial high-level characterization of each System
Service for each image. The pivot table enables the method-level feature vector data to be
aggregated into service-level statistics. Going back to the NetworkManagementService example
used earlier, the aggregate feature data for various AOSP versions is displayed in Figure 4.3.
From this top-level graphical representation, it’s immediately evident that the number of AIDL
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Table 4.1: Case study images.
Image Android version AOSP Baseline (if applicable)
AOSP jdq39 4.2.2 N/A
AOSP ktu84p 4.4.4 N/A
AOSP lmy48m 5.0 N/A
AOSP lrx21o 5.0.1 N/A
AOSP lrx22g 5.0.2 N/A
AOSP lrx22c 5.1.1 N/A
AOSPmra58n 6.0 N/A
BLU Neo4.5 4.2.2 jdq39 4.2.2
CyanogenMod 11-20150901 4.4.4 ktu84p 4.4.4
CyanogenMod 12.1-20151121 5.1.1 lrx22c 5.1.1
FireOS 32.4.6.5* 4.4.4 —
FireOS 37.5.2.2 5.0.2 lrx22g 5.0.2
LG D855PC10C_00 4.4.2 ktu84p 4.4.4
LG VS980 5.0.2 lrx22g 5.0.2
LG LS991ZV6_00 5.1 lrx22c 5.1.1
MotoX LXE22.46-11 5.0 lmy48m 5.0
SamsungEdge G925FXXU2COH8 5.1.1 lrx22c 5.1.1
SamsungNote8 N5110UEU2CNE2 4.4.2 ktu84p 4.4.4
SamsungS4 I9505XXUHOB7 5.0.1 lrx21o 5.0.1
SamsungS5 ATT G900AUCU1ANCE* 4.4.2 —
SamsungS5 Sprint G900PVPU1ANCB* 4.4.2 —
Xiaomi MIUI V7.0.5.0.KXDMICI 4.4.4 ktu84p 4.4.4






















































methods in NetworkManagementService has steadily grown from Android version 4.2.x through
6.0. Also, somemethods check the caller’s identity by way of uid, but the vast majority check if the
caller has been granted a signatureOrSystem-level permission, even those that were added by
Google in newer releases. A few in the later releases of Android also have no access controls, a
secondary feature, noAC , derived by checking the state of the others. Notably, the summary
clearly shows what was manually confirmed earlier: none of the methods contain blocks with
elevated privileges (i.e., no clearCallingIdentity-restoreCallingIdentity blocks), and none rely on
normal- or dangerous-level permissions. Thus, the pivot analysis of the feature vector data has
quickly and clearly revealed key access control characteristics of the service, across a couple of
years of successive Android releases.
The PQFL and pivot functionality allows this analysis to be accomplished for any one or more
services in any one or more images, just by placing the appropriate CSVs in the import directory
structure. Appendix E shows the complete results for all services analyzed in AOSP images
corresponding to Android versions 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 5.0, 5.0.1, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, and 6.0.
This baseline characterization provides insights into the nature of the security design of each
System Service. In the case of NetworkManagementService, it’s clear that the designers intended
the service be used only by apps trusted to have signatureOrSystem-level privileges. In contrast, a
service such as LocationManagerService is protected by predominately dangerous-level
permissions, since location is considered sensitive privacy data, but necessary for 3rd-party apps if
the user approves. In addition, as shown by the data in Appendix E, LocationManagerService
performs 13-16 (depending on Android version) privileged operations, based on the count of
clearCallingIdentity and restoreCallingIdentity features.
Many other insights can be gained from the feature vector data and the endless ways to analyze it.
By including the raw feature vector data in a database, complex queries suited to the needs of the
security investigator may be applied. For AOSP images, exploration of the feature set data can
help guide the investigator through the source code using Android source code browsers such as
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GrepCode4 or AndroidXRef5. The feature vector database contributed by this work and its
powerful analysis capabilities can thus be used to answer the question “what is the type and
nature of access controls in System Services?”
4.4.3 Dierential Analysis
A pivot analysis is also useful for a dierential analysis using the feature vector dierence CSVs.
Figure 4.4 shows such an analysis for the SamsungS4 I9505XXUHOB7 5.0.1 image as it compares
with the AOSP lrx21o 5.0.1 baseline. Here we can quickly see which new and existing services were
added or modified, as well as the relative scope of the customization.
The database allows more detailed analysis to be performed as well. As one example of many
possibilities, Table 4.2 depicts the results of an investigation of the same Samsung image to find
all new or modified AIDL methods that enforce access control with a dangerous-level permission.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As with the characterization analysis, there are endless possibilities for querying, analyzing and
manipulating the feature data, depending on the needs of the researcher. As an indication of the
extent of vendor modifications, Appendix F contains the results of a pivot analysis of all 8,037
added andmodified System Service methods from 12 vendor images that were compared to their
closest AOSP counterpart. These images contain an average of 670 added or modified AIDL
methods, with a high value of nearly 1600 additions in the Samsung images.
These example comparison analyses represent a few of the many ways that the second two
research questions are answered using the methodology described here. Using the database and
analysis tools, the security researcher can very quickly determine, “has a vendor customized
System Services for their devices and, if so, how?” and “if present, how do the customizations
compare with a known baseline, AOSP?”
4.4.4 Method-level Evaluation
Feature vector analysis can only go so far in yielding security insights about access control and
vendor customizations. Its purpose is to enable the researcher to gain a high-level understanding
quickly and then be able to easily focus in on specific areas of interest. Without the aid of the
various feature vector analyses described above, and the ability to quickly explore the entire
System Services dataset, investigators must resort to time-consuming static analysis or combing
through source code or decompiled JARs.
Once focused in on specific areas of interest, full and complete evaluation depends on traditional
methods such as source code or bytecode review and actual testing. This section provides
examples of how the feature vector analysis enabled rapid discovery of some problematic
conditions in vendor customizations.
The focus now turns to specific methods of three selected images in the dataset: LG VS980 5.0.2
(hereaer referred to as LG-5.0.2), SamsungS4 I9505XXUHOB7 5.0.1 (S4-5.0.1), andMotoX LXE22.46-11
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5.0 (MotoX-5.0). These were chosen for method-level evaluation because actual devices running
these images were available for testing and verification of hypotheses made from the feature
vectors.
Table 4.3 shows the result of querying the database for a count of all methods in each service that
have the potential to be accessible by 3rd-party apps. Based on experience, methods that invoke
getCallingUid() do so in order to check whether the caller has Linux system privileges (i.e, uid
of 0, 1000, or 2000). Also, as discussed earlier, signatureOrSystem-level permissions are not
obtainable by 3rd=-party apps. Thus, in terms of the feature set, the database can be queried for all
records that match the following criteria:
fthirdPartyMethod = fgetCallingUid=0 ∩ fpermissionSig=0
.




















































PackageManagerService 5 1 9
PersonaManagerService 19
PluginManagerService$PluginBinder 13































WindowManagerService 12 2 20
Total 472 15 758
This focused feature dataset can be used to guide additional detailed analysis. For example,
focusing in on NetworkManagementService, it can be seen that LG-5.0.2 contains 15 new accessible
methods, whileMotoX-5.0 and S4-5.0.1 contain 6 and 10 newmethods, respectively. A further query
of the feature vector database yields the following list of actual method names, argument types
and return types. These are determined during static analysis and are shown as Java object types




































It is important to note that the methods included here constitute a superset of those that may be
accessible to 3rd-party apps. This is because the current feature set does not attempt to capture
everything about the call chain between an entry point and the resources ultimately accessed.
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Some entry points may depend on access controls further down the call chain or access controls
not captured by the feature set. For example, Samsung’s custom ABTPersistanceService includes
an AIDL method getDeviceId()which appears to have no access control from a feature vector point
of view. However, manual testing revealed that this method in fact calls a private method g(),
which requires the caller to have a Linux uid of 1000. As it turns out, all of the AIDL methods in this
service are protected in the same way, using g(). Addressing this in the FeatureExtraction soware
is possible, but would require additional static analysis time to follow the call path to find access
control at deeper levels. This ends up being a trade-o between static analysis complexity and
extra testing time to eliminate false positives.
For actual method-level testing, a test app, ServiceApiTest, was developed and used in
conjunction with each physical device to verify that the API methods are indeed exposed to
3rd-party apps. Using reflection, each candidate method is called with the appropriate arguments
and return types, which are known from the static analysis and indicated in the lists above. For
example, theMotoX-5.0method setChannelRange() has three integer arguments (denoted by III
above), and is return type void (denoted by V).
Listing 4.2 shows the key portion of the code that can be used to invoke any public method in any
service running on the device. To call a method under test, SystemService.getServiceProxyObject()
is first used to get a handle to the service that contains the method. Then a reference to the
method is found in the proxy class of the interface using getMethod() and the method is invoked.
Results from the invocation are written to logcat and captured.
As an example, representative logcat output (for setChannelRange()) is shown in Listing 4.3. This
invocation is successful as evidenced by the status messages from the service. An example of an
unsuccessful invocation is shown in Listing 4.4, which indicates that Samsung’s getDeviceId() is
protected by access controls deeper in the call chain than visible with the current feature set and
static analysis approach.
Listing 4.2: App code to call test methods by reflection.
83

1 static final String LOG_TAG = "ServiceApiTest ::NMS";
2
3 static String serviceInterfaceName = "android.os.INetworkManagementService";
4 static String serviceProxyName = "android.os.INetworkManagementService$Stub$Proxy";
5 static String serviceManagerRegistrationName = "network_management";
6
7 public static void testMethodCall(Context context) throws ClassNotFoundException ,
8 SecurityException , NoSuchMethodException , IllegalArgumentException ,
9 IllegalAccessException , InvocationTargetException ,
10 InstantiationException , IOException {
11
12 Class proxyClass = Class.forName(serviceProxyName);
13 Object serviceProxyObject = SystemService.getServiceProxyObject(serviceInterfaceName ,
14 serviceProxyName , serviceManagerRegistrationName);
15 Log.d(LOG_TAG , "Returned object = " + serviceProxyObject.toString ());
16
17 try {
18 // Following depends on the method to be invoked
19 //Object result[] = null; // use this if method returns array
20 Object result = null; // use this otherwise (change below too)
21
22 // Following depends on the method to be invoked
23 Method testMethod =
24 proxyClass.getMethod("setChannelRange", int.class , int.class , int.class);
25 // ‘method name ‘arg type(s)
26 Log.d(LOG_TAG , "Found method = " + testMethod.toString ());
27
28 //result = (Object[])testMethod.invoke(serviceProxyObject); // use this if method returns array
29 result = testMethod.invoke(serviceProxyObject , 2, 3, 5); // otherwise use this
(change above too)
30 // ‘arg(s)
31 Log.d(LOG_TAG , "Result = " + result); // ObjectUtil.serializeObjectToString(result));
32 }
33
34 catch (NoSuchMethodException e) {
35 Log.e(LOG_TAG , e.toString ());
36 }  
Listing 4.3: logcat output from successful invocation of setChannelRange() method in customized
MotoX-5.0 NetworkManagementService.

1 D/ServiceApiTest ::MA (25369): Invoking test method ...
2 D/ServiceApiTest ::SS (25369): Returned object = android.os.
INetworkManagementService$Stub$Proxy@268a3266
3 D/ServiceApiTest ::NMS (25369): Returned object = android.os.
INetworkManagementService$Stub$Proxy@268a3266
4 D/ServiceApiTest ::NMS (25369): Found method = public void android.os.
INetworkManagementService$Stub$Proxy.setChannelRange(int ,int ,int) throws android.os.
RemoteException
5 D/NetworkManagementService( 933): Set SAP Channel Range
6 D/ ( 343): CMD INPUT [ set setchannelrange= 2 3 5][256]
7 E/ ( 343): Cmd: setchannelrange Argument : 2 3 5
8 D/ ( 343): cmd=setchannelrange , Val: 2 3 5, INI:0
9 D/ ( 343): Updated:setchannelrange= 2 3 5
10 D/ ( 343):
11 D/ ( 343): CMD OUTPUT [success]
12 D/ ( 343): len :7
13 D/ ( 343):
14 D/ServiceApiTest ::NMS (25369): Result = null
15 D/ServiceApiTest ::MA (25369): ... finished.  
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Listing 4.4: logcat output fromunsuccessful invocation of getDeviceId()method in customized S4-5.0.2
ABTPersistanceService.

1 D/ServiceApiTest ::MA( 2286): Invoking test method ...
2 D/ServiceApiTest ::SS( 2286): Returned object = com.absolute.android.persistence.
IABTPersistence$Stub$Proxy@274b8d19
3 D/ServiceApiTest ::ABTPS( 2286): Returned object = com.absolute.android.persistence.
IABTPersistence$Stub$Proxy@274b8d19
4 D/ServiceApiTest ::ABTPS( 2286): Found method = public java.lang.String com.absolute.android.
persistence.IABTPersistence$Stub$Proxy.getDeviceId () throws android.os.RemoteException
5 E/ServiceApiTest ::MA( 2286): java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException
6 W/System.err( 2286): java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException
7 W/System.err( 2286): at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
8 W/System.err( 2286): at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Method.java :372)
9 W/System.err( 2286): at com.ratazzi.serviceapitest.ABTPersistenceService.
testMethodCall(ABTPersistenceService.java :43)
10 W/System.err( 2286): at com.ratazzi.serviceapitest.MainActivity.onCreate(
MainActivity.java :25)
11 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.Activity.performCreate(Activity.java :6289)
12 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.Instrumentation.callActivityOnCreate(
Instrumentation.java :1119)
13 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.ActivityThread.performLaunchActivity(
ActivityThread.java :2646)
14 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.ActivityThread.handleLaunchActivity(
ActivityThread.java :2758)
15 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.ActivityThread.access$900(ActivityThread.java
:177)
16 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.ActivityThread$H.handleMessage(ActivityThread.
java :1448)
17 W/System.err( 2286): at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java :102)
18 W/System.err( 2286): at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java :145)
19 W/System.err( 2286): at android.app.ActivityThread.main(ActivityThread.java :5942)
20 W/System.err( 2286): at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
21 W/System.err( 2286): at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Method.java :372)
22 W/System.err( 2286): at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run(
ZygoteInit.java :1400)
23 W/System.err( 2286): at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main(ZygoteInit.java
:1195)
24 W/System.err( 2286): Caused by: java.lang.SecurityException: Not authorized to access ABT
Persistence Service
25 W/System.err( 2286): at android.os.Parcel.readException(Parcel.java :1540)
26 W/System.err( 2286): at android.os.Parcel.readException(Parcel.java :1493)
27 W/System.err( 2286): at com.absolute.android.persistence.IABTPersistence$Stub$Proxy.
getDeviceId(IABTPersistence.java :630)
28 W/System.err( 2286): ... 17 more  
4.4.5 Results
Because it was done manually in this work, testing of actual methods was limited to a sample. In
total, 81 methods, selected from across the three images were tested using the methodology
described above. Services successfully tested include:
• LG-5.0.2: 54 methods selected from NetworkManagementService, InputManagerService,
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BackupManagerService, AlarmManagerService, CCModeService, ClipboardService,
ConnectivityService, LGEncryptionService,MHPService, andWiFiOloadingService.
• S4-5.0.1: 10 methods from ABTPersistanceService, AccessibilityManagerService,
WindowManagerService, AudioService, and ClipboardService.
• MotoX-5.0: 17 methods from NetworkManagementService, PowerManagerService,
StatusBarManagerService, VzwConnectivityService, andWindowManagerService.
Detailed test results and test notes are located in Appendices G, H, and I for LG-5.0.2, S4-5.0.1, and
MotoX-5.0, respectively. Overall findings are summarized as follows:
• All 15 of the newmethods in LG’s customized NetworkManagementService identified as
3rd-party-accessible by the feature vector data were confirmed to be so. Of particular
interest were methods that involved enumeration or manipulation of the device’s network
interfaces, routing tables, and firewall (iptables). In addition, LG’s use of
non-signatureOrSystem permissions in this service contrasts with AOSP’s exclusive use of
them.
• LG’s customized ConnectivityService includes several “getter” methods that have no
permission requirement. This contrasts with AOSP’s use of ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE to
protect network state information. Also, several “setter” methods, such as setDataBlock()
and setRoamingDataEnabled_RILCMD() had no permission requirement, which contrasts
with AOSP’s typical use of CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE to protect changes to network settings.
• LG includes a custom service,MHPService (related to mobile hotspot settings) which
contains 126 3rd-party-accessible methods, all with no access control features. Of the five
selected for testing, all were confirmed to have no access control and were invocable. All
five changed important device settings or returned sensitive information. Examples are
enabling and disabling the mobile hotspot, getting and setting the WiFi Protected Access
(WPA) keys, and getting and setting the mobile hotspot Service Set Identifier (SSID). At a
minimum, to be consistent with AOSP, these methods should be protected with
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CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE or ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE. More likely, they are methods that
should only be accessible to bundled LG system apps and thus should be protected with
CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL or a custom signatureOrSystem-level permission.
• LG includes a custom service,WiFiOloadingServicewhich includes 24 methods with no
access controls. disableWifi()was confirmed to be invocable and change device network
state. The lack of access control in this service is inconsistent with AOSP’s typical use of
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE or ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE to protect network information and
state changes.
• Samsung’s customized AccessibilityManagerService contains 16 newmethods with no
access control features. Of the 3 tested, two has no access controls and appeared to make
changes to the device’s display. The third requires the system permission REBOOT. The
permission is enforced elsewhere, explaining the lack of access control features.
• Samsung’s AudioService contains 21 newmethods, 2 of which have the getCallingGid
feature, while the others have no access control features. Three of these were tested and
appear to have eect, as the log reports activity in VolumePanel.
• Motorola’s NetworkManagementService contains 6 newmethods that are potentially
available to 3rd-party apps. Five of these use normal- or dangerous-level permissions and 1
has no access control features. All 6 were tested. Execution of 2 seemed to be blocked by
SELinux denials, while the others were successful. Access control for all 6 methods is
inconsistent with AOSP’s use of signatureOrSystem-level permissions in this service, and the
unprotected method, runIpLogCmd() should be considered for access controls, since it
passes raw commands to a native daemon and is thus high risk for misuse.
• Motorola’s PowerManagementService contains one accessible method with no reported
access control features. It was successfully invoked during testing.
• Motorola’s StatusBarManagerService contains twomethods without access control features.




Generically, the feature extraction, characterization, and comparison methodologies introduced
here may have applicability to analyzing access controls in systems other than Android. Overall,
the feature vector-based approach is most useful when analyzing presence or absence of access
control at interfaces between components of a larger system. Systems that have these
characteristics include modular and client-server architectures, especially those that have a
well-defined common security framework that should be used when building extensions.
An example of such a system are Linux kernels with a common security framework such as Linux
Security Modules (LSM) [58]. LSM provides kernel developers with a general-purpose framework
for implementing standard access controls in future modules and extensions.
The standardization aorded by LSM is analogous to the insights gained in this work about
Android’s relatively standard use of specific access control patterns throughout the system and
specifically in System Services. Just as these insights enabled the definition of a feature set
applicable to many System Services, the LSM API can be translated to a feature set. Appropriate
static analysis tools can then be applied to source or binary representations of the kernel or kernel
modules to examine how, where, and if standard access controls are implemented. Moreover,
kernel changes or customizations can be assessed via dierential analysis of feature vector
databases from dierent kernel versions, just as was done in this work for vendor customizations
of Android System Services.
Client-server web applications represent another class of systems that may benefit from a feature
set-based approach. Implementations of these systems have also benefitted from standard
security frameworks such as [59] and [60]. APIs describing the framework can be translated into a
feature set which can then be extracted from code using static analysis tools. Various eicient
analyses and comparisons are then facilitated by the resulting feature vector database.
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4.6 Limitations and Future Directions
Some images were not able to be fully analyzed due to errors in unpacking or during static
analysis. It is believed that this is due to variances in vendor image formats, non-standard files,
deodex tool limitations, and the usual limitations of static analysis. Unfortunately, this means that
in some cases, not all System Services are represented in the feature vector files. To address this,
more robust unpacking and deodexing tools must be developed. Nevertheless, even partial
feature vector analysis can provide meaningful insight into portions of a vendor’s propietary
image.
More complex features would also improve the fidelity and usefulness of the results. For example,
adding features that describe how the return value of getCallingUid and getCallingPid is used
would help in understanding access controls that require the caller to have specific Linux-based
credentials. Also, feature extraction from deeper along the call chain would reduce the number of
methods thought to be without access controls, and in turn reduce the amount of verification
testing.
Finally, common analysis macros could be developed to avoid having to manually build queries
over the feature vector databases. These would be tailored to the domain of Android access
control, as opposed to the generic data analysis tools available in Microso®Excel.®
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter described a feature vector-based approach to studying and understanding access
controls in Android. The method was used to develop an interactive database of access controls
in the System Services of 19 Android images. Seven of these are AOSP images and are used as a
baseline in a case study to analyze the changes introduced by the vendors of the other 12. This
dierential analysis is captured in a second interactive database. Selected changes from three of
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the vendor images were further studied on actual devices, in order to confirm the feature vector
data, its utility and show that the methodology can be used practically to find potential
shortcomings in vendor customizations. The case study revealed a number of issues and
inconsistencies with the vendor code.
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Chapter 5
Protecting Sensitive and Vulnerable Resources
Traditionally, we’ve thought about security and usability as a trade-o: a
more secure system is less functional andmore annoying, and amore
capable, flexible, and powerful system is less secure. This “either/or” thinking
results in systems that are neither usable nor secure.
- Bruce Schneier
Chapters 3 and 4 describe security analysis methodologies that provide insights into the inner
workings of Android access controls, in both open source and vendor implementations. As the
results show, the advantages of an open, modular system, whereby each resource is responsible
for implementing its own access controls, can be oset by security problems arising from
mistakes and inconsistencies. In particular, protections implemented by resources can be partially
or completely nullified when changes to the platform architecture or vendor customizations
invalidate the assumptions implicit in the original design. To address these situations, each and
every resource must be reevaluated and redesigned every time the platform changes. If system
designers and vendors use the methodologies of the previous chapters, then these mistakes can
be fixed before the platform is deployed. However, once deployed, end-users have virtually no
way of addressing any remaining problems unless the platform itself contains a flexible, generic
means of isolating any vulnerable resource(s) from untrusted apps.
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Many of the system insights gained during the course of work described in earlier chapters relate
to the mechanisms by which Android’s modular system resources are requested, protected, and
accessed. The knowledge gained from the systematic, top-down subject-object access control
path evaluation, combined with that from the detailed method-level feature vector-based
characterization and comparison led to new insights. These led to the realization that almost any
current or future system resource could be transparently isolated from apps that may take
advantage of access control shortcomings or, for critical apps, fall victim to poorly designed or
malicious resources. This chapter describes the concept and design methodology that emerged
from these realizations, and demonstrates through an actual implementation and case study how
the novel approach is simultaneously eicient, eective, and consistent with Android’s unique
architecture and design tenets.
5.1 Introduction
Security and privacy compromises by malware and faulty apps is a persistent concern of
smartphone users. While many users may not fully understand the technical aspects of security
architectures, permissions, access control mechanisms, or measuring trust, most have no trouble
articulating which high level objects, resources or capabilities they are most concerned with. For
example, it’s common to find users worried about how apps might misuse or leak their location,
sensitive data such as personal contacts, or personally-identifiable information (PII) like phone
number and International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI). In response to this, numerous
solutions to address these concerns have been proposed, and many of these involve some form
of virtualization combined with access control to isolate untrusted applications.
Although every approach to isolation has its own unique strengths and weaknesses, all include
trade-os in terms of sharing and communication. In Android’s open architecture, where resource
sharing and inter-process communication (IPC) are fundamental to the platform’s basic operation
and usability, careful attention must be paid to fully understanding how a particular isolation
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boundary impacts the system’s functionality and performance. If this trade-o is not considered at
the outset of a design, significant performance, usability, and functionality issues can arise.
Countering these negative side-eects requires designers to overcome challenging system
problems, typically resulting in substantial modifications to the operating system, and significant
second-order complexities not directly related to the initial security goals. These problems are
especially prevalent in general-purpose designs that attempt to provide isolation containers for
entire apps or virtual phones, without the benefit of a priori knowledge of specific threat(s) or
end-user security goals.
This chapter introduces PINPOINT, a resource isolation strategy that forgoes general-purpose
solutions in favor of a lightweight approach that addresses only specific end-user security goals.
By addressing the end-users’ stated security goals and nomore, PINPOINT yields an eective
result using only the minimum amount of isolation. This significantly reduces or even eliminates
the negative side-eects that inevitably emerge when large parts of Android’s open, shared
architecture are isolated. Because isolation of resources can occur at many places within the
system architecture, and with varying degrees of granularity, the chapter begins with a discussion
of the tradeos in the design space in Section 5.2. This is followed by Section 5.3, which contains a
high-level description of the chosen concept. Section 5.4 describes a case study whereby we
implemented the PINPOINT concept as a lightweight hypovisor1 within Android’s Context
Manager, facilitating isolation of any System Service. Since resources available to apps are
typically presented as System Services, this case study implementation addresses a wide range of
practical security and privacy problems.
5.2 Design Space
In a layered architecture such as Android, isolation of a particular resource could be accomplished
at many levels, from the most abstract all the way down to the hardware device itself. Each of
1See Section 5.3.1 for an explanation of this new term.
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these alternatives has both advantages and disadvantages in terms of its impact on the system
and the end-user’s experience. With this in mind, this section contains an analysis of the
alternatives within the design space such that we can find the best solution given the metrics
deemed important. In this work, that includes solutions that are eective for specific threats or
classes of threats (as required by the end-user), while remaining transparent to developers,
negligible in their performance impacts, free of complex changes to the system, and low-cost to
the end-user in terms of usability and convenience. As we traverse the design space, we consider
the following qualitative aspects as our measures of merit for each design alternative:
1. Range of threats: does the design address a wide range and variety of threats?
2. Adequacy: is the design adequate in containing the threats it is intended to address?
3. Isolation “size”: is the isolation comprehensive, resulting in a small attack surface (few things
shared)?
Together, these measures relate to the notion of eectiveness, while an aggregation of the
following contribute to eiciency:
1. Complexity: does the design require far-reaching or complex modifications to the Android
system in order to restore basic platform functionality or compensate for loss of end-user
usability/convenience?
2. Transparency: does the design require special considerations on the part of the application
developer, i.e., do apps need to be modified to function?
3. Performance: does the design have a significant impact on overall device performance in
terms of start-up, application launch, user interface response, etc.?
4. Usability and convenience: will the end-user face significant concessions in terms of usability




















Figure 5.1: Simplified Android architecture.
5.2.1 Tradeo analysis
Consider the simplified Android architecture diagram of Figure 5.1. Here we see that all
applications and high-level system services share a single runtime, with inter-app communication
facilitated by Binder, Android’s lightweight IPC subsystem [61]. Now consider the situation where
we don’t trust App 2 and wish to isolate it in some way. This diagram now represents our
tradespace, where we can consider the overall ramifications of dierent approaches to isolating
App 2, in terms of the seven qualitative measures of merit introduced above.
First, we could totally isolate App 2 by running it on an entirely dierent instance of the kernel and
operating system (i.e., “dual boot”), where the only thing shared between the two apps is the
device hardware (Figure 5.1, location 1©). Using a mechanism like the open source BootManager
project [62], this approach provides a strong isolation between untrusted App 2, App 1, and the
system services on the OS instance we wish to protect. However, this very strong isolation comes
with a very high price. Usability and convenience suer greatly since switching between apps
involves a full reboot, and interactive sharing of data and resources becomes impossible. Also, as
is common in Android, App 2 may depend on components of App 1 for full functionality, requiring
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separate copies of App 1 to be installed in both boot partitions. On the other hand, the isolation is
very strong, and even if App 2 is able to exploit kernel vulnerabilities, it cannot escape its isolation
and aect App 1.
Inserting a virtualization layer at location 1© to enable simultaneous virtual machines (VM) is
another approach that recent work has shown possible [63]. This is the “bare metal” or Type 1
hypervisor design that would increase convenience somewhat by precluding the need for full
reboots to switch between apps. Isolation with a native hypervisor is still very comprehensive,
presenting App 2 with a very small attack surface. However, many of the sharing and open
communication tenets of the Android design are still broken and would require a significant
amount of added complexity to restore.
If we instead allow the isolated app to share both the hardware, kernel and some native Android
operating system resources with the trusted app (Figure 5.1, location 2©), one major aspect of
usability improves somewhat. Similar to Type 2 hypervisor architectures, the user no longer has to
reboot the device to switch apps. While the shared kernel and native processes represent
additional attack surfaces (App 2 can now use a kernel vulnerability to escape its isolation and
attack App 1), it enables low-level sharing of raw resources and communication channels, and the
design is still general enough to address a wide variety of common threats. Unfortunately, Android
fundamentally assumes a common runtime, and breaking this assumption introduces many
diiculties. To address these diiculties, one must undertake challenging and complex side
projects, such as those described in [64] and [65], which both use dierent variations of this
approach to isolation.
Another possibility would be to allow the apps to share the same hardware, kernel and runtime,
but not share the entirety of a frequently-misused subsystem such as Binder (Figure 5.1, location
3©). From results described in [66], where this approach was taken, we see that although the
eectiveness is limited to threats promulgated through IPC, nasty system problems (and
additional corrective complexity) that come with isolating the Android runtime have been
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avoided. Usability and convenience also benefit, since an isolated IPC subsystem likely has much
less negative eect on performance than does concurrent instances of the Android runtime
environment. App 2’s attack surface is also greater, since it now has the opportunity to exploit
vulnerabilities in aspects of the framework other than IPC. Again, whether this was a prudent
trade-o depends on the end-user’s expectations and the threats they need addressed.
As can be seen by the design alternative summary in Table 5.1, it’s clear by now that things like
complexity, usability, and the range of threats addressed appear to be strongly correlated to how
much of the system is shared by the isolated app and howmuch is part of the isolation itself
(isolation size). If large portions of the system are part of the isolation (i.e., not much is shared
between trusted and untrusted apps), many threats are addressed, but usability drops o,
countered only by a commensurate increase in complexity to fix things. Conversely, as more
system components are shared among all apps, fewer threats are addressed, but usability suers
less and fewer complex systemmodifications are required to compensate. At this level of analysis,
all designs are assumed to be adequate in addressing the threats they were designed to address,
and transparent to apps (i.e., apps can run unmodified without crashing). Thus, we can
summarize the more interesting aspects of the design tradespace by noting a few apparent
correlations among several of our measures of merit:
1. Range of threats addressed increases as isolation size increases (i.e., the attack surface
decreases).
2. Complexity increases (i.e., having to fix things broken by the isolation) as isolation size
increases.
3. Usability and convenience decreases as isolation size increases.
Thus, when the security goal is to address a specific threat or threats, the best solution would be
one that isolates only what’s necessary and nothing more. In this way, all relevant threats are
addressed without sacrificing any more usability than necessary and without increasing ancillary























































































































































































[66], this mindset is what allows their approach to isolating IPC to be termed “lightweight.” In this
work however, we consider this as a more general design principle that is potentially applicable to
many dierent aspects of the Android Framework, not just IPC. The next section describes a
design concept that embodies this mindset.
5.3 Design Concept
Having explored the tradeos related to the various approaches to achieving resource isolation in
Android, it is now possible to establish a more concrete design concept that addresses security
needs without sacrificing key features and convenience. As mentioned earlier, several previous
eorts have used isolation to address the problem of untrusted apps having access to sensitive or
private information. Some of these address specific types of data, such as location, while others
look for more general solutions (see Chapter 6 for more details). Two approaches that influenced
this work tremendously are Cells[65] and AirBag [64]. Cells leverages Linux Namespaces to allow
multiple Android user spaces, or virtual phones, to run simultaneously on a single hardware
platform. AirBag also leverages Linux Namespaces, but achieves isolation at the native runtime
boundary.
As an isolation mechanism, Linux Namespaces have several traits which correspond well to the
favorable characteristics of minimal isolation described in Section 5.2. Because of this, a
systematic analysis of Linux Namespaces, detailed in Appendix J, was undertaken to better define
these traits and their specific value to Android security. This analysis identified six key traits that
have value to the goal of providing eective yet eicient security, and are summarized in Table 5.2.
However, when comparing these benefits to the existing work that leverages Linux Namespaces, it
becomes apparent that much of the positive value of Namespace isolation was not realized in
these solutions. Understanding why is key to proposing a design concept that avoids this pitfall.
Looking at the Linux Namespace-based solutions in more detail, one finds that while eective for
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Table 5.2: SummaryofNamespaceTraits and theValue toAndroidSecurity (seeAppendix J for details).
Namespace Trait Value to Android Security
Fine-grained isolation of spe-
cific resources
Tailored isolation environment for each application, address-
ing specific threat and/or user goal
Resource-centric isolation Match user perspective on security; increase usability; sim-
plicity
High eiciency Negligible performance impact; design simplicity
Share-by-default Preserve open system design; avoid breaking things unre-
lated to the isolated resource
Transparent to host and apps System retains control over apps; apps run unmodified
Small footprint (files, mem-
ory)
Little impact on performance & resources; OTA updates
a broad range of threats, each introduces a number of significant challenges that must be
addressed before the overall system can function anywhere near what was intended and/or
acceptable to the user. For example, approaches that isolate untrusted apps in a separate runtime
[64] or virtual phone [65] require special customization of many shared hardware drivers, such as
those of the framebuer and graphics processing unit (GPU), resulting in a great deal of additional
complexity which may have little or nothing to do with the end-user’s primary security objectives.
In fact, in order to work at all, these designs require duplication of a number of system processes
and resources that may also have little or nothing to do with security objectives. In these
architectures, fundamental Android features such as IPC, which have a direct relationship to
usability and convenience, become problematic due to isolation of the Android runtime.
Compensating for these negative impacts can result in significant additional complexity in the
design. In the case of IPC, this requires the addition of special communication channels to
partially bridge the isolated runtime with the rest of the system.
In spite of the practical limitations of these designs, their use of Linux Namespaces is intriguing, as
Namespaces are generally considered to be a lightweight and eicient form of isolation. In
traditional Linux systems, Namespaces are a useful tool for abstracting system resources so that
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dierent applications have an isolated view of the resource. Namespaces have been used to
facilitate checkpoint/restart in high-performance computing (HPC) [67,68] and as the basis for
Linux Containers (LXC) to provide eicient security and resource containers [69]. The typical uses
of these technologies require only certain resources to be virtualized, and thus do not require the
creation of multiple instances of the operating system kernel. This allows higher density than
would be possible with traditional virtual machines. This advantage of container-based
virtualization has been long-recognized and put to good use in HPC and cloud environments
[70,71].
Why then haven’t Linux Namespace-based approaches to application isolation in Android been all
that practical, eicient, or successful at being accepted into the mainstream? The answer lies in
the fact that Android applications do not access system resources directly, but rather through the
layers of abstraction presented by the Android Framework, which runs on top of the Linux system.
Thus, the use of Linux Namespaces in Android presents an isolated view of resources to the entire
Android Framework, rather than to just individual applications. Because the Framework was not
designed exist in multiple instances of the global namespace, many problematic side-eects arise.
These side-eects and the additional complexity needed to overcome them, negate the positive
traits that Namespaces have for their traditional applications.
Realizing the benefits of namespace-based isolation, without causing the problems and
side-eects seen by their direct use is the goal of this design. Thus, the concept introduced here is
to adopt the Linux Namespace concept of fine-grained isolation, but do so with a new
implementation that is better suited to the resource abstractions of the Android Framework. In
essence, this work seeks to move the point of isolation as close as possible to the object(s)
requiring isolation, based on the stated security goals, while allowing continued sharing of
everything else. Put another way, the goal is to realize the benefits of lightweight isolation in
Android by identifying strategic locations where Linux Namespace concepts can be implemented.
As we will show, the result is a simpler implementation free of problems and far-flung platform
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side-eects. When specific security goals are taken into account, the result can be just as eective
as general-purpose solutions.
5.3.1 Hypervisor vs. Hypovisor
Before describing the high-level concept for PINPOINT, a brief aside on terminology is warranted.
In IBM’s System/360 Operating System, the supervisor was a program that had complete control
over everything running on the system. Later, and in most other systems, this program was known
as the kernel [72]. When IBM introduced full virtualization to System/360, the result was a
hypervisor that enabled soware virtual machines and essentially supervisedmultiple supervisors
[73]. The stronger prefix hyper-was chosen to imply a larger scope of authority than that of super-.
As stated earlier, the goal of this work is to move the point of isolation as close to the resource(s)
as possible, thus reducing the size of the virtualization and preserving the authority of the kernel.
In essence, this work proposes to introduce the opposite of a hypervisor. Just as hypothyroidism
and hyperthyroidism are opposites, the term hypovisor is used in this work to refer to a virtual
object manager with a very limited scope of authority compared to that of a hypervisor. Where
hypervisors have authority over one or more virtual machines and their kernels, hypovisors have
authority only over specific objects within the operating system.
The term hypovisor is also used in [74], where LXCs were used as a hypovisor to allowmultiple,
separate, independent instances of the Android Framework to run simultaneously on the same
hardware.
5.3.2 High-level design overview
Figure 5.2 depicts the overall concept at a high level. Given a specific security goal that relates to
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Figure 5.2: PINPOINT concept showingminimized isolation to address security goals, withmaximized
sharing of system objects.
hypovisor) at a strategic location that enables virtualization of only these objects such that App 1
and App 2 see dierent instances of each, while everything else about the system is common and
unmodified. When trusted App 1 requestsA andC ( 1©), the hypovisor returns instances ofA and
C ( 2©). On the other hand, when untrusted App 2 presents the same request ( 3©), the hypovisor
returns instances ofA′ andC ( 4©). SinceC and other resourcesD , E , F andG are not related to
the security goal, they are not virtualized, and either app may share them. Thus, the isolation size
is minimized to justA andB according to the threat and stated requirements. Resources that can
andmust be shared for transparent operation remain shared as intended. In this way, Framework
complexities that would arise from utilizing kernel-level isolation mechanisms are completely
avoided.
A non-trivial challenge that can sometimes arise when PINPOINTing certain resources is when
there are other operating system components or resources, shown in Figure 5.2 as resourceG ,
that depend on interactions ( 5©) withA orB and are unaware that nowmultiple virtual copies of
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them exist. In these cases,G must also be modified to account for this. Since this represents
additional complexity, one must always consider whether this extra complexity will negate the
lightweight benefits of the PINPOINT approach. IfA is a large and complex object that has many
dependencies throughout the system, it’s likely that creating virtual copies ofAwill break many
things that assume there is only oneA. In cases like these, it may be better to use a coarser
isolation such as the approaches in previous works. On the other hand, ifA has few dependencies,
then the modifications toG (if in fact there are any) will be straightforward. Two of our four case
study applications described in Section 5.5 exhibit this characteristic, and these details are
included there.
Another challenge that can arise is when the same sensitive information can be revealed by more
than one object. For example, let’s say bothA andC are capable of returning a piece of sensitive
data such as IMEI. It is important that all of these paths be identified, and either blocked or added
to the isolation boundary. Our case study encountered one example of this which will be
described in Section 5.5.
When designing and implementing the hypovisor, care must be taken to ensure that the system
does not allow any form of delegation of the hypovisor’s duties. For example, if the hypovisor is
responsible for dispatching a capability, there must be no other ways for an entity to acquire that
capability. Any other ways must be blocked in order to maintain the integrity of the isolation.
Section 5.4.3 contains a specific example of this and how we addressed it using mandatory access
controls (MAC).
5.3.3 Methodology
A summary of the PINPOINTmethodology is found in Table 5.3.
Identifying the best place to instantiate the hypovisor is key to achieving a balance between
flexibility and specificity. In our experiences thus far, we have found that the best isolation points
104
Table 5.3: PINPOINT Methodology.
Step Description Example
1 Define/collect security goal(s) Protect IMEI from app A
2 Identify relevant resource(s) iphonesubinfo and phone system services
3 Identify point(s) of resource access / capabil-
ity dispatchÞ implement hypovisor(s) & gen-
eralize
servicemanager
3a Security analysis Prevent inter-apppassing of service binder to-
kens (modify MAC policy)
4 Identify and address dependency(ies) com.android.phone and ProxyController
(service startup)
are places in the Framework where classes of objects and/or their capabilities are managed or
dispatched to apps. In Android, many resources are abstracted as system services, and their
capabilities are dispatched by ContextManager (i.e., the native servicemanager process). As
such, our initial work has focused on PINPOINTing system services, and our accomplishments
thus far in this regard are described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. However, we see future opportunities
for implementing complementary hypovisors in key places other than system services, including:
1. High level data objects, such as ContentProvider. These may leak personal data [75].
2. Binder and Intents. These may be used as a path for a malicious app to attack or trick other
apps[76].
3. Camera, audio. These have obvious privacy implications if miused, e.g., [21].
4. Clipboard. Can be used as an attack channel [77].
5. Accessibility subsystem. May be malicious toward critical apps [78].
6. Notifications. Potential misuse [79].
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Figure 5.3: Interactions with System Services.
5.4 Case Study on Android System Service
In order to evaluate the PINPOINT concept, we undertook a case study using Android’s system
services framework in both Android 4.4.4 (KitKat) and 5.1 (Lollipop) on a Nexus 5 device. Since a
wide variety of key resources are abstracted as system services, this choice illustrates that if the
point of isolation is wisely chosen, a single PINPOINT hypovisor can be used for a variety of
situations. To illustrate this point, we first provide some background on system services.
5.4.1 Android System Services
Interactions between Android applications and system services is enabled by the Binder and
ServiceManager subsystems. Binder relies on capability-based security and implements a “call by
invitation” mechanism to allow communication among apps, system services and
ServiceManager. As such, before an app is allowed to call a service, it must receive an invitation in
the form of an IBinder token.
Figure 5.3 shows an overview of the process by which apps access resources presented as system
services. Invitations are first created when services are registered with the central directory of
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services known as ContextManager. By design, there can be only one ContextManager, a
designation granted exclusively to the native servicemanager process early during the boot
process, by way of its privileged relationship with Binder.2 Once ServiceManager becomes
ContextManager, SystemServer registers core system services using the addService()method of
ServiceManager (path 0©). The result of this registration process is that ServiceManager now holds
an invitation (IBinder) for every system service running on the device. When an app needs an
invitation for one of these services, it contacts ContextManager (path 1©). ContextManager then
passes a copy of this invitation to the app (path 2©), and upon seeing this transaction, Binder
updates its protected list of invitations held by the app. Invitations cannot be forged because any
forged invitation will not have a corresponding entry in the protected list maintained by Binder.
Once the app has the invitation, it can interact directly with the service running in SystemServer
(paths 3© and 4©).
All requests for system services, even those made by system components, must go through
ContextManager. Thanks to Binder, the native servicemanager process has access to the trusted
identity of the caller, in the form of the Linux uid, which corresponds to the Android userId and
appId. This makes servicemanager an excellent place to implement a system service hypovisor
that can regulate applications’ interactions with virtualized system services. In this way, this
hypovisor represents the PINPOINT “sweet spot” of being specific enough to limit
inter-dependencies with other parts of the system, but flexible enough to apply to a large class of
objects and the mechanism whereby their capabilities are dispatched.
5.4.2 PINPOINTing System Services
The case study implementation is presented in three parts as shown in Figure 5.4, beginning with
the central enabling core, the system service hypovisor, labeled 1©. The hypovisor exists within the
2In fact, in the Android source (frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/binder.h), ServiceManager is de-




















Figure 5.4: Designoverviewshowing the servicehypovisor andpolicydefinition 1©, virtual serviceplug-
ins 2©, and application 3©.
native servicemanager process, where all service lookups are processed and capabilities
dispatched. Lookup requests by apps ( 3©), are initiated with a call to
Context.getSystemService(), and arrive in the form of a Binder transaction containing the
name of the service requested (e.g., location and other values as defined in Context class).
Because the requests are Binder IPC transactions, they are identified by the app’s Linux uid and
pid. This identification can be trusted because it is applied in the kernel driver.
The native servicemanager looks up and returns the capability (handle) for the requested
service to the caller in the do_find_service() function. This function uses the service string,
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along with the caller’s uid and pid to decide whether the caller is allowed to receive an invitation
to call the service. First, the device’s mandatory access control (MAC) policy may prevent the
calling process from receiving the handle, based on the subject’s and object’s SELinux security
context. Second, the service itself may disallow the dispatch of its handle to isolated apps (i.e.,
those with uids in the range [AID_ISOLATED_START ,AID_ISOLATED_END]). The
PINPOINT hypovisor is placed within this function, following the pid security context check, and
prior to the uid range check. Refer to Listing K.1 in Appendix K during the following description of
the modified do_find_service() function.
Following the MAC policy check, the modified code consults a secure namespace policy file,
nspolicy, using the requester’s uid as the index. Namespace policy is defined by a set of 3-tuples
of< uid , service_name, namespace >, where uid corresponds to the appId of the app assigned
to service_name namespace namespace. If the uid key appears in the policy, then
servicemanager invokes the local function add_ns() (see Listing K.2) to concatenate
_namespace to the service_name string that was passed to the function. A pointer to the string,
along with a length value are passed to the function find_svcwhere the actual handle is
retrieved. For uids that do not appear in the policy file, add_ns() is not called and the original
requested string is at the pointer location. Either way, find_svc() returns the actual handle of
the service corresponding to the resulting modified or unmodified string. The policy may specify
more than one service_name and namespace for a given uid to contain apps that present a
multi-dimensional threat. Since handle lookup requests can occur once or many times during the
lifecyle of an app, the design also supports dynamic policy changes.
An example policy file is shown in Listing 5.1. In this example, apps represented by uid 10052 and
10065 are assigned to location namespace 1, while app 10063 is assigned to location namespace 2
and iphonesubinfo namespace 1. 10064 is also assigned to iphonesubinfo namespace 1. Finally, as
directed by the special uid value 99999, all apps are assigned to sensorservice namespace 1. Note
that the uid can be chosen to address security needs related to multiple device users, such as the
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multi-user framework issues identified in Chapter 3. For example, to assign app 10063 to an
alternate location namespace only for userId 10, nspolicywould contain the line 1010063
location 2.
Listing 5.1: Example /etc/ns/nspolicy showing
how apps are assigned to dierent namespaces
(for the device Owner, userId 0).

1 10063 location 2
2 10063 iphonesubinfo 1
3 10064 iphonesubinfo 1
4 10065 location 1
5 10052 location 1
6 99999 sensorservice 1  
Currently, virtual services shown in Figure 5.4 at 2© (e.g.,A′,A′′,B ′ andB ′′) are preconfigured at
build time. For example, the existing SensorService code can be duplicated as SensorService_1 and
SensorService_2. The semantics of these duplicates is then modified such that they implement
the required characteristics of the alternate namespaces, such as random data, “fuzzed” data, or
adjustments to specific sensors or sensor families. These additional services are started at boot
time, along with the normal global service. SystemServer is modified to start the additional
services along with their global counterparts,A andB . An example of how SystemServer was
modified to accomplish this for LocationManagerService and two alternate location namespaces
is shown in the code excerpt of Listing 5.2. In this example, the running device will have two new
services available, location_1 and location_2, in addition to the original service, location.
Listing 5.3 is an excerpt from Android’s service list command, showing services with multiple
namespaces for iphonesubinfo, location, input_method, and sensorservice running on the test
device.
Listing 5.2: SystemServer excerpt showing how multiple instances of LocationManagerService are
started.

1 public final class SystemServer {
2 ...
3 LocationManagerService location = null;
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4 LocationManagerService_1 location_1 = null;
5 LocationManagerService_2 location_2 = null;
6 ...
7 if (! disableLocation) {
8 try {
9 Slog.i(TAG , "Location Manager");
10 location = new LocationManagerService(context);
11 ServiceManager.addService(Context.LOCATION_SERVICE , location);
12 } catch (Throwable e) {
13 reportWtf("starting Location Manager", e);
14 }
15
16 // register additional location namespace (1)
17 try {
18 Slog.i(TAG , "Location Manager 1");
19 location_1 = new LocationManagerService_1(context);
20 ServiceManager.addService("location_1", location_1);
21 } catch (Throwable e) {
22 reportWtf("starting Location Manager 1", e);
23 }
24
25 // register additional location namespace (2)
26 try {
27 Slog.i(TAG , "Location Manager 2");
28 location_2 = new LocationManagerService_2(context);
29 ServiceManager.addService("location_2", location_2);
30 } catch (Throwable e) {
31 reportWtf("starting Location Manager 2", e);
32 }
33 ...
34 }  
Listing 5.3: List of services running on a Nexus 5 device, showing multiple namespaces for iphone-
subinfo, location, input_method, and sensorservice.

1 $ adb shell service list
2 Found 105 services:
3 0 sip: [android.net.sip.ISipService]
4 1 phone: [com.android.internal.telephony.ITelephony]
5 2 isms: [com.android.internal.telephony.ISms]
6 3 iphonesubinfo_1: [com.android.internal.telephony.IPhoneSubInfo]
7 4 iphonesubinfo: [com.android.internal.telephony.IPhoneSubInfo]
8 ...
9 36 location_2: [android.location.ILocationManager]
10 37 location_1: [android.location.ILocationManager]
11 38 location: [android.location.ILocationManager]
12 ...
13 62 input_method_1: [com.android.internal.view.IInputMethodManager]
14 63 input_method: [com.android.internal.view.IInputMethodManager]
15 ...
16 91 batterystats: [com.android.internal.app.IBatteryStats]
17 92 sensorservice_4: [android.gui.SensorServer]
18 93 sensorservice_3: [android.gui.SensorServer]
19 94 sensorservice_2: [android.gui.SensorServer]
20 95 sensorservice_1: [android.gui.SensorServer]
21 96 sensorservice: [android.gui.SensorServer]
22 ...
23 104 drm.drmManager: [drm.IDrmManagerService]  
Although not required, the alternate services usually have interfaces identical to their global
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counterpart, and dier only in semantics. For example, the global location service returns the
actual current location, while the other location services return noisy, random or preset locations
via an identical public interface. This example is illustrated by Listing 5.4 where latitude and
longitude data received from the provider are overwritten with random values before being
passed to the handler.
Listing 5.4: Modified reportLocation() excerpt from LocationManagerService_1 showing how the
API’s semantics are changed from that of the standard LocationManagerService. In this case, the
method overwrites the Location object with random lat/long values.

1 public class LocationManagerService_1 extends ILocationManager.Stub {
2 ...
3 @Override
4 public void reportLocation(Location location , boolean passive) {
5 // This is the random location namespace, so overwrite real location that came from provider
6 double lat = Math.random () *181.0 -90.0; // -90 to +90
7 double lon = Math.random () *361.0 -180.0; // -180 to +180




12 mLocationHandler.removeMessages(MSG_LOCATION_CHANGED , location);
13 Message m = Message.obtain(mLocationHandler , MSG_LOCATION_CHANGED , location);




18 }  
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, some services may have dependencies outside the PINPOINTed
virtualization boundary. An example of this is LocationServicewhich receives “push” updates in
the form of callbacks from native code. The implication of this is that the alternate location
namespaces will not receive callbacks from the native code, since the native code was not
designed with multiple location service instances in mind. Thus, this native code must be
modified to support the additional services, resulting in additional complexity. In the case of
location service, this additional complexity is relatively small, and is implemented by changing
the scalar callback object to an array of callback objects with length equal to the number of
location namespaces. Listing 5.5 shows how this was done for the native function
location_callback() in the GPS provider.
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Listing 5.5: location_callback() from native GPS provider modified to push location updates to
all registered location services by way of an array of callback objects.

1 static void location_callback(GpsLocation* location)
2 {
3 JNIEnv* env = AndroidRuntime :: getJNIEnv ();
4 //env->CallVoidMethod(mCallbacksObj, method_reportLocation, location->flags,
5 for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
6 if (mCallbacksObj[i]) {
7 env ->CallVoidMethod(mCallbacksObj[i], method_reportLocation , location ->flags ,
8 (jdouble)location ->latitude , (jdouble)location ->longitude ,
9 (jdouble)location ->altitude ,
10 (jfloat)location ->speed , (jfloat)location ->bearing ,
11 (jfloat)location ->accuracy , (jlong)location ->timestamp);
12 checkAndClearExceptionFromCallback(env , __FUNCTION__);
13 }
14 }
15 //  
5.4.3 Security Discussion
The PINPOINT case study introduces a lightweight services hypovisor into the native portion of
ServiceManager. The purpose of the hypovisor is to isolate particular apps from various services
as specified by the user’s policy. This security discussion is included to provide a sense of the
strength of this isolation. We begin with Binder, since most of the isolation strength derives from
Binder’s security model.
Every process using Binder, including system service threads within system_server has a
protected representation in the kernel as an instance of a binder_proc structure. Each remote
capability that a process holds is represented by one or more binder_node structures attached
to the binder_proc instance. These nodes are known only to the kernel module and are used to
determine the recipient of the communication, based on a handle provided from userspace.
Handles are local references and mappings from handles to nodes are also stored securely in
binder_proc. Hence, only the kernel knows how to map a particular handle to the
corresponding node.
When SystemServer registers system services with ContextManager using addService() (as
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shown in the example of Listing 5.2), the kernel adds the service’s binder_node to the
binder_proc corresponding to the servicemanager process. ContextManager also allocates a
local index to each registered service. When an app asks ContextManager for a handle to a service,
servicemanager returns the handle and the kernel binder driver adds the service’s
binder_node to the app’s binder_proc, thus recording the validity of the app’s newly acquired
capability. Apps can also send handles they posses to other apps via Intent. Upon seeing the
handle within the transaction, the kernel driver adds the node to the receiver’s binder_proc so
that the recipient is now a valid holder of that capability. This is known as a binder transfer.
The addition of a services hypovisor does not change anything about how handles are looked up
and provided by ContextManager or how capabilities are propagated by way of the kernel binder
driver. All apps, native and Java alike, are subject to the intervention of the hypovisor when
requesting service handles from ContextManager. Thus, any vulnerabilities in the prototype
regarding how service handles are obtained from ContextManager, or vulnerabilities in the binder
driver itself, are also vulnerabilities of stock Android and thus outside the scope of this discussion.
What the design does change iswhich handles are given out. PINPOINTing services introduces the
notion of remote service handles that should be unobtainable by certain apps. For example, an
app assigned to an alternate location namespace should never be allowed to get the capability to
the global location namespace, either directly from ServiceManager or from another app. This is
dierent than stock Android where ContextManager acts as an open directory service, and
obtaining a service handle via binder transfer from another app does not represent a capability
leak. In fact, the kernel binder driver itself facilitates these transfers through the
BINDER_READ_WRITE command of the driver’s ioctl interface. When a transaction is made, the
driver simply updates the target’s binder_node to reflect the newly-acquired capability. These
app-to-app binder transactions do not involve servicemanager and therefore do not involve the
PINPOINT services hypovisor. Thus, in order to maintain isolation among namespaces, these
transfers must be regulated or blocked.
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In essence, the hypovisor design turns an unprivileged instruction for transferring binder
capabilities into a privileged one. Thus to enforce this new privilege, all ways to transfer binder
capabilities must be controlled. Thankfully, all binder transactions, including transfers, are
processed in one place, binder_transaction() function of the binder driver code, binder.c.
Binder’s ioctl interface supports five commands: BINDER_WRITE_READ,
BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS, BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, and
BINDER_VERSION. Of these, only BINDER_WRITE_READ is of interest for the analysis of binder
transfers, as it is the basis for all IPC operations. BINDER_WRITE_READ’s purpose is to copy a
binder data buer from userspace into the kernel for processing, and then back to userspace
when processing is finished. The buer includes a binder_transaction_data structure which
contains the handle of the target, transaction code, and other information about the transaction
including the sender’s pid and eective uid.
The BINDER_WRITE_READ command is handled by a switch statement in function
binder_ioctl() in binder.c. The BINDER_WRITE_READ case branches to two places,
binder_thread_write() and binder_thread_read(). Binder transactions are ultimately
accomplished through the former, so the focus now turns to binder_thread_write().
binder_thread_write() does a lot of bookkeeping, but for binder transactions, it in turn relies
on binder_transaction(). Aer validating the source and target of the requested transaction,
the core of binder_transaction() includes a switch statement where each of the three
possible types of binder objects are processed accordingly. These include binders, handles and
file descriptors. Because they take the form of binders and handles, the focus of controlling
transfers lies within these two parts of the switch. Inside the case blocks for binders and handles,
the binder_proc and binder_node kernel data structures are updated according to the
transaction. These are the only two places in the driver where this is done. Hence, we add an
access control point in these two locations to enforce the new privilege associated with binder
transfers.
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Theoretical transfers of capabilities by means other than a binder ioctl, such as through UNIX
sockets, will be ineective as the kernel binder driver will not record the transaction and will not
update the target’s binder_proc. The received capability will be useless.
The PINPOINT system services prototype blocks app-to-app transfers of system services
capabilities in the kernel binder driver’s binder_transaction() function, through an extension
of existing SEAndroid MAC policy. Specifically, the security_binder_transfer_binder()
hook, present in each of the two relevant cases of the transaction type switch, is extended to
also pass the task_struct of the binder_ref (for references) or binder_node (for handles)
under consideration. This allows the hook function to extract the owner’s SELinux security
identifier (SID) and use it as the subject in an access control decision. To enforce the prohibition
on app-to-app transfers of system service handles, the prototype contains modified type
enforcement rules pertaining to untrusted_apps, so as to disallow transfer of
u:r:system_server:s0 binders between apps with an SELinux security context
ofu:r:untrusted_app:s0. In addition, a new neverallow rule was added to further ensure at
policy build-time that there are no allow rules elsewhere in the policy that are inconsistent with
this. This eectively blocks any attempted bypass of the hypovisor, while allowing all other normal
binder transfers among apps and the system to proceed.
In assessing the impact of this new binder transfer restriction, a legitimate use of the function was
sought out, with no findings. In fact, even aer extensive testing of many apps, none that exploit
this possibility have ever been found. Seemingly, the normal design patterns have apps getting
system services directly from servicemanager rather than relying on other apps. Thus, there is
high confidence that blocking these transfers will have no aect on any legitimate app.
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5.4.4 Policy Configuration
As explained in Section 5.4.2, the servicemanager hypovisor consults a secure policy file to
determine if the requester has been assigned to any alternate service namespaces. This policy can
be created and updated by a variety of means: via the system Settings app, via launcher
configuration, from hard-coded (i.e., build-time) mandatory policy, via over-the-air (OTA) updates
in a mobile device management (MDM) architecture, via adb, using a privileged text editor on the
device, etc. In the prototype, a default policy file was included in the system build, and it was
updated via adb over USB and directly on the device using a text editor with root privileges. The
system was also integrated with a custom launcher application being developed by another
student. In terms of user-friendliness, the custom launcher enables the end-user to drag-and-drop
app icons to and from dierent containers, each representing a specific PINPOINT configuration.
For example, a particular container might be configured to protect two sensitive resources,
location and IMEI, from the apps placed within it. When an app is dropped into this container, the
launcher app automatically updates the policy with the uid and service names corresponding to
the protected resources. This update takes eect immediately since servicemanager consults
the policy each time the appmakes a request.
5.4.5 Limitations
Currently, the case study prototype requires all global and virtual system services to be running
whether or not any apps are assigned to them. In terms of overhead, this fact manifests itself as
additional memory use by the system_server process. Although data presented in Section 5.6.1
shows that this overhead is small, this aspect of the design should be made more elegant and
eicient in the future.
It is also important to note that the design does not provide full security domain isolation in the
sense that it does not prevent apps from passing high-level sensitive information to other apps.
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5.5 Applications
This section describes application and evaluation of the system services PINPOINT prototype in
four practical applications involving system services. Each application involves a specific security
goal that is used as the motivation for the scenario. All implementations were tested using AOSP
branches of Android 4.4.4 (KitKat) and Android 5.1 (Lollipop) on a Nexus 5. The four services and
corresponding security scenarios discussed here are as follows:
1. LocationManagerService: A widely used location-finding service that binds with a
number of abstract provider mechanisms. Security goal is to prevent untrusted apps from
obtaining accurate location information[80]. See Section 5.5.1.
2. IPhoneSubInfo: A “hidden” service for accessing phone subscriber information, called only
by other system services such as TelephonyManager. Security goal is to prevent untrusted
apps from accessing sensitive subscriber information [37]. See Section 5.5.2.
3. InputMethodManagerService: A service that arbitrates communications between apps
and a variety of installed input methods, and has complex interactions with other system
objects including WindowManager. Security goal is to protect critical apps from falling
victim to malicious input methods[81]. See Section 5.5.3.
4. SensorService: A native service that interfaces directly with hardware sensors. Security
goal is to prevent untrusted apps from obtaining accurate sensor data to steal data[23][82],
eavesdrop [83], or track movement/location[84]. See Section 5.5.4.
By and large, porting from 4.4.4 to 5.1 was straightforward. In fact, the implementation of the
hypovisor within servicemanager is virtually identical, even across the major version releases.
Most of the diiculty in porting to dierent Android versions is due to changes in the design of the
services themselves, especially for internal services that are not designed to be directly accessed
by developers and are thus not subject to deprecation. For example, between Android versions 4
and 5, the underlying architecture of (IPhoneSubInfo) changes substantially, requiring an
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expansion of the isolation boundary in order to continue to meet the security goal. This is
discussed below.
5.5.1 Location Service
Although location services provide great convenience and enable new functionality for users, they
have significant security and privacy implications if misused. While some apps require accurate
location to fulfill their main purpose, others utilize location information only to enrich their
primary function. For example, a social networking app’s primary function is to interact with
friends via photo and status updates. These apps usually enrich this interaction by attaching
location to these updates. If the end-user wishes to prevent only this one app from knowing
location, and still enjoy its primary friend-interaction functions, she must rely on the
trustworthiness of the app’s own settings and controls. This is because current location privacy
support from Android itself is too coarse-grained to achieve the user’s goal of isolating only this
one aspect of this one app. If the app is poorly-written or malicious in its handling of location data,
privacy leaks may occur despite the user’s best eorts to prevent them. By PINPOINTing the
location service resource, and placing only this app in the new location namespace, we can
transparently and eectively address this user’s security goal without inconveniencing her or
introducing the complex systemmodifications and overhead of general-purpose solutions.
To demonstrate this, we PINPOINTed the location service to provide three separate location
namespaces for assigning apps, each with dierent semantics but identical interfaces. The global
location namespace functions normally and is used with trusted apps. A fuzzy location namespace
provides reduced-accuracy location information by adding noise to location objects. Finally, a
random location namespace returns totally random location data to assigned apps.
We implemented these two additional location namespaces by adding two additional system
services, LocationManagerService_1 (LMS ′) and LocationManagerService_2 (LMS ′′), as
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shown in Figure 5.5. These present the exact same API as the stock service, and thus are
indistinguishable from the app’s perspective.
Each location service binds to the standard set of common location providers such as
GpsLocationProvider that interfaces through native code to actual hardware. However, as
alluded to in Section 5.3, these providers represent dependent resources (G in Figure 5.2) that are
designed based on an assumption of only one location service. Thus, these must also bemodified
slightly to make callbacks to all three location services. Otherwise, LMS ′ and LMS ′′ will never get
location update callbacks since the providers are not otherwise aware of the virtualized services.
Since the specifics of these modifications was provided as an example in Section 5.4.2, they are
not repeated here. Instead, refer to Listings 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5.
The semantics of the additional services are as follows: LocationManagerService_1 replaces
location updates returned from the providers with random data, while
LocationManagerService_2 adds random osets to the same. Since each namespace is
indistinguishable from the global location namespace in, apps in alternate namespaces behave
normally and process the virtual location data as if it were real.
Figure 5.6 shows screenshots of a popular fitness app, RunKeeper3, that we used to demonstrate
the isolated location namespaces. The version used for testing accesses LocationManagerService
directly and not through a proxy (see discussion below). Figure 5.6a shows points collected during
an activity while the app is assigned the noisy location namespace. Figure 5.6b shows the same
app while assigned to the random location namespace. Note that in both cases, the app’s display
indicates “Good GPS”, demonstrating the complete transparency of these namespaces to this
unmodified app.
In some cases, applications may use Google Play Services to access resources such as location
[85]. In fact, the latest version of the RunKeeper app used for testing this namespace now accesses










































Figure 5.5: PINPOINTing LocationManagerService.
Services package, com.google.process.gapps, on behalf of the client app. Since this package
runs as a separate app process, the system services hypovisor does not have access to the uid of
the client. While the uid of the Play Services app can be assigned to a namespace, doing so will
result in all apps using Play Services to be subject to the semantics of that namespace. While this
is recognized as another type of dependent resource,G , addressing it is outside the scope of this
work, since Play Services source code is not available. However, modifying Play Services to
include an extension of the system services hypovisor would be possible.
5.5.2 Subscriber Information Service
iphonesubinfo is a hidden service used exclusively by TelephonyManager to service app
requests for subscriber information such as IMEI, mobile equipment identifier (MEID), electronic
serial number (ESN), phone number, voicemail number, private/public user identities, home
network name, etc. Several of these values have significant security and privacy implications and
are known to be malware targets [37]. Although protected by Android’s READ_PHONE_STATE
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(a) RunKeeper running in location names-
pace with noisy locations.
(b) RunKeeper running in location names-
pace with random locations.
Figure 5.6: RunKeeper fitness app running in alternate location namespaces.
permission, misusing or malicious apps can easily legitimize declaration of this permission since it
is necessary for a number of common features, such as those provided by PhoneStateListener.
To isolate an untrusted app from or more of the data values returned by iphonesubinfo, we
PINPOINTed this system service. We enabled the non-global namespace by modifying the internal
telephony ProxyController to instantiate PhoneSubInfoController_1 as well as
PhoneSubInfoController. The former starts iphonesubinfo_1 service with an API identical to
iphonesubinfo, started by the latter. When an untrusted app is assigned to the alternate
iphonesubinfo namespace, it can obtain the same instance of TelephonyManager as trusted
apps can, but any subsequent calls to getDeviceId(), getLine1Number(), etc. by the
untrusted app are processed by iphonesubinfo_1. iphonesubinfo_1 returns dierent values
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for sensitive subscriber parameters.
When porting this design to Android 5.1, we found that the underlying structure of the telephony
service had changed significantly. In particular, the ITelephony (phone service) interface was
enhanced to include its own getDeviceId() call, and TelephonyManagerwas modified to
obtain the device ID from this interface rather than IPhoneSubInfo as was the case in 4.4.4. Thus,
apps assigned to iphonesubinfo_1would still get the device’s real IMEI because our isolation
did not include every object that could return that sensitive data. This necessitates an expansion
of the isolation boundary to include both iphonesubinfo and phone services, and is a good
example of needing to identify all possible means of access to the sensitive resource related to the
end security goal.
To demonstrate eectiveness of our PINPOINTed subscriber information service, we obtained the
popular app IMEI Analyzer.4 Figure 5.7 shows this app running unmodified in both global (Figure
5.7a) and fake (Figure 5.7b) iphonesubinfo/phone namespaces. In the global namespace, the
actual, valid IMEI of our test device is returned, while a fake IMEI is returned to the app aer it has
been assigned to the alternate iphonesubinfo_1/phone namespace by adding its uid to the
nspolicy file.
5.5.3 Input Method Service
Input Method Editors (IME) are screen controls that enable users to enter text. Currently, there are
about 900 third-party keyboard apps published on the Google Play store, with at least 10 having
more than one million downloads. Most require INTERNET or WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
permissions, which enable the IME to log or transmit any data that’s typed in. In an empirical study
of keyboard apps, it was found that more than 61% require three or more permissions giving them
the ability to exploit keylogging andman-in-the-middle attack vectors [81]. To illustrate this threat,
4https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.vndnguyen.imeianalyze
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(a) IMEI Analyzer running in global
iphonesubinfo/phone namespace.
(b) IMEI Analyzer running in alternate
iphonesubinfo/phone namespace.
Figure 5.7: IMEI Analyzer running in dierent iphonesubinfo/phone namespaces.
consider sensitive apps like banking or purchasing apps, which oen require users to enter bank
card numbers or passwords for authentication. All entry of these values is done via the current
IME, selected by the user. If the IME is malicious, an attacker can easily collect these values [86].
The overall working architecture of IMEs is shown in Figure 5.8. In every application’s context
space, there exists an instance of InputMethodManager (path 1) which is used to communicate
with a system-wide service, InputMethodManagerService. When an input field comes into
focus, the app’s InputMethodManager invokes this system service (paths 4 and 5) aer obtaining
its handle via ServiceManager (paths 2 and 3). With this handle, the appmay obtain a unique
InputConnection Binder token from InputMethodManagerService for making direct calls to
the IME keyboard app. Using this token, the system is able to secure and control interactions
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amongmultiple applications andmultiple IMEs [87].
Currently, apps do not have control over the IME selected by the user. Instead, the system will
bring up the user’s selected IME whenever any text field comes into focus. While Google has
recognized the security and privacy issues associated with this design [88], the current measures
rely on the user to make wise choices regarding IME installation and selection. Using session
information attached to each window instance by WindowManager, the Input Method Framework
(IMF) ensures that only the active activity can get access to the data being entered. Furthermore,
InputMethodManagerService ensures that all messages received from running IME
applications are from the current user. Importantly, this includes messages for changing IMEs (i.e.,
messages resulting from calls to InputMethodManager.setInputMethod()), which are guarded
with the token to ensure that they originated from explicit user selection. However, none of these
protections will help if the IME itself is malicious or compromised and the user selects it.
PINPOINTing the InputMethodManagerService provides an eective mechanism to shield
sensitive apps from falling victim to a malicious IME selected by a tricked user. Figure 5.9 shows
the PINPOINT concept applied to input methods. This is accomplished by using the our PINPOINT
service hypovisor prototype to virtualize InputMethodManagerService. In the figure, IMMS
corresponds to the “real” InputMethodManagerService (input_service), while IMMS ′ is a
second service (input_service_1), with an identical interface and features except for the fact
that it holds only a subset of all available IMEs.
As suggested in Section 5.3, there are additional complexities with virtualizing IMEs due to
dependencies with other objects in the system. Because of interactions with WindowManager
mentioned above, minor modifications to WindowManager are necessary so that it can be aware
of the all the InputMethodManagerService namespaces running and push updates about the
current activity to all of them. As with location service, this situation corresponds to dependent
resourceG in Figure 5.2. To enable independent InputConnection from each app’s
InputMethodManager instance to each service, we created a Java interface which all of the
125
Figure 5.8: Input method framework architecture.
InputMethodManagerService instances implemented.
A demonstration of IME namespaces is illustrated by Figure 5.10. Figure 5.10a depicts a non-critical
app, Eat St.,5 assigned to the global IME namespace, where any IME can be used, including a
representative untrusted IME, SwiKey.6 Here, the Choose input method dialog shows all installed
input methods. In contrast, the critical banking app, Chase Mobile,7 in Figure 5.10b has been
assigned to the alternate IME namespace in order to protect its data from possible malicious IMEs.
As shown, the chooser only allows selection of trusted IMEs, with SwiKey excluded due to the
alternate IME namespace isolation.
5.5.4 Sensor Service
Modern mobile devices have a rich set of environmental and motion sensors available to apps.
Unfortunately, the Android security architecture does not extend to most of these sensors, making
it all too easy for malware to utilize them to compromise user data entry [23,82], eavesdrop on
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Figure 5.9: PINPOINTing InputMethodManagerService.
(a) Non-critical app running in global IME
namespace, showing all input methods, in-
cluding a 3rd party ( 1©), as selection options.
(b) Critical banking app running in alternate
IME namespace, showing only built-in input
methods as selection options.
Figure 5.10: Non-critical and critical apps running in dierent IME namespaces.
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SensorService, we enable the user to take advantage of apps without needing to also trust their
handling of sensor data.
In the Android platform, apps may acquire sensor data by getting an instance of SensorManager,
which in turn accesses raw sensor data via SensorService, a native system service. SensorService’s
threadLoop() collects raw sensor data in a structured data buer of type sensor_event_t,
which is then returned to the app via its SensorManager’s SensorEventConnection. The buer
structure contains raw sensor data for each of the device’s sensors including acceleration,
magnetic, orientation, gyro, temperature, distance, light, pressure, and relative humidity.
To PINPOINT sensor resources, we followed the same general approach as with previous
examples, by adding two additional native SensorServices to the device, and registering themwith
ContextManager as sensorservice_1 and sensorservice_2. For demonstration purposes, we
hardcoded sensorservice_1 to overwrite the gyro, magnetic, and orientation structure
members of the buer structure with random data before it is returned to the app’s
SensorManager. Likewise, sensorservice_2 is hardcoded to overwrite only the light structure
member of the structure with random values. Structure members containing data from other
sensors are passed through unmodified.
With three possible sensor service handles on the device, SensorManagers of apps assigned to
one of the two alternate sensor namespaces are always given handles to sensorservice_1 or
sensorservice_2, depending on their assignment. To demonstrate the eectiveness of this, we
installed AndroSensor,8 a popular Google Play Store app, and ran it in each of the three sensor
namespaces. Figure 5.11 shows AndroSensor running in the global sensor namespace, with all
sensor traces steady, indicating a stable physical environment. In contrast, Figures 5.12a and 5.12b
show AndroSensor running in the alternate sensor namespaces of sensorservice_1 and




Figure 5.11: AndroSensor running in global sensor namespace showing normal traces for gyro ( 1©),
light ( 2©), magnetic ( 3©) and orientation ( 4©) sensors.
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(a) AndroSensor running in 1st alternative
sensornamespace showingnormal trace for
light sensor ( 2©), and random traces for gyro
( 1©), magnetic ( 3©) and orientation ( 4©) sen-
sors.
(b) AndroSensor running in 2nd alternative
sensor namespace showing normal traces
for gyro ( 1©), magnetic ( 3©), and orientation
( 4©) sensors, and random trace for light sen-
sor ( 2©).
Figure 5.12: AndroSensor running in alternative sensor namespaces.
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Table 5.4: Evaluation benchmarks used.
Name Version Workload type
Linpack 1.2.8 CPU
Quandrant Advanced Edition 2.1.1 File I/O
Quandrant Advanced Edition 2.1.1 2D & 3D
SunSpider 1.0.2 CPU & I/O
5.6 Evaluation
5.6.1 Performance
Evaluation of the overall performance impact of PINPOINTing services was accomplished with the
benchmarking tests shown in Table 5.4, with and without namespaces. For each benchmark,
performance under four dierent device configurations was measured: 0NS represents stock
Android without any PINPOINT capability or namespaces, while 1NS, 2NS, and 3NS represent
devices configured with one, two and three PINPOINTed services, respectively. Figure 5.13 shows
the average value of 10 runs of each benchmarking test.
The impact on memory of adding PINPOINTed services was also measured. Since each running
service represents additional threads within SystemServer, we measured VmSize of the
system_server process by reading its /proc/<pid>/status under each of the same four
configurations. Figure 5.14 shows the average value of 10 measurements of memory footprint for
each configuration.
5.6.2 Qualitative Assessment
Having described four representative PINPOINTed services, and measured overall system
performance impacts, we now recall the qualitative metrics related to eectiveness and eiciency
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(a) Average LINPACK CPUperformance score
vs. number of namespaces.
(b) Average file I/O performance score vs.
number of namespaces (Quadrant file I/O).
(c) Average file I/O performance score vs.
number of namespaces (Quadrant file I/O).
(d) Average browser performance score vs.
number of namespaces (SunSpider).
Figure 5.13: Benchmarking results for 0-, 1-, 2- and 3-namespace configurations.
Figure 5.14: Averagememory footprint in kB (VmSize) for 0-, 1-, 2- and 3-namespace configurations.
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Table 5.5: PINPOINT prototypemeasured against qualitative metrics related to eectiveness and ei-
ciency (L=low/small; M=medium/some; H=high/large).
Metric (best) PINPOINT Comparative Approaches
of [64] and [65]
Location Sub. Info. Input Method Sensor
Range of
threats (H)









H H H H H
Isolation
size (H)
L L L L H
Complexity
(L)
L L L L H
Transparency
(H)












H H H H M
introduced in Section 5.4, and assess the prototype against them. Table 5.5 shows these results.
5.6.3 Discussion
Performance evaluation results presented in Section 5.6 indicate that increasing numbers of
PINPOINTed services has a negligible eect on CPU, browser, and graphics performance. On the
other hand, data indicates a clear correlation between the number of PINPOINTed services and
file I/O. Decreases in this score with increasing numbers of namespaces is expected due to an
increase in policy file size and associated data structures being parsed and searched by
servicemanager during every service lookup request in order to support namespace
reassignments of running apps. In our current, unoptimized design, file I/O performance degrades
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by an average of 1.57% of the 0NS value for each additional namespace represented in the policy
file. Although this degradation is negligible for simple policy files, we feel that this is an area for
improvement. Future implementations will include an optimization of this code, and policy
options to configure how oen policy lookups are performed.
We also observed a growth in system_server’s memory size that is correlated to the the number
of additional service objects (i.e., namespaces) available for use in the system_server process.
On average, we observed this increase to be approximately 0.64% of the 0NS value per each
additional service. For a system with one additional IMEI namespace, two additional location
namespaces, one additional input method namespace, and two additional sensor namespaces,
system_serverwould have an approximately 3.84% larger memory footprint than the stock
process. Note that an unused namespace still consumes additional memory, but since it does not
add to the policy file, it will not contribute to file I/O degradation. This is another area target for
improvement in the future.
5.7 Future Directions
In our present work, we have gained a tremendous insight into the trade-o between isolation
design alternatives, system complexity, usability, convenience and eectiveness. We plan to
further quantify these relationships so that we can make informed choices when addressing the
high-level requirements typically stated by end-users. Ultimately, we plan to formalize the
PINPOINTmethodology, so that security designers can easily understand the trade space of
PINPOINT designs vs. general-purpose approaches.
Through our case study of implementing a services hypovisor, we’ve acquired a sense for the
diiculty of implementing a representative PINPOINT hypovisor and its companion virtual
resources within the Android Framework. Encouraged by our experiences, we plan to consider the
potential benefits of PINPOINTing other resources, including those outside the purview of Service
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Manager. Following from this, we envision implementing a container abstraction, whereby
multiple, heterogeneous PINPOINTs, Linux Namespaces, and other forms of access control and
virtualization can be easily combined by the end-user to form easily-understood security and
privacy macros such as “incognito,” “banking,” etc.
We recognize the inflexibility of having to define PINPOINTed resources at system build time. As
such, we see opportunities to investigate techniques for establishing new PINPOINTs while the
system is running. Also, we would like to evolve our current rudimentary means of policy
configuration into a more powerful and intuitive means for end-users to configure, combine and
use PINPOINTed resources, possibly through an advanced launcher interface.





This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 discusses previous work on security analysis
techniques and specific types security and privacy problems in Android, and compares these with
the contributions of Chapters 3 and 4. Section 6.2 compares the contributions of Chapter 5 with
prior work on resource protection, sensitive data protection, and privacy.
6.1 Security Analysis
Work on systematic security analysis was initially inspired by those who have reported on
confused deputies [89], [90], [91], [92], [93], [94], component hijacking [95], and capability leaks
[41], [96] in Android. However, these are dierent from the work presented here for two reasons.
First, their goal is to find and explain specific types of vulnerabilities rather than gaining an overall
understanding of how access control is implemented along paths between specific sets of
subjects and objects (Chapter 3), or within the modular resources themselves (Chapter 4). When
subject-object paths are checked, both eective as well as missing or ineective access controls
are uncovered. These missing or ineective controls may lead to one or more of the categories
studied in the previous work, but new categories are also uncovered because of the deliberate
choice to focus on subject-object combinations rather than a specific threat model.
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Second, the contributions of Chapters 3 and 4 include unique case studies that result in findings
dierent than previous work. The case study on the multiuser framework was described by a
reviewer as the only known at the time of publication, and this still appears to be the case at the
time of this writing. In fact, a fundamental dierence is that that all of the previous work focuses
on maliciousness among or by apps, while the multiuser work addresses potential maliciousness
among users. Several studies [97,98], [99], [100] have explored the use of motion sensors available
on smartphones to perform user activity recognition, while [22], [24], [23], [82], [25] have focused
on inferring user keyboard presses, icon taps and secure inputs using accelerometer and
gyroscope sensor. Nonetheless, these do not consider unauthorized use of these sensors by other
users of the device as done here. Finally, [101] and [102] present complete secure multi-user
architectures which may be able to solve some of the problems identified in Chapter 4.
Several works have contributed to finding security flaws and inconsistencies in Android. Kratos
[47] uses static analysis to find access control inconsistencies in System Services. The authors
define these as any condition where two entry points from the same image reach the same sink by
dierent paths, and the security checks along the two paths dier. As such, Kratos cannot find
missing access controls, or evaluate controls against special conditions such as user switching, as
Chapter 3’s methodology does. In addition, Kratos does not allow comparisons among dierent
images, as is the case with the dierential feature-based analysis of Chapter 4. Finally, Kratos
depends on costly static analysis of the entire code path between entry point and resource, in
contrast to the feature-based approach which favors rapid analysis as well as creation of a
comprehensive feature database that can support a variety of research inquiries.
Identification and evaluation of custom system configurations, including the addition of receivers
and custom permissions by device vendors is the subject of [46]. The authors extract features
from system and appmanifests and compare these to a baseline. Although similar in terms of the
feature-based approach of Chapter 4, the actual feature sets are quite dierent, as are the feature
extraction processes and portions of the system that are evaluated. Hence, the prior work and the
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work presented herein are complementary.
Problems with pre-loaded apps are addressed in several works [44,41,45]. As is the case with the
custom configuration work just discussed, these evaluations focus on the apps and their
configurations rather than the system code itself.
Hanging attributes are unused references that can be co-opted by malicious apps. [43] describes
a means to identify these in custom system images. At a high level, this is essentially a special case
of the feature extraction introduced in Chapter 4. However, the goal of Chapter 4 is to generate an
overall characterization of access controls to support a variety of inquiries, while this work is
specialized in identifying only hanging attributes. Nevertheless, the two contributions are
complementary in that they each provide important assessments of security within the system
itself.
The Linux kernel has been the subject of security analysis for many years. In 2000, [48] introduced
an automated compiler-based method that finds system-specific rule violations in source code.
Certain features of compiler error output are examined andmatched against a set of rules
designed to find security problems and other bugs. At a conceptual level, the features generated
by the compiler extensions have several similarities to the features described in Section 4.2.1. Each
are defined from domain knowledge through a feature engineering process. Each attempts to
capture salient information about the system in an eicient albeit lossy representation. Finally,
each is used to facilitate additional analyses necessary to make various conclusions about the
system. However, in addition to the obvious dierences between the Linux kernel and Android
Framework, which make the feature sets entirely incompatible, the features of [48] are specific to
finding particular bugs rather than providing a more general characterization of access controls as
described in Chapter 4. In addition, the compiler-based approach requires source code, while the
extraction process described in Section 4.2.2 is useful for proprietary vendor devices for which
source code is not available.
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Chou et al. and later Palix et al. used this compiler-based methodology to answer questions about
the nature of bugs in the Linux kernel [49,50]. They studied the location of bugs across dierent
subsections of the kernel, bug distribution properties, and bug clustering. At a high-level, this type
of analyses and characterization is similar to how the feature vectors are used in Section 4.2 to
study the nature of various Android System Services. They also performed dierential analysis
among dierent kernel versions to learn how long bugs live in a particular kernel and how
dierent kernels (e.g., OpenBSD vs Linux) compare. Again, at a high level, this is similar to the
vendor comparison discussed in Section 4.3. Thus, the feature database described in Section 4.4
could be used to answer similar questions about the Android codebase in future work.
Zombie features are kernel features which cannot be enabled or disabled at all because of
inconsistencies between the kernel implementation and its representation in the configuration
tool. [51] extracts features from C preprocessor blocks in kernel source and compares them with a
corresponding model generated from the kernel configuration tool to identify inconsistencies and
find zombie features. [52] maps configuration options to related source code files, enabling
identification of sources aected by a change to configuration options. Both of these techniques
could be applied to Android’s Linux kernel, and the results would complement the various
Framework analyses described here.
6.2 Resource Protection
A number of previous eorts have addressed the problem of untrusted apps having access to
sensitive or private information. Some of these address specific types of data, such as location,
while others look for more general solutions. These works can be classified into broad categories
of inspection, permissions, and isolation.
Approaches using inspection, including IPC Inspection [76], Quire [92] and TaintDroid [103], have
provided more access control and tracking of call chains, IPC messages, and information flows,
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respectively. Although these may identify or prevent privilege escalation and confused deputy
attacks among apps, they do not address an app’s direct access to resources it already has
adequate permissions for, as PINPOINT does. While TaintDroid can identify restricted information
flows, it has no provisions for preventing them.
AppFence [104] leverages TaintDroid monitoring to enable data substitution and blocking. For
information resources, such as location and IMEI, the resulting capability is similar to some of
PINPOINT’s basic namespaces. However, AppFence cannot control the semantics of functional
resources, such as we demonstrated with the input method namespace. Furthermore, AppFence’s
substitution and blocking capabilities aect information resources for the entire platform rather
than being selective for individual apps as is the case in the System Services case study.
Mr. Hide [105] added finer-grained permissions to apps by way of byte code rewriting, while APEX
[106] introduced context-sensitive run-time permissions. Compac [107] allows dierent
components within apps, such as in-app ads, to have dierent sets of permissions. The work of
Chapter 5 and other isolation approaches are fundamentally dierent from these, as the previous
work strives to enhance inadequate access control mechanisms, while isolation approaches use
virtualization to place untrusted apps in containers where sensitive or vulnerable resources are
simply not present, or exist with redefined semantics.
Previous work in the area of isolation includes MOSES [108], a framework designed to isolate
applications and data for the purpose of protecting sensitive corporate data. While MOSES
represents an eective general solution to securing corporate data leaks on mixed-use
personal/business devices, it is not very suitable for protecting users’ privacy or securing specific
resources because of its security profile-centric architecture that forces explicit switching and
carries performance penalties.
Two significant isolation approaches that influenced the PINPOINT eort tremendously are
Cells[65] and AirBag [64]. Cells leverages Linux Namespaces to allowmultiple Android user spaces
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to run simultaneously on a single hardware platform. Each user space, or virtual phone (VP), is
isolated in a combination of separate Linux Namespaces for file system paths (mount namespace),
process identifiers (pid namespace), IPC identifiers (System V IPC namespace), network interface
names (network namespace), user names (userid namespace), and hardware devices (a new
Linux namespace introduced in the work). Cells introduces the concept of a foreground and
multiple background phones that are isolated from each other so that malicious or buggy apps in
one VP cannot aect others. Isolation in Cells is thus achieved at the virtual phone boundary.
AirBag also leverages Linux Namespaces, but achieves isolation at the native runtime boundary.
This is accomplished by instantiating a separate app runtime that has virtually no interaction with
the original native runtime. Each isolated runtime contains its own copies of key service processes
and daemons, such as vold, binder and servicemanager that are launched in separate
namespaces as compared with the normal runtime. Thus, an untrusted app “sees” an entirely
dierent set of services, binder objects, file paths, etc. through the lens of its decoupled runtime.
The untrusted app cannot communicate with apps in dierent runtimes, and the system resources
it can view and control are completely dictated by the isolated runtime. Condroid[109] improves
on AirBag’s design by restoring binder communications via virtual binders and increasing
eiciency by enabling many System Services to be shared among runtimes instead of duplicated.
While Cells, Airbag and Condroid provide excellent general-purpose isolation, their designs are
complex, burden the system, and somewhat intrusive from the user’s point of view. For example,
all three require special modifications to numerous shared hardware drivers, duplication of
system processes and resources not related to the security goals, and introduce significant
usability restrictions. Although they leverage lightweight Linux Namespace isolation, key benefits
of Namespaces (Table 5.2) are lost when the Android Framework is added on top since many
fundamental aspects of Android’s open design are broken by the kernel-level isolation. Fixing
these problems greatly complicates the designs. Thus, PINPOINT’s main dierence from these
works is the deliberate choice not to provide a general-purpose solution, but rather one that
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addresses specific security goals by directly isolating the specific Framework objects associated
with the security goals. For these specific cases, PINPOINT is simpler, less burdensome, and more
usable.
Finally, as location data is widely viewed as having serious privacy implications, there are
numerous works specific to improving location privacy. LP-Guardian [110], LISA [111], and Koi [112]
are examples of these. While each is eective for controlling or preventing the use of location data,
they are not generally applicable to other resources as PINPOINT is. As the case study on
PINPOINTing System Services demonstrates, if the point of virtualization is chosen wisely, the
resulting isolation capability is flexible enough to apply to classes of resources rather than only




Understanding a system’s design tenets and use cases, as well as its security architecture and
implementation details, are important prerequisites to proposing useful improvements and
making soundmodifications. In the case of Android, its unique open architecture, emphasis on
usability, and scattered access control points make it very dierent from previously-seen systems.
In spite of its open source roots, gaining an understanding of Android security is diicult because
of the sheer complexity of the code base, as well as the fact that most Android devices in use run
customized, proprietary versions of the platform.
This dissertation introduces a simplified model of access control that can be used to
systematically analyze and understand access controls as they relate to dierent aspects of the
system. The systematic process was used in the first and only evaluation of Android’s multiuser
framework. This comprehensive evaluation uncovered a diversity of issues with the framework,
from simple access control omissions to pervasive problems calling into doubt the suitability of
the original architecture for supporting multiple users.
Although a labor-intensive manual investigation such as the one applied to the multiuser
framework may be fruitful, it is hardly suited to rapid assessment of the new Android versions that
appear every fewmonths, or the plethora of custom, closed-source images that are constantly
surfacing. Thus, the next part of the dissertation contributes an access control feature extraction
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technique which automates the characterization by way of static analysis libraries and database
techniques. Unlike other static analysis-based approaches, which typically slice the problem in
order to achieve great accuracy within a limited scope, the approach here trades o accuracy in
favor of a broad scope that can encompass entire subsystems of many images in a relatively short
time. The technique was applied in a case study of System Services from 19 real-world system
images. The resulting database of over 35,000 methods represents an interactive resource that
can be used to quickly identify and isolate problematic areas of a service or in vendor
customizations. The eicacy of the feature vector approach was demonstrated in a case study that
identified a number of real vulnerabilities and inconsistencies in actual images. It is hoped that
this database can be used by system designers as well as vendors to identify problems before new
images are released to users.
Finally, the insights gained enabled the development of a novel means to employ virtualization
and isolation to solve the problem of protecting sensitive resources and vulnerable services from
untrusted apps, while not diminishing Android’s open design and strong emphasis on usability
and performance. Known as PINPOINT, the hypovisor-based solution isolates only the minimum
necessary objects in order to achieve stated security goals. As a new system framework feature, it
allows problems not directly fixable by end-users, such as those mentioned above, to be
addressed in a flexible, lightweight way, without sacrificing usability or performance. The







Table A.1 contains the results of a manual parsing of Android documentation to extract
security-related statements. These statements were one of several sources that formed the basis
for the access control analysis described in Section 4.2. The following documents were included
(index corresponds to entries in “source index” column of table):
• 1.1: Security overview [113]
• 1.2: System and kernel security [114]
• 1.3: Application security [115]
• 1.4: Security updates and resources [116]
• 1.5: Security enhancements in Android 5.0 [117]
• 1.6: Security enhancements in Android 4.4 [118]
• 1.7: Security enhancements in Android 4.3 [119]
• 1.8: Security enhancements in Android 4.2 [120]
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Android Image Extraction Procedures
This appendix describes the procedures used in this research for extracting JARs and other system
files from Android image files. In general, it was found that every image is dierent, especially
among dierent commercial vendors that may use dierent formats or protection mechanisms.
Also, the tools used are u Thus, development of a fully-automated process is unlikely, unless the
goal is to process a large number of very similar images. However, it was also apparent that many
of the dierences disappear once the raw image is unpacked andmounted. The final processing
then becomes a matter of using the right tool depending on what type of files are present (OAT,
ODEX, DEX, JAR, etc.), which is almost entirely dependent on the version of Android (i.e., KitKat,
Lollipop, etc.).
B.1 AOSP, Android KitKat version 4.4.4
Extract the contents of the downloaded tar file (i.e., tar xz). Convert system.img using
simg2img, mount converted image to system folder, then system/framework contains the




sudo mount -o loop system.img system/
cd system




B.2 AOSP, Android Lollipop version 5.x
Extract the contents of the downloaded tar file (i.e., tar xz). Convert system.img using
simg2img, mount converted image to system folder, then system/framework/arm contains
boot.oat and framework ODEX files. Use dextra to extract DEX files from boot.oat and and
framework ODEX files, and dex2jar to convert framework ODEX files to JARs. NOTE: baksmali
probably will not work on ODEX files prior to version 56, which roughly corresponds to
Marshmallow [122]. Use dextra as below or alternate method in Windows.
simg2img system.img u-system.img
mkdir system








Alternate method of deodex: Use JoelDroid Lollipop Batch Deodexer [123] on system folder.
162
B.3 AOSP, Android Marshmallow version 6.x
Extract the contents of the downloaded tar file (i.e., tar xz). Convert system.img using
simg2img, mount converted image to system folder, then system/framework/arm contains
boot.oat and system/framework/oat/arm contains framework ODEX files. Use dextra to












B.4 CyanogenMod 11-20150901, Android KitKat version 4.4.4
Unzip the downloaded file. system/framework contains the framework JARs in DEX format. Use
baksmali, smali, and dex2jar to convert them to standard JARs.





B.5 CyanogenMod 12.1-20151121, Android Lollipop version 5.1.1
Unzip the downloaded file. Convert system.new.dat to system.img using sdat2img. Mount
image to system folder, then system/framework contains the framework JARs. Use baksmali,
smali, and dex2jar to convert them to JARs.
sdat2img system.transfer.list system.new.dat system.img
mkdir m-system
sudo mount -o loop system.img m-system/
cd m-system




B.6 Xiaomi MIUI, Android KitKat version 4.4.4
Unzip the download, system/framework contains the framework JARs. Use baksmali, smali,
dex2jar to convert them to JARs.





B.7 FireOS 32.4.6.5, Android KitKat version 4.4.4
Extracting the JARs from this image is problematic and not completely working. This version of
FireOS contains ODEX files coded as version 39, which is dierent than other KitKat images and
not supported by the Smali tools. Hexedit was used to rewrite the version field to 36, which
enabled baksmali to run, but it produced many errors. Inspection of the resulting JARs revealed
that they are incomplete and have many classed replaced with //INTERNAL ERROR. Otherwise,
the process is the same as other KitKat images.
Rename the .bin file to .zip and unzip. system/framework contains the framework JARs in DEX
format. Use a hexeditor to change the version fields to 36. Use baksmali, smali, and dex2jar to
convert them to standard JARs.
B.8 FireOS 37.5.2.2, Android Lollipop version 5.0.2
Rename the .bin file to .zip and unzip. Convert system.new.dat to system.img using
sdat2img. Mount image to system folder, then system/framework/arm contains boot.oat and
framework ODEX files. Use dextra to extract DEX files from boot.oat and and framework ODEX
files. dex2jar to convert framework ODEX files to JARs. NOTE: baksmali probably will not work
on ODEX files prior to version 56, which roughly corresponds to Android Marshmallow version 6.x
[122]. Use dextra as shown below or alternate method in Windows.
sdat2img system.transfer.list system.new.dat system.img
mkdir m-system









Alternate method of deodex: Use JoelDroid Lollipop Batch Deodexer [123] on system folder.
B.9 LG, Android KitKat version 4.4.2
Use LG Firmware Extract [lg_extract] on downloaded file to extract KDZ, DZ, and merge
system-bin into system.img. Mount system.img to system folder, then system/framework
contains the framework JARs and ODEX files. Use baksmali, smali, dex2jar to convert them to
JARs.
mkdir system
sudo mount -o loop system.img system/
cd system




B.10 LG, Android Lollipop version 5.x
Use LG Firmware Extract [lg_extract] on downloaded file to extract KDZ, DZ, and merge
system-bin into system.img. Mount system.img to system folder, then
system/framework/arm contains boot.oat and framework ODEX files. Use dextra to extract
DEX files from boot.oat and and framework ODEX files, and dex2jar to convert framework ODEX
166
files to JARs. NOTE: baksmali probably will not work on ODEX files prior to version 56, which
roughly corresponds to Android Marshmallow version 6.x [122]. Use dextra as below or alternate
method in Windows.
mkdir system








Alternate method of deodex: Use JoelDroid Lollipop Batch Deodexer [123] on system folder.
B.11 HTC RUU, Android Jellybean version 4.2.x
Get rom.zip from RUU exe file by either 1) running RUU in Windows, finding temporary location of
extracted rom.zip and copy it; or 2) use unruu [124] in Linux to extract rom.zip. Use ruuveal
[125] to decrypt rom.zip, then use standard methods to extract system.img, convert (if
necessary), mount. Finally, use the standard baksmali-smali-dex2jar toolchain to produce
JARs.
B.12 HTC RUU, Android KitKat and later versions
Unfortunately, KitKat and later ROMs from HTC use strong encryption and knownmethods, such




This appendix contains source code of the scripts written to capture the permissions and
associated protection levels from unpacked Android images. xtract_perms.py, shown in Listing
C.1, is run from the root folder of an unpacked image. It uses apktool to decode each APK found
in the image and store its manifest. Once all manifest files are found, xtract_perms_config.py
is called to search each manifest for permission names and their protection level. This combined








6 decode_dir = "./ apk_decode"
7 exclude = set(["WORKING"])





13 if not os.path.isdir(decode_dir):
14 raise
15
16 for subdir , dirs , files in os.walk(top , topdown=True):
17 dirs [:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in exclude]
18 for file in files:
19 #print os.path.join(subdir, file)
20 filepath = subdir + os.sep + file
21
22 if filepath.endswith(".apk"):
23 print ("Decoding: " + filepath)
24 out_dir = decode_dir + "/" + file
25 subprocess.call(["apktool", "d", "-s", "-o", out_dir , filepath ])
168
26
27 print "apktool finished; extracting permissions from manifest files ..."
28
29 fd = open("allpermsV2.txt", "w")






4 from xml.dom.minidom import parse
5 import xml.dom.minidom
6 import os
7 from os import path
8 import csv
9
10 # argv[1] is name of directory containing the manifest files
11 inputDir = sys.argv [1]
12
13 images = []
14 class Image():
15 name = ""
16 files = ""
17 def __init__(self , name):
18 self.files = []
19 self.name = name
20
21 for path , subdirs , filenames in os.walk(inputDir):
22 if not (path == inputDir):
23 image = Image(path)
24 for filename in [f for f in filenames if (f.endswith(".xml")) ]:
25 image.files.append(os.path.join(path , filename))
26 if not (path == inputDir):
27 images.append(image)
28
29 for image in images:
30 for filename in image.files:
31
32 try:




37 manifest = DOMTree.documentElement
38
39 permissions_m = manifest.getElementsByTagName("permission")
40
41 for permission_m in permissions_m:
42 name = ""
43 level =" -1" #"No Level Specified"
44 if permission_m.hasAttribute("android:name"):
45 name = permission_m.getAttribute("android:name")
46
47 if permission_m.hasAttribute("android:protectionLevel"):
48 level = permission_m.getAttribute("android:protectionLevel")
49
50 if (level == "signature") or ("Signature" in level)
or ("system" in level) or ("System" in level):
51 level = "3"
52 if level == "dangerous":
53 level = "2"
54 if level == "normal":
55 level = "1"
169




60 sys.stdout.write(’;’)  
170
Appendix D
Power Query Import Script
This appendix contains the PQFL script used to import a directory tree of feature vector CSVs into
Microso®Excel®. The root of the CSV filename is used to identify the System Service
corresponding to the feature vector content.
Listing D.1: PQFL script to import multiple feature vector CSV files into Microso® Excel® for analysis.

1 let
2 Source = Folder.Files("E:\CSVs"),
3 #"Removed Other Columns" = Table.SelectColumns(Source ,{"Content", "Name", "Folder Path"
}),
4 #"Reordered Columns" = Table.ReorderColumns (#"Removed Other Columns" ,{"Content", "Folder
Path", "Name"}),
5 #"Filtered Rows1" = Table.SelectRows (#"Reordered Columns", each true),
6 #"Split Column by Delimiter" = Table.SplitColumn (#"Filtered Rows1","Folder Path",
Splitter.SplitTextByDelimiter("\", QuoteStyle.Csv),{"Folder Path.1", "Folder Path.2"
, "Folder Path.3", "Folder Path.4"}),
7 #"Removed Columns" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Split Column by Delimiter",{"Folder Path.1",
"Folder Path.2", "Folder Path.4"}),
8 #"Split Column by Delimiter1" = Table.SplitColumn (#"Removed Columns","Name",Splitter.
SplitTextByDelimiter(".", QuoteStyle.Csv),{"Name.1", "Name.2"}),
9 #"Removed Columns1" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Split Column by Delimiter1",{"Name.2"}),
10 #"Renamed Columns" = Table.RenameColumns (#"Removed Columns1" ,{{"Folder Path.3", "IMAGE"
}, {"Name.1", "SERVICE"}}),
11 #"Add and Import" = Table.AddColumn(Source , "Custom", each Table.PromoteHeaders(Csv.
Document ([ Content],[Delimiter=",", Encoding =1252]))),
12 #"Removed Columns2" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Add and Import",{"Extension", "Date accessed
", "Date modified", "Date created"}),
13 #"Expanded Custom" = Table.ExpandTableColumn (#"Removed Columns2", "Custom", {"METHOD", "
is_AIDL", "getCallingUid(", "getCallingPid(", "clearCallingIdentity(", "
restoreCallingIdentity(", "checkPermission(", "checkCallingOrSelfPermission(", "
checkCallingPermission(", "enforcePermission(", "enforceCallingPermission(", "
enforceCallingOrSelfPermission(", "security_exception_raised", "permission_normal",
"permission_dangerous", "permission_sig", "permission_undef"}, {"Custom.METHOD", "





permission_normal", "Custom.permission_dangerous", "Custom.permission_sig", "Custom.
171
permission_undef"}),
14 #"Removed Columns3" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Expanded Custom",{"Attributes"}),
15 #"Split Column by Delimiter2" = Table.SplitColumn (#"Removed Columns3","Folder Path",
Splitter.SplitTextByDelimiter("\", QuoteStyle.Csv),{"Folder Path.1", "Folder Path.2"
, "Folder Path.3", "Folder Path.4"}),
16 #"Changed Type" = Table.TransformColumnTypes (#"Split Column by Delimiter2" ,{{"Folder
Path.1", type text}, {"Folder Path.2", type text}, {"Folder Path.3", type text}, {"
Folder Path.4", type text }}),
17 #"Removed Columns4" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Changed Type" ,{"Folder Path.1", "Folder Path
.2"}),
18 #"Renamed Columns1" = Table.RenameColumns (#"Removed Columns4" ,{{"Folder Path.3", "IMAGE"
}}),
19 #"Removed Columns5" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Renamed Columns1" ,{"Folder Path.4"}),
20 #"Filtered Rows" = Table.SelectRows (#"Removed Columns5", each [Custom.is_AIDL] = "1"),
21 #"Split Column by Delimiter3" = Table.SplitColumn (#"Filtered Rows","Custom.METHOD",
Splitter.SplitTextByDelimiter(",", QuoteStyle.Csv),{"Custom.METHOD .1", "Custom.
METHOD .2", "Custom.METHOD .3"}),
22 #"Changed Type1" = Table.TransformColumnTypes (#"Split Column by Delimiter3" ,{{"Custom.
METHOD .1", type text}, {"Custom.METHOD .2", type text}, {"Custom.METHOD .3", type text
}}),
23 #"Renamed Columns2" = Table.RenameColumns (#"Changed Type1" ,{{"Custom.METHOD .3", "METHOD"
}}),
24 #"Split Column by Delimiter4" = Table.SplitColumn (#"Renamed Columns2","Name",Splitter.
SplitTextByDelimiter(".", QuoteStyle.Csv),{"Name.1", "Name.2"}),
25 #"Changed Type2" = Table.TransformColumnTypes (#"Split Column by Delimiter4" ,{{"Name.1",
type text}, {"Name.2", type text }}),
26 #"Removed Columns6" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Changed Type2",{"Name.2"}),
27 #"Reordered Columns1" = Table.ReorderColumns (#"Removed Columns6",{"Content", "IMAGE", "
Name.1", "Custom.METHOD .1", "Custom.METHOD .2", "METHOD", "Custom.is_AIDL", "Custom.





permission_normal", "Custom.permission_dangerous", "Custom.permission_sig", "Custom.
permission_undef"}),
28 #"Split Column by Delimiter5" = Table.SplitColumn (#"Reordered Columns1","Custom.METHOD .1
",Splitter.SplitTextByDelimiter(" ", QuoteStyle.Csv),{"Custom.METHOD .1.1", "Custom.
METHOD .1.2", "Custom.METHOD .1.3", "Custom.METHOD .1.4"}),
29 #"Changed Type3" = Table.TransformColumnTypes (#"Split Column by Delimiter5" ,{{"Custom.
METHOD .1.1", type text}, {"Custom.METHOD .1.2", type text}, {"Custom.METHOD .1.3",
type text}, {"Custom.METHOD .1.4", type text }}),
30 #"Removed Columns7" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Changed Type3",{"Custom.METHOD .1.1"}),
31 #"Renamed Columns3" = Table.RenameColumns (#"Removed Columns7" ,{{"Custom.METHOD .1.2", "
METHOD TYPE"}}),
32 #"Removed Columns8" = Table.RemoveColumns (#"Renamed Columns3" ,{"Custom.METHOD .1.3", "
Custom.METHOD .1.4"}),
33 #"Renamed Columns4" = Table.RenameColumns (#"Removed Columns8" ,{{"Custom.METHOD .2", "
CLASSPATH"}, {"Custom.is_AIDL", "isAIDL"}, {"Custom.getCallingUid(", "getCallingUid"
}, {"Custom.getCallingPid(", "getCallingPid"}, {"Custom.clearCallingIdentity(", "
clearCallingIdentity"}, {"Custom.restoreCallingIdentity(", "restoreCallingIdentity"
}, {"Custom.checkPermission(", "checkPermission"}, {"Custom.
checkCallingOrSelfPermission(", "checkCallingOrSelfPermission"}, {"Custom.
checkCallingPermission(", "checkCallingPermission"}, {"Custom.enforcePermission(", "
enforcePermission"}, {"Custom.enforceCallingPermission(", "enforceCallingPermission"
}, {"Custom.enforceCallingOrSelfPermission(", "enforceCallingOrSelfPermission"}, {"
Custom.security_exception_raised", "securityException"}, {"Custom.permission_normal"
, "permissionNormal"}, {"Custom.permission_dangerous", "permissionDangerous"}, {"
Custom.permission_sig", "permissionSig"}, {"Custom.permission_undef", "
permissionUndef"}, {"Name.1", "SERVICE"}}),
34 #"Changed Type4" = Table.TransformColumnTypes (#"Renamed Columns4" ,{{"isAIDL", Int64.Type
}, {"getCallingUid", Int64.Type}, {"getCallingPid", Int64.Type}, {"
clearCallingIdentity", Int64.Type}, {"restoreCallingIdentity", Int64.Type}, {"
checkPermission", Int64.Type}, {"checkCallingOrSelfPermission", Int64.Type}, {"
checkCallingPermission", Int64.Type}, {"enforcePermission", Int64.Type}, {"
enforceCallingPermission", Int64.Type}, {"enforceCallingOrSelfPermission", Int64.
Type}, {"securityException", Int64.Type}, {"permissionNormal", Int64.Type}, {"




36 #"Changed Type4"  
173
Appendix E
AOSP System Service Pivot Analysis
This appendix contains the results of a pivot analysis of System Service feature vectors from
various versions of oicial “stock” AOSP images. Blank columns indicate either that the service is
not present in that particular version of AOSP, or that FeatureExtractionwas unable to process the
JAR/class for that image.
The Count of METHOD rows show the total number of AIDL methods in the service. Sum rows show
the total number of occurances of each feature among the AIDL methods. Sum of None reveals the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Vendor System Service Pivot Analysis
This appendix contains the results of a pivot analysis of System Service feature vectors from
various vendor images compared with AOSP baselines with a similar Android version. Blank
columns indicate either that the service is not present in that particular version of AOSP, or that
FeatureExtractionwas unable to process the JAR/class for that image.
Table entries show the total number of AIDL methods added or modified by the vendor for each























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This appendix provides a background on Linux Namespaces and the analysis of the traits which
oer value to Android security. These traits and values are used to support the design tradeos
discussed in Chapter 5 and are summarized in Table 5.2.
J.1 Background
Since their introduction to the mainstream Linux kernel beginning in 2002, Linux Namespaces
have enabled a form of kernel-enforced process-level virtualization, useful for isolating specific
resources within a single instance of the operating system. In contrast to hypervisor-based
approaches, Namespaces represent a lightweight, “only what’s needed,” approach to virtualizing
various aspects of a process’s environment. This container architecture is arguably more scalable
and eicient than full virtualization solutions [71] [70]. Practical uses for Namespaces include
resource sharing [67], checkpointing/migration, [68] vulnerability containment, and binary
isolation [126].
Simply put, namespaces allow dierent objects to have the same name. For example, the objects
“server1” and “server2” could both have the name “hostname” in dierent namespaces. In Linux,
the original motivation for including namespace support were the needs of virtual private servers
249
(VPS) and application checkpoint and restart (ACR) [68]. Six namespaces make up the current
Linux implementation discussed here:mount, hostinfo, System V IPC, pid, network, and userid.
Each of these orthogonal namespaces address a dierent aspect of the system which can be
virtualized for particular applications. They can be used in any combination or individually. Finally,
while the main feature of namespaces can be described as lightweight virtualization, namespaces
also represent a form of isolation since access to namespaces is controlled by the Linux kernel.
Creation andmanagement of Linux namespaces done through privileged system calls.
Namespaces are created andmanaged by way of three privileged system calls: clone(),
unshare() and setns(). clone() forks a new process into a new namespace, while unshare()
and setns() allow the calling process to leave and join other namespaces, respectively.
Configuration of each new namespace is specified using some twenty-two dierent CLONE_* flags
to identify the type, and how the caller’s execution context is to be shared.
Implementation of namespaces within the Linux kernel is accomplished by way of a proxy
structure of pointers, nsproxy. As namespace support was added to the kernel, system calls that
interact with namespace objects were rewritten to use this proxy rather than referencing objects
directly. Hence, one process’s nsproxymay point to dierent objects as compared with another’s.
From these two processes’ point of view, they are using the exact same name to reference the
object, but are given back dierent objects. The object returned is determined by the state of
nsproxy, which is out of the process’s control. In a sense, each process is isolated from other
objects with the same name in dierent namespaces. This isolation is immutable because the
redirection is enforced by the kernel, within the trusted computing base (TCB).
To illustrate this implementation, we use the hostinfo, or UTS1 namespace as an example. UTS
namespaces isolate two system identifiers returned by the uname() system call, namely
nodename and domainname. Prior to kernel version 2.6.19, these values were returned by reading
1This name derives fromUnix Timesharing System, abbreviated uts in the source code ofmany Unix-like operating
systems.
250
them from global kernel parameters, system_utsname.nodename and
system_utsname.domainname, respectively. As a result, these objects had the same values for all
processes. Beginning with the introduction of UTS namespace support in kernel version 2.6.19,
these values are read from a private kernel data structure, nsproxy. One member of nsproxy is a
pointer to a structure containing UTS namespace objects such as nodename and domainname.
Processes that have all the same namespaces share nsproxy, but it is copied and its pointers
changed when one of the namespaces is cloned or unshared. In this way, the nsproxy structure
enables the kernel to hold dierent objects (i.e., values) referenced with the same name (e.g.,
nodename, domainname) by dierent processes.
In userspace, namespace support adds a set of symbolic links in /proc/<pid>/ns, one for each
namespace supported. These links act as “handles” for processes to use to interact with the
namespaces. For example, the handles can be compared across two processes to determine if
they belong to the same namespace. Also, by passing a file descriptor for one of these links to
setns(), a privileged process may join the namespace [127].
J.2 Namespace Traits and Their Value to Our Work
With a modified Linux kernel at its heart, and resource constraints that may preclude full
virtualization, Android is a great candidate to take advantage of the benefits of Linux Namespaces.
In fact, recent versions supporting multiple users and restricted profiles leverage mount
namespaces to isolate each user’s external storage [35]. It is likely that future Android releases will
make further use of these facilities.
As mentioned earlier, our objective is not to isolate Framework objects using Linux Namespaces
themselves, but to develop a specific virtualization and isolation architecture that reflects the
same high-level benefits as Linux Namespaces. To do this, we conducted a systematic analysis to
extract a list of key traits and link these to specific benefits that our architecture should realize.
251
The following analysis is summarized in Table 5.2.
Trait 1: Namespaces virtualize and isolate specific resources on a per-process basis. Namespaces
provide a level of abstraction that wraps certain resources, allowing them to appear to be
dedicated to a particular process rather than globally shared [127][128]. These virtual
resources are isolated because the kernel controls which processes can join or leave a
namespace.
Value to our work: The fine granularity of namespace isolation allows each process to be
placed in a tailored virtual environment. Processes spawned by untrusted applications can
be presented with a surrogate or subset of sensitive, otherwise global resource(s), thus
making it impossible for the application to misuse the resource(s). This can be done
permanently for some applications or temporarily while trust is established during testing
and debugging [129].
Trait 2: Namespaces are resource-centric. When there is a specific resource that must be isolated,
namespaces are able to address the isolation directly, unlike coarse-grained approaches
such as platform virtualization.
Value to our work:Mobile device users are concerned with their privacy and personal data,
and typically think in terms of these high-level semantics rather than trying to understand
the details of why an application needs certain permissions and how granting that
permission could negatively aect them. At the same time, users want their applications to
work smoothly and provide the functionality they desire (but no more). By isolating
resources using semantics similar to the user’s point of view, namespaces relieve the user
from having to understand low-level access control mechanisms and the
permission-to-resource mappings. This translates to a high level of usability, not just for the
user’s configuration of namespaces, but also for the platform as a whole. Moreover, because
Android is based on an open architecture that facilitates and depends on a high level of
interaction among apps, isolating only certain critical resources preserves other
functionality without having to implement complex workarounds or inconveniencing the
252
user.
Trait 3: Namespaces are eicient. Linux Namespaces share a single kernel and operating system
instance [71][129]. As a result, isolation of a specific resource can be achieved with high
eiciency, and overall performance levels are nearly identical those without any isolation
[71][70][68][67]. Unlike isolation based on platform or application virtualization, there is no
extra startup time for a namespace [71].
Value to our work: By applying the namespace concept to high level semantics of the
Android Framework, we carry forward the eiciency advantages of the namespace concept.
Just as Linux Namespaces share a single kernel and OS instance, our namespaces share a
single Framework and runtime instance. In the constrained environment of a mobile device,
this is an extremely important trait.
Trait 4: Namespaces share by default. Namespaces provide strong isolation of certain resources
while permitting sharing of others [70][68][67] . This contrasts with isolation based on
coarse-grained platform or application virtualization where communication among
processes in dierent virtual machines is diicult, and may require modifications to either
applications or the virtual machines themselves.
Value to our work: Android is a platform designed around the fact that apps are closely
related andmust communicate in order to provide the best usability and eiciency. In fact,
most of the Android system itself uses these same channels for system-app and
system-system communications. Isolating resources by way of fine-grained namespace
virtualization at the Framework level preserves continued sharing of resources unrelated to
the isolated resource. Coarse-grained virtualization breaks many shared resources that have
nothing to do with the isolated resource.
Trait 5: Namespaces are transparent. Namespaces are transparent to the host system, as well as
to the applications inside them [71][68]. This means that processes running in a namespace
appear as normal processes to the host system, and the host system appears normal to an
application. The host system retains the full ability to monitor, analyze, and directly control
253
all processes, and the application need not be modified to run in the namespace. This is not
always the case with other forms of virtualization such as platform and application
virtualization. In the former, the host system loses visibility and control over the individual
processes running within the VM, and in the latter, the application may need to be modified
to account for unrepresented resources.
Value to our work: By applying the namespace concept to the Framework, a single Android
system and kernel retains full control over all applications, and apps do not need
modifications to work properly.
Trait 6: Namespaces have a small footprint Unlike many forms of platform and application
visualization, namespaces do not require persistent files or large binaries, and have a small
kernel footprint, making them lightweight [71][70][68][67].
Value to our work:Mobile devices are resource-constrained andmost users will become very
impatient with security features that consume storage or negatively impact performance. By
addressing only a specific, high-level resource, namespaces applied to the Framework can
be implemented with relatively fewmodifications to the Android system, and only a small
amount of memory consumed. This results in nearly zero impact on storage resources and
device performance. In addition, since mobile devices are usually subject to disadvantaged
or expensive communication links, the small footprint opens the possibility of practical
over-the-air (OTA) configuration or update.
254
Appendix K
Android servicemanager hypovisor code
This appendix contains the code added to
frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c to instantiate the
SystemServices hypovisor within the native servicemanager process. The code is explained in
Section 5.4.2.
Listing K.1: Modified do_find_service() function.

1 // Structure to hold records read from /etc/nspolicy.
2 struct nspace {
3 unsigned uid;
4 const char service [32];




9 uint32_t do_find_service(struct binder_state *bs, const uint16_t *s, size_t len , uid_t uid ,
pid_t spid)
10 {
11 struct svcinfo *si;
12
13 if (! svc_can_find(s, len , spid)) {
14 ALOGE("find_service (’%s’) uid=%d - PERMISSION DENIED\n",





20 * RATAZZI 7/14/2014
21 *
22 * Before calling find_svc (), we check /etc/nspolicy to see if this uid
23 * belongs to a namespace for the service requested. If so, we append the the




28 uint16_t *ns_val , *ns_s;




32 // Currently, we support two places for nspolicy to live: a system file in /etc, and a file controlled
33 // by CSRG’s SecureLauncher in that app’s data directory. The latter supercedes the former if present.
34 char filename1 [128] = "/data/data/com.syr.csrg.seclauncher/files/nspolicy";
35 char filename2 [128] = "/etc/ns/nspolicy";
36 char filename [128] = "";
37 unsigned int nfields = 3; // <uid> <service_name> <modifier>
38 unsigned int lineno = 0;
39 int nret;
40 struct nspace nsp [128];
41 bool nflag = false;
42
43 fd=fopen(filename1 , "r");
44 if (fd == NULL) {
45 fd=fopen(filename2 , "r");
46 if (fd == NULL) {
47 ALOGE("Unable to open %s or %s policy file: %d (%s)\n",
48 filename1 , filename2 , errno , strerror(errno));
49 } else {
50 strcpy(filename , filename2);
51 }
52 } else {
53 strcpy(filename , filename1);
54 }
55
56 if (fd != NULL) {
57 while(!feof(fd)) {
58 ++ lineno;
59 while(nfields == (nret = fscanf(fd, "%d %s %s", &nsp[lineno ].uid ,
60 &nsp[lineno ].service ,
61 &nsp[lineno ]. modifier))) {
62 if ((uid == nsp[lineno ].uid || (uid > 10000 && nsp[lineno ].uid == 99999)
)
63 && str16eq(s, &(nsp[lineno ]. service))) {
64 ALOGI("MATCH in do_find_service (’%s’ requested by uid/pid=%d/%d).
Adding ’_%s’",
65 str8(s, len), uid , spid , &nsp[lineno ]. modifier);
66 nflag = true;
67 len +=2;
68 ns_s = add_ns(s, &(nsp[lineno ]. modifier));






75 } else if (nret != EOF) {







83 si = find_svc(s, len);
84
85 if (nflag) ALOGI("check_service (’%s’) handle = %x\n", str8(s, len), si ? si->handle : 0)
;
86 if (si && si ->handle) {
87 if (!si->allow_isolated) {
88 // If this service doesn’t allow access from isolated processes,
89 // then check the uid to see if it is isolated.
90 uid_t appid = uid % AID_USER;






96 } else {
97 return 0;
98 }
99 }  
Listing K.2: add_ns() function.

1 /* **********************************************************************************
2 * RATAZZI 7/15/2014
3 *
4 * Function to concatenate the namespace value from namespace [] to the name in
5 * the original request.
6 *
7 * Pointers made this a royal pain and I was forced to use only 1 char for the
8 * namespace. I guess this is OK , ’cause even with only 1 char , we can have a
9 * lot of namespaces for each service. Maybe 36 or more , not counting special
10 * chars (are they allowed in service names ??).
11 */
12
13 const char *add_ns(uint16_t *x, uint16_t *ns)
14 {
15 static char buf [128];
16 unsigned max = 127;
17 uint16_t *p=buf;
18
19 if (x) {
20 while (*x && max --) {
21 *p++ = *x++;
22 }
23 *p++ = 0x5f; // "_"
24 *p++ = *ns++;
25 }
26 *p++ = 0;
27 return buf;
28 }  
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